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CHAPTER I. ISSUES, OBJECTIVES, AND METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
Fanning, be it of fish or corn, is an activity in which 
modifications of natural environments are undertaken for the 
purpose of enhancing flows of harvestable goods and services 
from nature and is to be distinguished from the case in which 
such goods and services are harvested directly as they occur 
(Shuize, 88). While the enhancement of given flows repre­
sents a beneficial outcome of environmental modifications, 
there may also be adverse consequences in the form of im­
paired flows of other goods and services and these impair­
ments may be of a temporary or permanent nature. As a case 
in point, and one to which this research is addressed, con­
sider agricultural farming and soil erosion. Environmental 
modifications undertaken for the purpose of increasing crop 
flows result in disturbances which have as a consequence the 
acceleration of soil erosion relative to natural or geologic 
rates. Soil loss almost invariably reduces soil productivity, 
an onsite effect of the farming activity, and also results 
in the pollution of water bodies, an offsite effect. The 
former represents an impairment of the ability of the soil 
resource to provide flows of crops in future periods while 
the latter effect diminishes flows of water-based goods and 
services. In addition, gully erosion can result in a loss of 
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acreages suitable for farming, the loss in this case being 
the productive services of the land. The dependency of the 
state of soil conservation and the state of water quality 
upon the rate of soil erosion makes the management of these 
resources conjoint to some degree. It is the purpose of 
this research to investigate issues in this conjunctive 
management problem. 
Background 
For much of this century, soil erosion has been a sub­
ject of interest as a consequence of the adverse effects 
of soil loss on soil productivity and the agricultural land 
base. As with many issues, the level of attention drawn by 
the problems resulting from cropland erosion has varied 
over the years. In the decade preceding World War II 
the erosion of croplands and the consequent damages were 
highly visible and lead to the widespread perception that 
measures to promote the conservation of soil resources were 
in the national interest. Federal legislation enacted 
in those years created the soil conservation policy structure 
which has been applicable in the nation to this day. In 
subsequent years, a number of factors, including techno­
logical developments in agricultural production, lessened 
the general level of concern for the conservation of soil. 
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But recently, erosion of cropland has again come to be 
viewed by many as an important threat to the nation's agri­
cultural production that requires attention. Further, 
there has in the last decade, emerged a substantial and 
growing concern for the adverse water quality impacts re­
sulting from cropland erosion. The geographic focal point 
of these concerns is the Corn Belt region of the nation. 
With renewed concern for cropland erosion, an interest 
has arisen in erosion control to promote both soil conser­
vation and water quality. Research has been directed toward 
gaining a better understanding of the physical processes of 
erosion, the impacts of erosion on crop production, the 
transportation of sediments, the water quality impacts of 
sediment, and the onsite control technologies. There 
remains, however, much additional basic research to be done 
in these areas. Economic research has also been stimulated 
by the rising interest in the onsite and offsite problems 
of soil erosion. In a recent article, Oscar Burt (20) 
observes that "... the economics of soil conservation has 
been a neglected subject in agricultural economics during 
the last two or three decades. The most obvious reason for 
this apparent lack of interest in the subject is the view 
that advances in technology have made soil resource per se 
of less consequence for agricultural production." Burt 
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further observes that "... topsoil was transformed by 
modern technology from primarily a stock resource into a 
largely renewable resource for the purpose of practical 
decision." It is clear that the subject of soil conser­
vation is again becoming one of interest, particularly in 
regard to the problems resulting from accelerated soil 
erosion. Examples of earlier analyses of the economics 
of soil management include Bunce's (18) volume on the 
subject published in 1942 and journal articles by Heady 
(48, 49) in the 1950s. While these and other 
contributions were, and remain, of considerable importance, 
particularly with respect to the implications of various 
agricultural institutions on soil management, they do not 
incorporate the advances in analytical methodology which 
began in the 1930s with the publication of Hotelling's (52) 
seminal paper on the economics of exhaustible resources. 
Recent analyses of the problem of soil erosion have been 
largely associated with nonpoint source pollution control 
planning efforts and have, as a consequence, focused on 
erosion control for water quality improvement rather than 
dealing with the issues of soil conservation. These include 
studies of farm level impacts (Boggess et al., 13; Boehlje 
et al., 12; McGrann, 68) ; watershed and riverbasin level 
impacts (Alt and Heady, 2; Miranowski et al., 71); regional 
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impacts, particularly in the Corn Belt (EPA, 111; Taylor 
and Frohberg, 100); and national impact studies (Crosson 
and Brubaker, 27; Wade and Heady, 118). 
There has been considerable support of applied re­
search in the area of soil erosion control and the control 
of other residuals by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) and the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA). 
The studies cited above are but a limited listing. There 
are, however, several common traits in such studies. First 
of all, these studies largely focus on the impacts of 
alternative public policies for controlling soil erosion, 
pesticide usage, and fertilizer usage on the actual levels 
of these quantities, on crop and livestock production, and 
on farm prices and/or income. There have been few attempts 
to ascertain or estimate, no less value, the actual water 
quality impacts of controls. Of course, a major problem 
in this area of research is the lack of data on the flow 
of residuals into water bodies or on the pollution damages. 
A second common trait of such studies is that they are 
performed within the framework of static linear programming 
models. The use of linear programming has gained widespread 
acceptance in the analysis of agricultural production and 
marketing decisions and also in the management of water 
quality. The problem with static linear programming models 
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is, however, that they ignore the future effects of soil 
erosion and thus any onsite costs or benefits arising from 
soil erosion control policies which occur in future periods. 
Further, the failure to incorporate the effect of erosion 
on productivity may result in misleading results concerning 
the effects of policy measures on agricultural production. 
An example of a recent paper which focused on soil 
conservation per se is Burt's article cited above. Burt 
develops a simple dynamic programming model of wheat pro­
duction in the Palouse region of the Northwestern portion 
of the country. In this model, Burt includes two state 
variables; the depth of topsoil and the organic matter 
content of the soil. While Burt does not develop the con­
ceptual framework of the model in any detail, the approach 
taken suggests the following viewpoint of the problem of soil 
management; As a composite natural resource, a soil can be 
described at points in time by a state vector, the elements 
of which are measurements on the various natural resource 
stocks which together form the composite. Associated with 
this state vector is a system of equations of motion which 
describe the behavior of the state vector in response to 
those internal and external forces acting upon the soil 
over time. The soil being so described, the soil manage­
ment problem can then be described as one of determining 
the path of the soil state vector which maximizes an 
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appropriate criterion function. This description of the 
problem is one which is highly conducive to useful 
analysis, both at the conceptual and applied levels, of the 
soil management problem and clearly in accord with the 
modern theory of natural resources management. Of course, 
a complete description of the soil resource state vector 
and the system of equations of motion would be an enormously 
difficult problem given the complexity of the resource. 
However, as in Burt's endeavor, appropriate abstractions 
can advance the understanding of particular problems. 
The Objectives and Methodology 
The soil management problem is clearly a problem in 
the management of natural resource stocks and the stock of 
particular importance when considering erosion is soil 
depth. There has, however, been little consideration of the 
economics of managing this stock and soil erosion at the con­
ceptual level. Good applied economic analysis requires a 
sound theoretical foundation and, thus, one objective of 
this analysis is to draw upon the analytical techniques 
that have been developed in natural resources production 
literature to consider the problem of soil erosion. This 
analysis offers the basis for an empirical analysis of 
erosion and erosion control that is also pursued. In 
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addition, it facilitates an understanding of the determina­
tion of erosion in markets and why markets may fail to yield 
rates of erosion that are considered optimal or efficient. 
It also facilitates an understanding of appropriate policy 
measures to achieve efficient levels of erosion. The 
failure of water quality damages to be priced offers one 
basis for expecting cropland erosion to be suboptimal and 
emphasis is given in this analysis to this source. Here, 
the theory of environmental policy is drawn upon to consider 
alternative policy measures. It is to be noted that in 
this analysis the endeavor is not to develop new results, 
but is, instead, to extend the theory explicitly to the 
problems at hand, this being something which has not yet 
been done and which is considered useful not only to provide 
a theoretical foundation for this research but, also, to pro­
vide for the rational and objective analysis of the onsite 
and offsite problems of cropland erosion. 
The remainder of the research is devoted to an empirical 
analysis of soil erosion and its control in the Four Mile 
Creek watershed of Tama County, Iowa. Four Mile Creek is a 
tributary of Wolf Creek which is a small tributary of the 
Cedar River. The Iowa-Cedar Rivers Basin is of interest 
because it lies in the heart of the Corn Belt and because 
of the land and water resource problems experienced within 
it, the most important of which have been identified as being 
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associated with cropland erosion (USDA, 107). The Iowa River 
has been the subject of several economic analyses of soil 
erosion and its control, the most notable among these being 
those of Alt and Heady, and of Miranowski et al. (71). Both 
utilized static linear programming models to consider im­
pacts of erosion control policies. While neither of these 
two studies analyzed damage costs, Boggess et al. (14) 
expanded the Alt and Heady model by incorporating damage 
cost estimates for the Iowa River. 
Several objectives are pursued in the empirical analysis 
of this research. One is to contribute to the advancement 
of the applied economic analysis of soil management prob­
lems; specifically, to the management problems arising as a 
consequence of cropland erosion. This objective is pursued 
by developing a model of soils management in the Four Mile 
Creek watershed to consider how a present value maximizing 
economic planner would manage agricultural production in the 
area which can be solved by readily available and efficient 
computational techniques but which properly treat the prob­
lem in a dynamic context. The model is solved for specified 
assumptions concerning agricultural price expectations and 
the rate of discount to consider the production patterns 
which would emerge and the planner's responses to the effect 
of soil erosion on the productive capacity of the soils. 
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A second objective of the empirical analysis is to consider 
the net social losses which occur as a consequence of the 
failure to abate erosion where these losses arise as a 
consequence of the water quality damages resulting from 
flows of sediment into streams and reservoirs. This ob­
jective is pursued by estimating damage costs associated 
with the solutions obtained above. The damage cost esti­
mates are based upon the assumption that marginal damage 
costs are invariant with respect to the level of residuals 
flows at points in time and over time. The marginal damage 
cost figures are hypothesized values based upon estimates 
available in the literature. The results from the analysis 
provide a basis for considering the severity of the water 
quality damages resulting from cropland erosion in the water­
shed. The final major objective of this analysis is to 
evaluate several alternative policies for improving water 
quality by controlling cropland erosion. The basis for 
evaluation is the diminution in the net present value of 
agricultural production in the watershed resulting from 
the pursuit of the policies. The estimates of these 
losses are obtained by application of the dynamic model of 
crop production in the study area and in evaluating policy 
options within this context an additional objective; this 
being the advancement of the applied economic analysis of 
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cropland erosion control, is pursued. The results of this 
component of the research will contribute to the economic 
evaluation of policies for water quality improvement by 
soil erosion control. 
The Study Area 
The Four Mile Creek area has been selected because it 
is small enough to allow a relatively detailed analysis 
without requiring a very-large scale model, while having a 
set of soils with a range of erosion problems sufficient to 
allow the generation of interesting results. Further, rela­
tively good production data is available for the watershed. 
Four Mile Creek has been the subject of EPA funded research to 
develop data for erosion control policy development. This 
research has involved several relevant disciplines and 
among the objects of the project was the development of an 
economic model of the watershed for policy analysis with a 
sound foundation on basic knowledge. Unfortunately, the 
project has been terminated and, while useful data has been 
generated, there remains much to be done before such a model 
could be developed. 
The Cedar River originates in south-central Minnesota 
and drains an area of 7,819 square miles (USDA, 107). The 
Wolf Creek drainage area contains 238 square miles and the 
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study area contains approximately 19 square miles. A study 
of the basin found the predominant land use to be agri­
cultural with seventy-nine percent of the land allocated to 
agricultural use in recent years. The principal agricultural 
land use in the northern two-thirds of the basin, including 
the study area, is cash-grain farming with the major crops 
being corn and soybeans. The principal agricultural land 
use in the remaining area is livestock production. A 
detailed description of the study area is available in 
Miranowski et al. (71). 
Organization 
Chapter II provides an overview of the problems and 
processes of cropland erosion which facilitate an under­
standing of the analysis in subsequent chapters by intro­
ducing certain relevant technical information and by placing 
the cropland erosion problems into a broader perspective. 
Chapter III is devoted to the conceptual analysis of crop­
land erosion and erosion control. The dynamic linear pro­
gramming model of crop production in the watershed is pre­
sented in Chapter IV and in Chapter V the results from the 
applications of the model are presented and discussed. The 
final chapter provides a brief summary of the research and 
the conclusions obtained. 
I 
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CHAPTER II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEMS AND 
PROCESSES OF CROPLAND EROSION 
Water and Wind Erosion of Soils 
Erosion is the wearing away of land surface by wind, 
water, ice, and other geologic forces, and by processes such 
as gravitational creep. The rate of erosion which is natural 
to an area is known as the geologic rate and depends upon 
climate, vegetation, slope, and soil materials primarily. 
The geologic rate will vary from location to location as 
these factors vary. Further, the rate will vary over time 
in a given location with changes in the primary determinants. 
Included in considerations of the geologic rate, however, 
are natural catastrophes such as floods and landslides which 
cause dramatic changes in the geologic rate. Accelerated 
erosion of soil is the result of human activities which in­
crease soil exposure, such as tillage, logging, and over­
grazing, and cause the erosion rate to be in excess of the 
geologic rate. Both geologic and accelerated erosion rates 
can vary from virtually zero to quite substantial magni­
tudes . 
The two major forces at work in soil erosion are wind 
and water. The principal forms of water erosion are sheet, 
rill, gully, and streambank erosion. With sheet erosion, a 
thin layer of soil is removed from a field as raindrops 
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detach particles which are then transported by runoff water. 
Rill erosion occurs as runoff water concentrates to create 
small channels in the field, soil loss occurring along the 
bed and edges of these channels. The channels created by 
rill erosion are easily obliterated by normal tillage 
operations, and, in the long-run, the effects of smoothing 
rills by field operations is to cause rill erosion to be 
similar to sheet erosion. Gully erosion occurs as the 
channels become so large that normal tillage operations 
will not destroy them. While sheet, rill, and gully erosion 
are associated with rainfall events, streambank erosion need 
not be so associated. Streambank erosion is a consequence 
of the action of streamflow on the bed and banks of the 
stream. 
In order to predict sheet and rill losses from culti­
vated fields in the area of the United States east of the 
Rocky Mountains, Wischmeir and Smith (125) developed a gross 
soil loss prediction model known as the Universal Soil Loss 
Equation (USLE). This equation predicts the amount of soil 
which will be detached and transported within a field on the 
average during a year. The soil may be completely removed 
from the field, or it may be redeposited in depressions, 
grassed waterways, or other parts of the field. The 
equation is ; 
A = R'K'L'S'C'P 
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where ; 
A = Average gross soil loss (tons per acre); 
R = Rainfall-and-runoff factor; 
K = Soil-erodibility factor; 
L = Slope-length factor; 
S = Slope-gradient factor; 
C = Gropping-management factor; 
P = Erosion-control and support-practice factor. 
The rainfall factor (R) summarizes the erosivity of 
rainfall events in a given location during an average year. 
The soil-erodibility factor (K) is determined by properties 
of given soils which influence the erosion potential or 
hazard of the given soil. The product of R and K is the 
quantity of soil which would be lost in a field that is 
72.6 feet long and has a nine percent slope when that field is 
continuously fallow and tilled. Slope length is the hori­
zontal distance from the point of origin of overland flow 
to where the runoff water enters a defined channel or water­
way or to where slope decreases to an extent such that 
sediment deposition begins. With increased slope length, 
runoff accumulation and thus soil loss per unit of area 
increases. Increases in the slope of land increase runoff 
velocity which increases the ability of runoff to detach and 
transport soil particles. The slope-gradient factor (S) is 
to account for the influence of the steepness of the slope. 
The product of the slope-length and slope-gradient factors 
is the ratio of soil loss per unit of area on a given field 
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to the loss that would occur from a field having a nine 
percent slope that is 72.6 feet long. 
The product of R, K, L, and S is the estimated average 
gross soil loss from a continuously fallow field which is 
tilled. This figure is adjusted downward by the cropping-
management factor and the erosion-control and support-
practice factor. The erosion-control and support-practice 
factor (P) is the ratio of soil loss with a practice to the 
loss with uphill and downhill culture. Erosion-control and 
support-practices include contour tillage, contour strip-
cropping, and terrace systems. The cropping-management factor 
(C) is the ratio of soil loss in a field cropped and managed 
in a specified fashion to soil loss in a continuously 
fallow and tilled field. The C factor adjusts for the 
complex and diverse influences of crops, crop sequences, 
residue management, tillage practices, and other cropping 
and management considerations, while the P factor adjusts 
for supporting actions undertaken to reduce the velocity 
of runoff. 
Table 2.1 presents data on sheet, rill, and wind 
erosion in the forty-eight contiguous states in 1977. The 
highest regional average rates of sheet and rill erosion 
are seen to have occurred in the Appalachian, Delta, and 
Corn Belt states, but the greatest volume of soil losses 
Table 2.1. Erosion from cropland in the United States in 1977 (USDA, 108) 
Wind Sheet & Rill TOTAL 
Region Amount (mill, 
tons) 
Tons 
per 
acre 
Amount 
(mill, 
tons) 
Tons 
per 
acre 
Amount 
(mill, 
tons) 
Tons 
per 
acre 
Percent of Total 
Erosion Croplai 
NATION 891 2.1 1,908 4.7 2,799 6.8 100 100 
Northeast ^ a n.e. 82.9 5.0 82.9 5.0 3.0 4.0 
Lake States n.e. 117.5 2.7 117.5 2.7 4.2 10.7 
Com Belt n.e. 688.3 7.7 688.3 7.7 24.6 21.8 
Iowa n.e. 261.3 9.9 261.3 9.9 9.3 6.4 
Northern Plains 212.3 2.2 322.4 3.4 534.7 5.6 19.1 22.9 
Appalachia n.e. 186.3 9.0 186.3 9.0 6.7 5.0 
Southeast n.e. 111.0 6.3 111.0 6.3 4.0 4.2 
Delta n.e. 154.9 7.3 154.9 7.3 5.5 5.1 
Southern Plains 488.8 11.6 141.4 3.4 630.2 15.0 22.5 10.2 
Mountain 190,3 4.5 70.8 1.7 261.1 6.2 9.3 10.2 
Pacific n.e. 31.9 1.4 3.19 1.4 1.1 5.6 
^n.e. means not estimated. 
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are indicated to have occurred in the Northern Plains and 
Corn Belt states. The USDA (108) has estimated that 
state average sheet and rill erosion rates of cropland 
in 1977 in the nation ranged from a low of 0.04 tons per 
acre per year in Nevada to a high of 14.1 tons per acre 
per year in Tennessee while in the Corn Belt states 
these rates ranged from 3.6 tons per acre per year in 
Ohio to 11.4 tons per acre per year in Missouri with the 
average being 7.7 tons per acre per year. Iowa had the 
second highest state estimated average rate in this region 
of 9.9 tons per acre per year, but had the greatest volume 
of soil lost. Further, Iowa had the most cropland of any 
state with estimated sheet and rill erosion rates exceeding 
the amount of five tons per acre per year. 
Unlike sheet and rill erosion, there exists no 
generally applicable model for estimating gully erosion 
rates. There are, however, methods which can be used to 
estimate gully erosion rates for given localities and using 
such methods, the USDA (105) estimated total gully erosion 
from all nonfederal land in Iowa in 1977 to be 44,211,188 
tons. Given 38,844,000 acres of nonfederal land in the 
state in that year, this implies an average gully erosion 
rate of 1.14 tons per acre. The data do not give gully 
erosion for cropland, but assuming that the average crop­
land gully erosion rate is equal to the state average woul^ 
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imply cropland gully erosion to have been 30,107,000 tons 
or approximately 11.5 percent of the total sheet and rill 
erosion estimated for 1977. It is implied by these 
figures that gully erosion is considerably less than sheet 
and rill erosion. This result is generally true for most 
humid areas and it would be reasonably assumed that gully 
erosion in Iowa cropland is generally about ten percent of 
cropland sheet and rill erosion (EPA, 114; Glymph, 43; 
Wade and Heady, 118). 
Wind erosion occurs when the energy of wind is suffi­
cient to detach and transport soil particles. A model of 
potential annual soil loss to wind erosion in tons per 
acre per year has been developed by Skidmore and Woodruff 
(89) for the Great Plains States. The model does not per­
form well for areas outside this region, however (USDA, 
108). The nature of this model will not be detailed here 
since wind erosion is not generally a severe problem in 
the Corn Belt states and because of the limits on its 
applicability. The USDA (108) has compiled estimates of 
wind erosion in the Great Plains States (Colorado, Kansas, 
Montana, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
South Dakota, Texas, and Wyoming) these being those in 
which wind erosion represents a significant problem. The 
range of wind erosion rates of cropland estimated for 1977 
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in these states is from a low of 1.25 tons per acre per 
year in Nebraska to a high of 14.9 tons per acre per year 
in Texas. The most severe wind erosion problems occur in 
New Mexico and Texas. Estimated wind erosion for crop­
land in New Mexico for 1977 is 11.5 tons per acre per year. 
In Colorado, the estimate is 8.9 tons per acre per year, 
but in the remaining Great Plains states, the estimates 
are below five tons per acre per year. 
Crop Production Impacts of 
Soil Erosion 
The impacts of soil erosion are commonly divided into 
onsite impacts, these being composed of damages to the soil 
and land where the erosion occurs, and offsite impacts, 
these being composed of the effects of sediments deposited 
on land or in water resources other than those held by the 
economic agent upon whose land the sediments originated. 
There are several onsite impacts of interest (Beasley, 
11; Troeh et al., 101). Erosion results in loss of top 
soil, loss of plant nutrients, and textural and structural 
damages to the soil which generally diminish the productive 
capacity of the soil. The effects upon crop yields depend 
most crucially on the relative properties of the top-
soil and subsoil. If the subsoil is more fertile than the 
top soil, a rare but existent condition, then soil loss may 
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actually be beneficial. However, the usual case is where 
the properties of the subsoil are less conducive to crop 
production. In some cases, the productive capacity of a 
soil may be totally destroyed by soil loss because the root 
zone is lost for soils that are shallow to bedrock. Erosion 
can also diminish the agricultural land base as gully erosion 
diminishes the cultivatable land area and as soil erosion 
results in depletion of soil depths. A further effect of 
erosion on the soil is to increase the erosivity of the 
soil as soil texture is deteriorated. Finally, the textural 
and structural damages to the soil can result in increased 
production costs as seed-bed preparation and other field 
operations are hindered by the damages to the soil and 
also as field time is increased by the dissection of fields 
by gullies. 
Agronomic research has focused on the productivity 
impacts of accelerated erosion as has public interest. The 
essential property of soils which has received the greatest 
attention in such research is soil depth. One statistic 
of interest developed by agronomists is the "Soil Tolerance 
Value" or "T value'" of soils, this being defined as the 
maximum amount of loss per acre per year of soil that will 
permit a high level productivity to be sustained economically 
and indefinitely. The concept was originally suggested by 
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Stamey and Smith (96). Smith and Stamey (91) report 
values ranging from 0.5 tons per acre per year to 6.0 tons 
per acre per year, but recently the Soil Conservation 
Service (SCS) has established a maximum of 5 tons per acre 
per year. There are a number of agronomists, however, who 
consider values within this range to be excessive, one 
reason being that soil formation rates from consolidated 
materials is no more than 0.5 tons per acre per year 
(Larson, 64). 
Table 2.2 presents data on sheet and rill erosion in 
excess of soil tolerance in the United States, exclusive of 
Alaska and Hawaii for 1977. Of the 413.1 million acres of 
cropland in the forty-eight contiguous states in 1977, 
27.28 percent of these acres had sheet and rill erosion 
rates in excess of the T values for those acreages. The 
area with the greatest number of acres with erosion rates 
in excess of the T value was the Corn Belt. Nearly fifty 
percent of all Iowa cropland experienced sheet and rill 
erosion in 1977 at rates in excess of the T values for those 
acreages. . What this data indicates is the amount of land 
on which long term productivity losses may be expected if 
conditions present in 1977 are maintained. The problem 
with T values, even if correctly determined, is that they 
yield no information useful for economic analysis. Such 
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Table 2.2. Cropland erosion in excess of T values in 1977 
(USDA, 108) 
Area 
Acres of cropland with sheet and rill 
erosion in excess of 
T value (10° acres) 
Appalachian 9.5 
Corn Belt 38.1 
Iowa 12.3 
Delta States 12.4 
Lake States 7.3 
Mo Vint ai n 3.5 
Northeast 6.0 
Northern Plains 16.2 
Pacific 1.5 
Southeast 7.7 
Southern Plains 10.5 
112.7 
information must provide for estimation of just how pro­
ductivity behaves with soil loss under specified conditions. 
There have been a number of studies which have considered 
the effects of erosion on soil productivity and the evi­
dence suggests that losses of 0 to 6 bushels per acre may 
occur with each inch of topsoil lost (USDA, 108). At an 
erosion rate of 10 tons per acre per year, it will, as a 
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rule of thumb, take approximately fifteen years to lose one 
inch of topsoil. However, the existing state of agronomic 
knowledge is insufficient to provide precise data on the 
effects of soil loss on crop yields for varying factor 
input levels for given soils. This represents a severe 
data problem in efforts to assess the seriousness of erosion 
losses. 
The Offsite Impacts of Soil 
Erosion 
The offsite impacts of water erosion occur as runoff 
water moves eroded soil particles from the field which are 
then deposited on land or in water. When deposited on 
cropland, sediments may result in the destruction of the 
current crop, and if these sediments are less fertile than 
the soil upon which they are deposited, then deposition may 
diminish soil productivity. However, the deposition of 
sediments on land is not invariably adverse in its impacts 
and in some cases can be quite beneficial. In recent years, 
the focus.of national concern has been upon the adverse 
impacts of sediment deposition in water and these will be 
the subject here. 
The sedimentation of water bodies is a two-step process. 
The first step is soil erosion which has been discussed above. 
The second step is the transportation of soil to water bodies. 
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Erosion results as soil particles are detached by raindrop 
splash and as a consequence of the action of runoff water. 
Some particles may be moved from the site to receiving 
waters during a particular storm while others may be moved 
from the site to be deposited en route or may simply be 
moved from one part of the field to another. Thus, the 
delivery of sediments during any particular storm will be 
some fraction of the amount of gross erosion. However, the 
"play fairs" law suggests that sediments deposited in con­
centrated flow channels will,after many storms, ultimately 
be moved into streams and lakes (EPA, 112). The ratio of 
sediment.delivered or sediment yield at a given location 
in a stream system to the gross erosion of the drainage 
area above that point during a specified period is the 
sediment delivery ratio. Factors influencing this ratio 
include those factors determining gross soil erosion, the 
size of the drainage area and particularly the implication 
of size on the distance of transport, the texture of the 
eroded soil, the relief of the drainage area, the sediment 
transportation systems within the area, and the locations of 
deposition within the area (EPA, 106). In general, the 
greater the distance required for delivery, the greater the 
opportunities for deposition en route. The finer the 
texture of the eroded soil, the greater will be the sediment 
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delivery ratio relative to that for coarser textured soils 
since the former tend to stay in suspension for a greater 
amount of time. High watershed relief-to-length ratios 
have been shown to be associated with higher delivery 
ratios. Further, the efficiency of the sediment trans­
portation systems within the watershed has a substantial 
effect upon delivery ratios. 
Simple models of sediment delivery from sheet and rill 
erosion involve multiplying the USLE by a sediment delivery 
ratio (EPA, 114). However, the USLE was not developed to 
predict single-event storm losses of soil, and sediment 
delivery is insufficiently understood to have any substantial 
confidence in its use at present. Alternative models in­
volve statistical methods for prediction such as that de­
veloped by Glymph (43) and modifications of the USLE such 
as the Williams (123) model. This area of research, as 
with many others related to cropland soil and erosion and 
the onsite and offsite impacts resulting, is one in which 
there remains much research to be done. 
Once the sediment has reached the stream, it may be 
transported within the stream as bed load or suspended 
load (Johnson and Moldenhauer, 57). The amount of sediment 
carried downstream to a given point need not equal, however, 
the amount introduced. For example, flooding may result in 
the deposition of some proportion back on the land. 
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Alternatively, stream flow characteristics may result in 
sediments being deposited in areas along the stream bed. 
The ratio of sediment yield in a watershed to the amount of 
sediment transported to a given point is the sediment trans­
portation ratio. 
There are numerous impacts of sediment in water, some 
resulting from sediment accumulation over long periods of 
time, others being a consequence of current sediment loads. 
These impacts occur as a consequence of sediments diminishing 
the capacities of water bodies, settling out on the bottoms 
of water bodies, increasing the turbidity of waters, and 
as a consequence of chemical substances which have been 
absorbed by sediments (EPA, 112). Sediments may reduce the 
capacity of stream and other channels, lakes, reservoirs, 
harbors, and coastal areas. Diminution of stream channel 
capacity can increase flooding and hamper boat traffic while 
reduction in the capacity of other channels, for example, 
irrigation channels, may reduce the flow of services from 
these as well. Sedimentation of lakes and reservoirs will, 
unless they are dredged, reduce the life and capacity of 
such. Lakes and reservoirs provide many kinds of services, 
including flood control, power generation, recreation, and 
water supply. Sedimentation of harbors is a long and per­
sistent problem in the United States. Turbidity can reduce 
the quality of water for drinking, cleaning, and recreation. 
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as can the association of chemicals with sediments. By 
reducing light transmission in water and dissolved 
oxygen levels, sediments can adversely affect aquatic 
plant and animal habitats. Further, high levels of sus­
pended sediments can kill fish outright and the settling 
of sediments on spawning beds can destroy the fish eggs. 
Table 2.3 presents estimates of the relative contribu­
tion of various sources to sediment yields in the United 
States in 1977. These data suggest agricultural activities 
to be clearly the most important source. Table 2.4 presents 
data on sediment delivery for various regions of the United 
States for 1977. These estimates suggest that problems 
arising from cropland erosion may be particularly severe 
in the Corn Belt states. 
While there are some instances of point source water 
pollution from agriculture, agricultural production activi­
ties generally result in nonpoint source pollution. Non-
point sources have been shown by the General Accounting 
Office (115) to account for over half of all pollutants 
entering the nation's waterways in recent years and it was 
noted in the same study that unless nonpoint sources are 
brought under control, the 1982 "fishable and swimmable" 
water quality standards set forth by Congress in the 1972 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments will be un­
obtainable. Data given in Table 2.5 show that agriculture 
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Table 2.3. Percentage contribution to total sediment flow 
by source (USDA, 108) 
Sediment source Contribution (percent) 
Cropland 
Streambanks 
Pasture and rangeland 
Forest lands 
Urban 
Roadsides 
Mining 
Other 
40 
26 
12 
7 
4 
3 
1 
7 
TOTAL 100 
Table 2.4. Sediment delivered to water bodies in the United 
States (Crosson and Brubaker, 27) 
! 1977 
Region (million/tons) 
Northeast 26.6 
Lake States 45.7 
Corn Belt. 250.9 
Northern Plains 141.7 
Appalachia 57.7 
Southeast 41.9 
Delta 73.8 
Southern Plains 69.3 
Mountain 29.5 
Pacific 11.2 
Nation 748.3 
Table 2.5. Percentage of basins wholly or partly affected by nonpoint source pollution, by 
source (USDA, 108) 
Regions 
(number of basins) 
Urban 
runoff 
Construc­
tion 
Hydrologie 
modifi­
cation 
Silvi­
culture Mining 
Agri­
culture 
Solid 
waste 
disposal 
Indi­
vidual 
disposal 
Northeast (40) 70 15 20 10 20 55 35 63 
Southeast (47) 57 2 21 30 15 62 9 40 
Great Lakes (41) 54 7 2 15 41 59 15 39 
North Central (35) 54 6 3 6 40 39 9 29 
South Central (30) 50 0 23 13 53 87 13 40 
Southwest (22) 23 0 18 5 36 73 0 35 
Northwest (22) 23 23 23 27 23 55 9 32 
Islands (9) ÉZ Ê1 22 _0 _0 78 22 89 
TOTAL 52 9 15 15 30 68 14 43 
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represents the most widespread source of nonpoint source 
pollutants in the United States. Several comments are 
warranted in regard to the figures presented in Table 2.5. 
First of all, the figures indicate only the percentage of 
basins affected by agricultural pollutants but not the 
magnitude of residual flows from various sources. There is, 
however, little available data on volumes. Secondly, even 
if the volume of agricultural pollutants is equal to or 
in excess of those from other sources, there are several 
reasons to expect that agricultural nonpoint source loadings 
may have lesser environmental impacts than equivalent 
point source loadings (USDA, 108). These loadings can be 
better assimilated than point source loadings which are 
highly concentrated and agricultural nonpoint source pollu­
tants are received by waters in pulse loads so that water 
quality impacts are intermittent rather than persistent. 
The USDA (108) has identified five agricultural 
pollutants which are potentially problematic. These are 
pesticides, nutrients, bacterial and organic matter, sedi­
ment, and salinity. Table 2.6 gives the number of basins 
affected by these. The question which arises at this point 
is the severity of these impacts. A definitive answer to 
this question does not exist at present. Crosson and 
Brubaker (27), in their recent analysis of the environmental 
Tablé 2.6. Percentage of basins wholly or partly affected by noripoint source pollution, by 
pollutant (USDA, 108) 
<Sro£ Bactari. oxygen nutrients solved Sa Toxics psati 
basins) ® solids solids grease 
(percent) 
Northeast (40) 70 53 63 65 10 18 15 33 18 
Southeast (47) 66 74 57 34 4 9 4 11 23 
Great Lakes (41) 51 54 44 56 27 37 20 34 15 
North Central (35) 69 66 63 80 51 20 0 51 37 
South Central (30) 53 43 63 37 70 23 3 47 40 
Southwest (22) 36 14 45 32 68 14 14 27 0 
Northwest (22) 64 18 55 64 14 9 5 32 0 
Islands (9) 89 ^ ^ 100 0 0 0 22 44 
TOTAL 61 51 56 54 30 18 9 32 22 
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impacts of erosion, commercial fertilizer usage, and pesti­
cides usage, note two reasons why this is the case. The 
first is that there is a notable lack of basic knowledge 
about the behavior of residual flows from agriculture and 
precise information on the impacts of agricultural pollu­
tants. The second is that there are difficulties which 
arise when valuing certain kinds of impacts such as the ill­
ness or death of humans resulting from pesticides. The 
region of the country with which this study is concerned is 
the Corn Belt states region and in this area the problem 
of dissolved solids or salinity can safely be said not to 
be of major concern since this problem arises largely in 
connection with cropland irrigation in arid and semi-arid 
areas. However, fertilizer and pesticide usage, soil erosion 
rates, and livestock operations levels are all quite high 
in this region suggesting that there exists a significant 
potential for substantial water quality problems. Crosson 
and Brubaker (27) argue persuasively, based upon a review 
of available data and literature, that the major threat to 
water quality in the nation from agricultural production 
arises in connection with soil erosion and sedimentation. 
Based upon their analysis and upon data presented above, 
one is led to conclude that, to the extent that this is 
true, the threat may be particularly severe in the Corn Belt 
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states. This conclusion finds support elsewhere. In an 
earlier paper published in the Journal of Soil and Water 
Conservation, Crosson (26) comes to much the same conclu­
sions. Wauchope (121), based upon a survey of expert 
opinion, has argued that with the possible exception of a 
few compounds, currently registered pesticides do not at 
present cause water quality problems. 
In the final analysis, conclusions regarding the 
relative severity of alternative agricultural nonpoint 
source pollutants must be based upon sound scientific analysis 
in which the availability of basic knowledge allows economic 
analysis of costs and benefits of abatement. Most concern is 
at present focused, however, on the water quality impacts of 
erosion and, without suggesting that other impacts are neces­
sarily of lesser concern, the remainder of this study will 
be given to the economic analysis of these and onsite 
impacts of erosion. 
Public Policy and Soil 
Erosion 
Soil erosion began to be recognized as a resource con­
servation problem in the late 1920s, and, as a consequence 
of the interest in the problem. Federal Government research 
projects were initiated. During the Great Depression, un­
employment problems and perceived soil and water resources 
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conservation problems led to the creation of the Civilian 
Conservation Corps in 1933. In this year, the Soil 
Erosion Service was also created to develop erosion control 
projects. However, the rise in public concern over soil 
erosion in a substantial way and the initiation of modern 
soil conservation policy dates back to the mid-1930s. 
During the severe droughts of the years from 1931 to 
1938, wind erosion became a severe problem in the Great 
Plains States. Dust storms in 1934 and 1935 made history 
as dust was carried from the Great Plains to the eastern 
seaboard and beyond. These erosion problems resulted in 
the passage of the National Soil Conservation Act of 1935. 
There have been subsequent developments in conservation 
policy. The interest in soil erosion as a source of water 
quality problems is more recent. Public concern for 
environmental quality problems resulted in Federal Govern­
ment actions beginning in the latter part of the 1950s and 
has evolved considerably since. The focal point of water 
quality policy was for many years on more noticeable types 
of point source pollutants. However, recently a greater 
interest in nonpoint source and agricultural nonpoint 
source pollution control has emerged. 
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Soil conservation policy 
There are three principal soil conservation programs 
operating at present in the United States. The SCS, which 
was created by the National Soil Conservation Act of 1935, 
provides farmers with soil and water conservation technical 
advice and conservation plans. A special program administered 
by the SCS that was mandated by Congress in 1956 is the Great 
Plains Conservation program in which the SCS encourages 
farmers in the region to enter contracts to perform agreed 
upon soil and wind erosion control plans. Participation in 
the Conservation Operations Program of the SCS, this being 
the program in which technical assistance and conservation 
plans are provided, is strictly voluntary, the initiative 
lying with the farmer. The General Accounting Office (116) 
has been critical of this program, arguing that the SCS is 
not aggressive in seeking out and concentrating efforts on 
severe erosion problem areas, for devising plans which are 
too elaborate and which go unimplemented by farmers, and 
for little follow-up, concluding that the program has little 
impact upon soil loss. The General Accounting Office has 
also been critical of the Great Plains Conservation Pro­
gram. This program has been implemented on only one-fourth 
of the intended acreages, priority has not been given to 
problem areas and to effective practices, and strong grain 
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prices have led farmers to decline contracts or to return 
lands to cultivation when contracts expire. 
The third program initiated by the Federal Government 
is the Agricultural Conservation Program which provides 
funds to farmers on a cost-sharing basis for conservation 
practices. The program is administered by the Agricultural 
Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) in cooperation 
with local committees of farmers. The service has its origin 
in the Agricultural Adjustment Administration which was 
created in 1933 to control agricultural production. The 
emphasis of the service on payments to farmers for soil 
conservation practices is the result of the Soil Conserva­
tion and Domestic Allotment Act of 1936. The SCS provides 
the ASCS with technical assistance as a consequence of an 
agreement made between the agencies in 1931. While the share 
of conservation practices costs paid by the ASCS is usually 
half, the percentage may vary with the particular practice. 
The review of this program by the General Accounting Office 
also pointed out several problems. First of all, less than 
half of the available funds were allocated to activities 
primarily of soil conservation character, the remainder 
providing farmers with funds for measures primarily in the 
farmer's own interests. Further, local committees have 
shown a tendency to support structural measures over non­
structural but effective measures such as conservation 
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tillage. 
In addition to these principal agencies, there are also 
other federal, state, and local conservation agencies. 
States were encouraged by the Federal Government to enact 
a "Standard States Soil Conservation Districts Law." All 
states had done so by 1947. These laws established 
districts, frequently called "Soil and Water Conservation 
Districts," "Conservation Districts," and "Soil Conservation 
Districts." The SCS acts in support of these. The role of 
districts is uniformly educational, but some states pro­
vided districts with taxation and enforcement powers. The 
districts are managed by elected boards. 
Concern for the effectiveness of soil and water conser­
vation policies rooted in the experience of the Depression 
led Congress to enact the Soil and Water Resources Conser­
vation Act (RCA) in 1977. This act required the Secretary 
of the Department of Agriculture to provide to Congress, an 
appraisal of soil, water, and related resources on non­
federal lands in the nation and to develop effective soil 
and water conservation programs which would be responsive 
to change by 1980. In addition, the act requires annual 
evaluation reports and a repetition of the process in 1985. 
A number of alternative strategies have been suggested 
in the RCA appraisal (USDA, 108). Two of these involve 
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modifications of the existing system. The first would en­
tail a redirection of existing programs to increase their 
effectiveness with a minimum of disruption to existing 
activities. The second would involve a cross-compliance 
strategy which would require considerable rules and pro­
cedures changes and diminish the voluntary nature of the 
programs. A third approach would involve yielding planning 
and implementation authorities to states subject to USDA 
approval and oversight, while a fourth would involve the 
initiation of a regulatory strategy administered by the 
USDA. Two strategies suggested involve monetary incentives. 
In one, farmers would receive bonuses for voluntary con­
servation efforts. The second would entail "natural re­
sources contracts" which would be entered into by farmers 
and the USDA or its agencies. Farmers would receive pay­
ments for the performance of conservation practices. 
Water quality policy 
The goals of United States water quality policy are set 
for the in the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend­
ments of 1972. The national goal is the elimination of all 
discharges of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985. 
An interim operational goal was also set forth by Congress, 
this being "fishable-swimmable" waters by 1983. With 
respect to point sources, the means by which the goals are 
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to be obtained are technology-based effluent standards 
established by the Administrator of the EPA. These standards 
are to be achieved, according to the enactment, in two 
stages. First of all, industrial discharges were to meet 
effluent standards by 1977, based upon the "best practicable 
control technology" currently available, while publicly 
owned treatment works were to initiate secondary treatment. 
By 1983, "industrial dischargers" effluent standards were 
to be based upon "best available technology economically 
achievable" while publicly owned treatment works are to 
meet effluent standards based upon "best available waste 
treatment technology." In addition to these requirements, 
the amendments called for the EPA to establish effluent 
standards based upon the "best available demonstrated control 
technology." 
The technology-based effluent standards do not apply to 
nonpoint pollution sources. Under Section 208 of the Federal 
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the EPA 
delegated nearly all planning and control of nonpoint source 
pollution to the states, subject to EPA approval. States 
were required to identify agriculturally and silviculturally 
related nonpoint sources of pollution and to devise pro­
cedures and methods by which to control such sources. In 
1977, Congress amended Section 208 with the Rural Clean Water 
Act. This amendment directed the Secretary of Agriculture, 
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with the concurrence of the Administrator of the EPA, to 
establish and administer a program in which five to ten 
year contracts with rural landowners and operators are 
entered to promote the installation of best management 
practices to control water pollution from nonpoint sources. 
The program provides technical and financial assistance on 
a cost-sharing basis for those practices that improve water 
quality and are consistent with the areawide waste treat­
ment management plans devised by states under Section 208. 
The EPA has provided financial assistance with administra­
tive guidelines for the preparation of 208 plans. Because 
the plans are new and mostly voluntary and because completion 
of plans has been laggard, there is no considerable record 
of implementation as yet. The emphasis in 208 planning has 
been upon so-called "Best Management Practices" (BMP's) which 
involve measures which can be adopted by farmers to control 
erosion and runoff. There has also been some emphasis on 
measures to inhibit sediment delivery. Most plans contem­
plate making use of existing conservation agencies such as 
the Soil Conservation Districts and envision the use of SCS 
personnel to provide technical assistance. Thus, in practice, 
208 programs have to some extent become extensions of existing 
soil conservation programs. Beyond providing financial 
assistance, planning guidelines, review of state plans, and 
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approval of BMP's, the role of the EPA has not been sub­
stantial; responsibility and initiative have fallen to 
the states. Crosson and Brubaker (27) suggest, however, that 
state performance has been unworthy of praise, although there 
is much variation in performance. 
Conclusion 
There is at present, a high level of public concern 
for the damages to soil and water quality in the United 
States. This survey of the processes and problems of water 
erosion has suggested some of the motivation for these 
concerns and has identified the Corn Belt states, and Iowa 
in particular, as warranting particular attention. Dissatis­
faction with current soil conservation policies and a change 
in focus in water quality concerns from the more obvious 
point sources to nonpoint sources has led to a situation 
in which both soil and water conservation policies are being 
evaluated in order to develop an effective public strategy 
for maintaining or enhancing the quality of these resources. 
Economic analysis should play an important role in policy 
developments, however, in order to direct policy delibera­
tions in a direction such that the costs of policy initia­
tives are warranted by the benefits from those initiatives, 
and the time is ripe for providing such direction given the 
43 
current state of flux in policy development. Past soil con­
servation and water quality policy in the United States has 
been subject to criticism by economists and others for 
failure to weigh costs and benefits. Yet, if the problems 
are real, it is important that adjustments proceed for 
several recent predictions of agricultural production suggest 
that erosion will not diminish from current levels in coming 
years (Crosson and Brubaker, 27; USDA, 108). That is, if 
the damages to soil and water quality are significant, they 
will, under projected future circumstances, remain so un­
less some actions are taken. 
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CHAPTER III. AN ABSTRACT ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF 
CROPLAND EROSION AND EROSION CONTROL 
Introduction: Soil Resources and Soil 
Management 
Students of natural resource management have devised a 
variety of systems for classifying natural resources for the 
purpose of management. Commonly, these systems are based 
upon characteristics of the natural occurrence of the re­
source. One of the most widely accepted systems of classifi­
cation based upon characteristics of the natural occurrence 
of resources is Ciriacy-Wantraup's (23). The resources are 
broadly classified as renewable or nonrenewable depending 
upon the economic significance of the rate of regeneration 
of the resource stock, and then further classified within each 
of these broad groupings depending upon other attributes of 
the resource. One common variant of this system is to 
further distinguish resources as to whether or not they are 
biological natural resources (Barlowe, 5). Soils, however, 
represent a more complex case because they are a mixture of 
biological and nonbiological resources and renewable and 
nonrenewable resources. Ciriacy-Wantraup chooses to 
classify resources with such a character as composite natural 
resources. 
The purpose in classifying resources is generally to 
focus attention upon the crucial aspects of the natural 
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resource management problem and thus the appropriate 
principles of resource management. The economic theory of 
the exploitation of particular types of resource stocks is 
well-developed. The theory of composite resource management 
is not so well-developed. To a large extent, however, prob­
lems in composite resource management involve only an ex­
tension of existing principles since it represents a problem 
in the conjunctive management of several interrelated re­
newable and/or nonrenewable resources stocks as demonstrated, 
for example, in a paper on the conjunctive management of 
ground and surface water resources by Cummings and Winkelman 
(30). As a composite of natural resource stocks the soil 
resource management problem is one of the conjunctive 
management of natural resources and it is a fundamental 
proposition of this research that the theory of extraction 
from renewable and nonrenewable resource stocks can be 
brought to bear appropriately and usefully upon issues in 
soil management including soil erosion. But, as noted in 
Chapter I, this theory has not to date been drawn upon to 
consider such issues in any significant way and thus an 
objective of the analysis of this chapter is to demonstrate 
the applicability of the theory to the soil management 
problem. This demonstration is provided as other 
objectives of this chapter are pursued. The first of 
these is to acquire some understanding of the economic 
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determination of soil erosion on particular soils as a 
farmer endeavors to maximize the net present value of 
the soil resource. The second is to consider issues in 
the economics of erosion control policy. The framework of 
analysis is one in which soil depth is treated as an 
exhaustible resource stock which is depleted by erosion and 
which may be renewable or nonrenewable depending upon the 
rate of soil genesis. A final objective of the analysis in 
this chapter is to provide a theoretical foundation for 
the empirical analysis of issues in the economics of crop­
land erosion and erosion control in the Four Mile Creek 
watershed. Before proceeding directly to the application 
of the theory, it is useful to develop the nature of the 
analytical framework, some useful terminology, and to develop 
some results of interest. This is done in the following 
section where a brief review of the theory of extraction is 
given. 
A Review of the Theory of Optimal 
Extraction 
The economic literature in this area can be divided 
into two basic categories (Smith and Krutilla, 90). The 
first category includes models in which natural resource 
inputs are included in models of reproducible capital 
accumulation primarily for the purpose of investigating 
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issues in economic growth in the presence of exhaustible re­
sources. Important examples of the literature in this area 
include contributions by Dasgupta and Heal (32), Stiglitz 
(98), and Solow (93). The second category is composed 
of models, of extraction of specific resources or types 
of resources at the level of the firm or industry, or at 
other levels of aggregation such as a river basin. These 
models have been developed to consider the properties of 
optimal extraction of specific resources or types of re­
sources and to investigate positive issues such as the be­
havior of resource scarcity indices, and the effects of 
taxation on extraction. Important examples of literature 
in this area include Hotellin^'s (52) seminal paper on 
economics of exhaustible resources, extensions of Hotelling's 
analysis by Gordon (44), Cummings (28), and Shulze (88), 
Scott's (86) analysis of the theory of the mine under 
conditions of certainty, Burness's (19) work on the effects 
of severance taxes, and developments in the theory of 
fisheries (renewable resource) management by Schaefer (84), 
Plourde (79) and Clark (24). The literature in both areas 
has grown substantially in the last decade as a conse­
quence of the interest in natural resource problems arising 
from the energy and environmental resources issues which 
emerged during this time. An extensive, though not highly 
detailed, survey of this literature is provided by Peterson 
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and Fisher (77). In the next several pages the basic models 
of optimal exploitation of renewable and nonrenewable re­
source stocks found in the second category of literature 
are briefly outlined. There are a number of variants and 
extensions of these models and a number of issues in the 
theory that will not be dealt with here. The purpose 
of this outline of the basic theory is to establish the 
structure of such models and to establish some of the 
basic propositions about optimal management found in the 
literature. 
The first issue to consider is what is meant by 
optimal exploitation. Treatments of optimal exploitation 
in the second category of literature commonly posit an 
optimal extraction path for a particular resource to be 
one associated with a particular Pareto optimum. It is 
assumed that the conditions for a first best optimum are 
otherwise satisfied within the economy and that wealth 
is distributed equitably both intratemporally and inter-
temporally. Then, as long as producers and consumers 
discount at the same rate, the optimal path of extraction 
will be that path that maximizes the flow of discounted 
consumers plus producers surpluses. This formulation was 
used by Hotelling and has been extensively used in subse­
quent contributions. It is to be noted, however, that 
while this formulation is fairly well-received by resource 
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economists, there remains some controversy over just what 
constitutes optimality of resource use. Page (76) in his 
recent book on materials policy, compares what he labels the 
"Present Value Criterion" of resource use, this being the 
criterion just given, and what he labels the "Conservationist 
Criterion", the latter being composed of a series of loosely 
formulated propositions about the "wise" use of resources 
which can be found in a survey of conservationist literature 
over the years. In a series of articles, Sandler 
and Smith (82, 83) have questioned the efficiency of dis­
counting while Solow (92) in his address to the American 
Economic Association meetings in 1973 expressed concern over 
the equity implications of discounting when doing so leads 
to resource exhaustion and the extinction of mankind. The 
equity and efficiency issues arising from the present value 
criterion are also considered by Krutilla and Fisher (62), 
particularly as they occur in relation to irreversible de­
velopment of unique natural environments. 
Turning now to the basic model of optimal nonre­
newable resource exploitation, let the benefits from extrac­
tion be given at any time by 
j-q* 
B(q*) = P(q)dq (1) 
Jo 
where P(q) is the inverse of the market demand for q. Now, 
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let C(q) be the long run cost of extraction function for the 
homogeneous resource where it is assumed that C'>0. De­
fining an optimal extraction path as a Pareto optimal path, 
a particular optimum can be obtained by maximizing 
.00 
{B(q)-C(g))e"^^dt (2) 
J Q  
Subject to the restriction that 
jQ 
where r is the social rate of discount, which is assumed 
constant, and S(t) is the resource stock at time t so S(o) 
= S^. The problem described here is an isoperimetric prob­
lem in the calculus of variations and may be solved by 
maximizing the function 
0 
where X is a Lagrangian multiplier. The Euler equation 
for determining the optimal path of q(t) is simply 
q d t =  S q (3) 
{B(q)-C(q))e ^''-Xq}dt (4) 
(B'-C')e -rt X = 0 (5) 
and where B' = P, this result implies that 
P = C + Xe rt ( 6 )  
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A property of the optimal program is then that at any point 
in time, the marginal willingness to pay or price of the 
product must equal marginal extraction cost plus an imputed 
cost. Let V* be the net present value of the optimal pro­
gram and X* be the value of the Lagrangian multiplier in 
this program. The value of A* is 
X* = ÉY1 = p(o) - c'(q(0)) (7) 
dSo 
and thus X *  gives the marginal scarcity value of the re­
source or the amount society would be willing to pay at the 
margin for an additional unit of the resource at t = 0. 
The multiplier also gives the marginal cost to society of a 
reduction in the resource stock at time t = 0 and X*e 
gives the marginal cost of a reduction of the stock at time 
t. This imputed cost is termed the marginal user cost of 
extraction (Scott, 86; Peterson and Fisher, 77) and rises 
at the rate of discount in the optimal program. 
A complication of the model is to introduce stock ef­
fects by defining the long-run extraction cost curve as 
C(q,S) where denotes the partial derivative with respect 
to S(t) and is assumed negative. The resource management 
problem can now be expressed as one of maximizing 
00 
(B(q)-C(q,S))e"^t (8) 
^0 
52 
subject to the restriction that S = -q and S(0) = S^. This 
problem may be solved by use of the maximum principle tech­
nique. The Hamiltonian is 
H = e"^^[B(q)-C(q,s)-0q] (9) 
where 0 is the costate variable. The necessary conditions 
of interest are 
(B'-C -0)e'^^ = 0 (10) q 
and 
Cg - Ô + r0 = 0 (11) 
where denotes the partial derivative of the cost func­
tion with respect to q(t). The first of these two condi­
tions can be written 
P = Cg + 0 (12) 
again, implying that a property of the optimal program is that 
price equals marginal extraction cost plus the marginal user 
cost. The second condition may be written alternatively as 
I = r + i . (13) 
Where €^<0, this result implies that the marginal user cost 
does not rise at the rate of interest but instead at a 
lesser rate. This result is reasoned to occur because when 
there is a stock effect, the gain from holding the resource 
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in situ is composed of a cost savings as well as capital 
gains and thus the rate of appreciation need not equal the 
rate of discount (Cummings, 28). 
The distinction between the basic renewable resource 
model and the basic nonrenewable resource model is the 
physical constraint set, which is given by 
S = R-q (14) 
and 
S(0) = (15) 
where R is the regeneration of the resource stock. In the 
nonrenewable resource case R = 0. For this outline, let 
R = g(S). Whereas the literature on the theory of non­
renewable resources typically uses cost functions as above, 
much of the literature on the theory of the fishery or 
other biological populations formulate the analysis in 
terms of production functions. Thus, let 
q = f (E,S) (16) 
where E is effort and f g>Q, f g g<0, f g > 0 ,  f g g<0 and f g g>0 are 
the partial derivatives and their assumed signs. The 
management problem is again to maximize 
.00 
(B(q)-wE)e""dt (17) 
0 
where w is the opportunity cost of effort, subject to the 
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technology and physical constraint set described above. This 
problem may be solved by application of the maximum principle 
technique. Let the Hamiltonian function be 
H = {B(q) - WE + r(g(S) - q}e"^^ (18) 
The necessary conditions of interest are, where B* = P, 
(Pfg - w - rfgie'^t = 0 (19) 
and 
(-Ef_ - rg' + rfL) + rr - r = 0. (20) 
The first condition may be rewritten as 
P = ^  + r (21) 
E 
which is the condition that price equal marginal extraction 
cost plus the marginal user cost. The second condition 
may be rewritten as 
fr = r + Pfg + rg' - rfg (22) 
which states that the opportunity cost of holding the re­
source stock must equal the appreciation of the stock plus 
the value of the stock in production plus the value of the 
stock in propagation less the user cost of additional 
output resulting from an increase in the stock. 
Plourde (79) has shown that for fixed values of P, W, 
and r, renewable resource models will tend to a steady state 
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in which the resource stock is constant. Two important 
points are that extinction can be optimal and that the 
maximum sustainable yield solution, which may arise when 
conditions in which biological growth laws are applicable, 
would arise only by accident. These two points have been 
demonstrated by a number of contributors (Peterson and 
Fisher, 77). 
To summarize, the fundamental feature of models of 
optimal natural resource production is the physical constraint 
set which describes the restrictions on resource extraction 
arising from the characteristics of the physical occurrence 
of the natural resource. The presence of the physical 
constraint set requires that models be dynamic. That is, 
the physical constraint set causes the problem to be one 
of the management of a capital stock over time and as in 
all models of optimal management of a capital stock, the 
appropriate models are dynamic. The problem of optimal 
natural resource management is to obtain that pattern of 
natural resource use which maximizes a specified criterion 
function subject to the technology of resource production 
and the physical constraint set. Defining an optimal 
management program as one in which resource use is Pareto 
optimal, there exist two basic conditions which must be 
satisfied for a particular Pareto optimum to be obtained under 
the assumption that the allocation of resources within the 
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economy otherwise satisfy the conditions for a "first best" 
optimum. These two conditions are: 
(1) The Flow Condition; The rate of natural resource 
extraction at any point in time must be such that 
the marginal willingness to pay for the flow of 
extractive output is equal to the marginal oppor­
tunity cost of the resources used in extraction 
plus the marginal user cost. 
(2) The Stock Condition: The stock of natural re­
source held at any point in time must be such 
that the opportunity cost of holding the stock 
is equal at the margin to the marginal benefit of 
holding the stock. 
Stiglitz (97) has outlined the conditions under which 
a market economy will obtain efficient resource usage. 
These conditions are that the market be perfectly competi­
tive, that there exists a complete set of perfectly competi­
tive futures markets and risk markets, that there be no 
external effects or common property resource problems, and 
that there exist no distortion of the market as a consequence 
of government intervention. It is to be noted, in addition, 
that if resources are allocated intratemporally and inter-
temporally in an equitable fashion, the Pareto optimum 
obtained in such an economy will also be a social optimum. 
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A Model of Erosion of a Soil 
Cropland erosion is no less a form of mining than is the 
extraction of coal from a coal deposit or the extraction of 
groundwater from an aquifer. It follows that the theory of 
extraction has direct applicability to the economic analysis 
of cropland erosion. In this section, the soil management 
problem faced by a present value maximizing economic agent 
operating in an environment characterized by perfect in­
formation is considered in order to gain an understanding 
of how the decision-making of that agent is influenced by 
erosion and the impacts of erosion on the flow of pro­
ductive services from the soil. To facilitate the analysis, 
a simple and highly abstract model of agricultural produc­
tion from an individual soil resource occurrence is de­
veloped. The "soil mine" is conceptualized here as a unique­
ly located and specialized resource which has a given land 
surface area and a given and uniform soil depth at points in 
time. It is assumed that the soil mine is technologically 
independent of adjacent soil resources in order to simplify 
the analysis. 
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The technology of production and the physical constraint set 
Assume that but one commodity can be produced from the 
soil resource and let the output of this commodity at time 
t be denoted Y^. The output of the commodity at time t 
is assumed to depend upon the utilization of hired factors 
of production, the depth of soil at time t, the stock of 
"soil constituents" present in the soil at time t, and 
external environmental conditions at time t. The quantity of 
the i-th hired factor of production Utilized at time t is 
denoted Soil depth at time t is denoted and the stock 
of constituents at time t by N^. External environmental 
conditions are measured by the index at time t. The 
production function is written at time t as 
\ St- Nt' Ht>-
To simplify the analysis, it is assumed that land surface 
area is constant and thus that gully erosion occurs at 
trivial economic rates. It is further assumed that the 
entire land surface area is utilized in production in any 
period. This assumption is reasonable if the land area 
of the soil resource is thought of as being small. The 
partial derivatives of the function with respect to the 
hired inputs and the elements of the soil resource state 
vector included in the production function are assumed 
positive. The values taken by the external environmental 
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conditions index are assumed to be known but beyond human 
control. 
Soil depth is assumed to behave over time in accordance 
with the transition equation 
St+l = St + «St - (241 
where is the formation of soil depth at time t and 
is the loss of soil depth to erosion at time t. If 
for all time it is the case that = 0 then the soil re­
source is nonrenewable. A strong argument can be made 
to the effect that soil formation occurs in many cases 
at rates of trivial economic importance (Larson, 64; 
USDA, 109). However, it is of some interest to allow for the 
possibility that soil formation may occur at economically 
significant rates and that the rate of formation may be in­
fluenced by crop production activities. Thus, it shall be 
assumed here that R^^ is given by the function 
^It ^ ^lt'^2t'• ' *'^nt' ^t' (25) 
The value of is taken to be given by the function 
92t(*lt'*2t'''''*nt' ®t' ^t' 
where is an erosion control capital stock. The behavior 
of the erosion control capital stock is assumed to be 
described by the transition equation 
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(27) 
where is investment in the stock in time t and 6 is a 
depreciation factor. The transition equation describing 
the behavior of the stock of soil constituents over time 
is assumed to be 
where is the diminution of this stock due to production 
and erosion and is the replenishment of the stock by 
investment. The value of is taken to be given by 
the function 
The soil resource state vector in this simplified 
and abstract model thus contains but three elements at any 
point in time, these being the depth of the soil, the stock 
of soil constituents, and the land area of the soil re­
source. The land area is assumed to be constant and to 
be fully utilized in all time periods. The stocks of soil 
depth and soil constituents are assumed to change from 
period to period in accordance with "laws of nature" 
summarized in the transition equations. The transition 
equations show how the stocks will change from one period 
to the next with these changes depending upon the existing 
^t+1 ^t " ^ t ^Nt ( 2 8 )  
^3t^^lt'^2t' • • • / (29) 
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stocks, the use of factors of production, external environ­
ment conditions, the stock of erosion control capital in the 
case of changes in soil depth, and investments to augment 
the stock of soil constituents. The stock of erosion 
control capital is not assumed to affect soil genesis or 
the depletion of soil constituents directly and invest­
ments to augment the stock of soil constituents are not 
assumed to directly affect soil genesis or erosion. The 
change in erosion control capital from period to period is 
assumed to depend only on the passage of time and upon in­
vestments to augment the stock. 
The management problem 
Now consider an economic agent who wishes to maximize 
the present value of the cash flow from exploiting the 
soil for T periods plus the present value of the amount 
for which the resource could be sold in period T+1. The 
returns from soil exploitation are at time t 
"^t ^yt^t~^J^^xit^it " ^Nt^Nt ~ ^kt^kt 
where p^^ is the market price of output in period t, 
is the market price of the i-th hired input at time t, 
is the market price of additional soil constituents in 
period t, and is the market price of increments to the 
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erosion control capital stock at time t. Where r is 
the market rate of discount, which is assumed constant for 
all time, the present value of the cash flow is given by 
the quantity 
T 
PV, = E n . ( l + r)"(t-l) ^ (31) 
t=l 
The amount for which the soil (mine) may be sold in the 
market at time T+1 will be, if the market for resource rights 
operates efficiently, equal to the present value of the cash 
flow from soil explanation that can be obtained in period 
T+1 with the resource stocks available at that time. 
Let this value be given by the terminal value function 
^(^T+1' ^ T+1' ^T+1^ • 
Where ir* is the value of returns obtained in an optimal 
program beginning in period T+1 with capital stocks 
S*+i, N*^^, and it will be the case that the present 
value of the program is given by the quantity 
00 
PV„ = I w*(l+r)"(T-t) (33) 
^ t=T+l ^ 
and also by the quantity given by the terminal value func­
tion evaluated with the stocks = N*^^, 
and Ky+i = K*+i. 
The management objective of the economic planner may 
now be expressed mathematically as maximizing the quantity 
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T 
+ VfSy+i, Ny+i, (1+r) "^ (34) 
subject to the physical constraint set and the technology 
of agricultural production for the resource. Given the 
definition of the terminal value function and Bellman's 
(54) "Principle of Optimality" it follows that the 
management objective can be expressed equivalently as 
maximizing the quantity 
Z m.(l+r)"(t-l) (35) 
t=l ^ 
subject to the same restrictions. The implication of this 
equivalence is that the length of the farmer's planning 
horizon is of no consequence to soil management. This 
result is important when considering reasons why farmers 
may fail to optimally conserve soils. 
The management problem can be formally expressed for the 
T period planning horizon case as : 
T n 
- PNtlwt- ^Kt 
+ V(S^^1, K^^^)(1+r) 
subject in any period l£t£T to 
^t ~ ^t^^lt'^2t'••*'^nt' ®t' ^t' 
- p„. } (1-r) -(t-1) 
Kt' 
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't+1 ~ 9lt(%lt'X2t''""'%nt' ^t' ^ t' 
" 92t(*lt'*2t'''''Xnt' ®t' ^t' ' 
^t+1 ~ ^3t • * •'^nt' ^t' ^Nt' 
Kt+1 = Kt(i-a) + Ikt' 
^It - ^2t - °'*-*'^nt - ^kt - ^Nt -
and subject in any period l£t_<T+l to 
^t+1 - ^t+1 - ^t+l -
and finally subject to the initial resource and capital 
stocks 
Si = sj, = NJ, = KJ. (36) 
The Lagrangian function for the problem is given by; 
^ ^^^fyt^t(*lt'*2t'''''*nt' ®t' 
.^,^xit^it " ^Nt^Nt ~ ^ktlktlfl^^) 
1—X 
+ VfS^+i' ^ T+l' ^ T+1^ (1+^) 
T 
t=l^t+l^^t+l ^It^^lt'^2t'•*•'^nt' ®t' ^ t'^t^ 
•*" ^2t ^ ^lt'^2t'• • •'^nt' ®t' ^t' ^ t^) 
T 
tfi'^t+1 ^ \+l~\ •'• ^3t ^ ^lt'^2t'• • •'^nt' ®t' ^t' ^ t^ 
•*• ^Nt) 
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- t!iGt+l(Kt+l - Kt(l-a) - Ikt)' (37) 
A solution to the problem, if one exits, is characterized 
by the Kuhn-Tucker (63) conditions. In any period l£t£T 
these are: 
%= 'Pyt 55%; -
3git 992tt 
^t+1^3X.. ~ 9X..' it it 
- "t+l ^  (3L/3Xit)Xit = 0, (38) 
and ^ 0; 
31^^ ^ ^ Pt+1 - 0' 
(3L/3lNt):Nt = 0, and I^^ > 0; 
3-kt ËR = + ST+L 10' 
(3L/9I%t)Ikt = 0, and > 0; 
(39) 
(40) 
3%^ = -St+1 + St + - 92t'-> = (41) 
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9L 
aPt+1 = -Wt+l + Nt - 93t(') + ^ Nt = 0' (42) 
= -K^^, + K^(l-6) + I.. = 0; (43) 
36t+i t+i "t'" kt 
%= V % - SF' -^T 
- P^.i âq^ < Of OL/3S )S. = 0, and S > 0; 
t+1 dS^ - t t t (44) 
% = Pyt+ % (l+r)-"=-l' + 
+ Pt+l(l- 95;^^ - Pt+1 1 0' (45) 
OL/8Nt)N^ = 0, and > 0 
3K^ ~^t+l 9i^ Gt+i(l-G) - 3^ 1 0 
(3L/8Kt)K^ = 0, and > 0. (46) 
The conditions for the stocks in period T+1 are: 
3S%+1 3S^+1 ^ " ^T+1 - ° 
(31/38^+1)5^+1 = 0, Sy+i > 0. (47) 
° ^ • "T+1 -
OL/3N^l)Nj+i > 0, and N^+i > 0, (48) 
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- 6^+, < 0, (49) 
l3L/3KT+i)Kp+i = 0, and K^+i > <>• 
Assume that the optimal soil depth is positive in all 
periods l£t£T+l. With this assumption condition (44) 
yields a recursion which may be iterated to obtain the 
result : 
^^t+1 -t 
At+1 = Pyt+1 3^ (1+r) 
- P 
'®3t+l 
t+2 
T 3f. 
i=t+2 ^^i 
Making similar assumptions about the stock of constituents 
and the erosion control capital stock and proceeding with 
conditions (45) and (46) in a similar manner allows the 
following results to be obtained: 
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T+2 'AWT+I " 3«T+I 
T 9f. ,. 1. 
' i!t+2 'V3N7<^«'"' -
1 1 j=t+l 1 
•" jît+i"' • "'+1 
Let PV* denote the present value yielded by an optimal 
soil management program and '^t+l' ^t+1 the 
values of "^t+l' ^t+1 that program. Then it 
must be true that 
^ = ^l+r %; = Pî«' îl|^ SÎ+1- <"' 
That is, the multipliers give the change in the value of 
the program resulting from marginal changes in the stocks 
in period t+1. Since a stock change in period t+1 is a 
consequence of an action in period t, it follows that the 
multipliers are the marginal user costs of the stocks in 
period t discounted to period one. It is to be noted that 
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the multipliers and in Equation (50) may, under 
the assumptions made here, be replaced by the present marginal 
terminal value of the soil stock and stock of constituents 
respectively, as can be ascertained from conditions (47) and 
(48). The same may be done with the multipliers in Equations 
(51) and (52) . The implications of conditions (47), (48), 
and (49), under the assumption that the resource stocks are 
positive, is that the marginal user costs of the stock in 
period T are simply the present marginal terminal value of 
these stocks in period T+1. This result is clearly con­
sistent with the definitions of the marginal user cost of 
resources and the terminal value function given above. 
Equations (50), (51), and (52), permit an under­
standing of the determination of the marginal user costs 
in the solution to the program. Consider first the 
marginal user costs of the soil depth and soil constituents 
stocks. Assuming that these stocks have positive marginal 
products it follows that a reduction in these stocks in some 
period t will result in a loss of output, ceteris-paribus, 
in all subsequent periods. If these stocks were not argu­
ments in the transition equations, the marginal user costs 
would simply be the discounted sum of the value of the 
marginal products forgone in each period, ceteris-paribus, 
to period T plus the discounted marginal terminal values of 
the resource stocks. However, because the stocks do enter 
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the transition equations a change in these stocks in one 
period will cause further changes in all subsequent periods. 
For example, soil loss in period t reduces the stock 
available in period t+1. Assuming that 3g^^/3S^ > 0 and that 
3g2t/9St > 0 in any period t, and assuming also that 
^^2t^^®t ^ ^^It/^^t' follows that reduction of soil depth 
in period t, by reducing the stock in period t+1, causes a 
further reduction, ceteris-paribus, in the stock of soil 
depth in period t+2. Further, assuming > 0 in any 
period t, the reduction in the stock of soil depth in period 
t+1 results in a loss of soil constituents, ceteris-paribus, 
in period t+1. Consequently, the marginal user costs 
reflect not simply the flow of value forgone by the re­
duction of the stocks occurring in a given period plus the 
loss in terminal value due to that loss. Instead, they 
reflect that flow and the values of the effects of the stock 
change on stock changes in all subsequent periods. 
The marginal user cost of the stock of erosion control 
capital is observed to be the present marginal terminal 
value of the stock plus a discounted sum of the marginal 
user cost of soil depth multiplied by the partial deriva­
tive of the erosion function with respect to the capital 
stock. This sum gives the present value of the flow of 
benefits derived from increasing the depth of soil, 
ceteris-paribus, by reducing erosion by increasing the capital 
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stock. The marginal terminal value gives the change in 
the price of the soil resource resulting from installing 
erosion control capital. 
Let and (1+r) . 
From conditions (44) and (45), it follows that if and 
are to be positive in the optimal program then there must be 
values of and such that the following conditions are 
satisfied; 
^^t ~^yt~3S^ (^t+l"^t) ^t+1 (9^ 
~ ^  t+1 3S^ 
3ft 393t 
^^t ^yt 3N^ (Pt+1 " ^t^ " Pt+1 9ÎÇ" 
, c f ^Slt _ 392t. , c c )  
^t+l^BN^ 3N^ ) 
The first of these conditions requires that if the stock 
of soil depth is to be positive in period t in the optimal 
program, then it must be the case that the stock chosen is 
such that the opportunity cost of holding the stock (rX^) 
is equal to the marginal value of the stock in production 
(Py^ • 3f^/3S^) plus the appreciation in the value of the 
stock (A.m-A.) plus the value of the stock in producing 
AGIT AG^T 
additional soil depth (%^^^ «(^ ^—)) plus the value of 
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the stock in producing soil constituents =3g3^/3S^). 
The second condition is that which must be satisfied by a 
positive stock of soil constituents in the optimal pro­
gram. It's interpretation is analogous. If these two 
conditions cannot be satisfied by positive resource stocks 
or if the resource stocks which do satisfy them are zero, then 
it will be the case that the net present value maximizing 
program is one which leads to exhaustion of the resource 
stocks by period t. Defining = g^+^fl+r) , the 
analogous condition derived from (52) for the erosion 
control capital stock is given by 
= -%t+i ^  + (êt+1-êt) - «St+i-
Before proceeding to a consideration of the choice of 
control variable levels some comments about the signs of 
the user costs are warranted. The transition equations are 
equality constraints and consequently the possibility of 
negative marginal user costs exists. It would generally 
be presumed that the user cost of soil depth and soil 
constituents will be positive given that increases in these 
stocks are beneficial. However, negative marginal user costs 
cannot be precluded. Suppose, for example, that the top-
soil is less productive than the subsoil and thus that the 
stock effect is negative rather than positive, i.e., 
9f^/9S^ < 0, for some range. It may be the case, then, that 
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the user cost is initially negative at the margin and 
thus, that an incentive exists to erode the soil to reduce 
soil depth. Similarly, without the possibility of cost­
less disposal of surplus stocks of constituents and erosion 
control capital, situations could conceivably arise in 
which the marginal user costs of those stocks are negative 
in some periods. 
Factor mix and investment decisions 
Now, consider the factor choice decisions of the 
economic agent. From (49) it follows that if ^ 0 for 
any l£i£n in any period l£t£T then it must be true that 
V % = Pxit + (L+RL 
- P t+1 3x^7) ' (57) 
it 
The optimal use of a factor thus requires equating the 
value of the marginal product in any period to the 
market price of the factor plus an imputed cost. This 
imputed cost reflects the value of changes in the soil 
resource stocks resulting from the use of the factor. 
The factor mix chosen by the.present value maximizing 
farmer at any point in time will, then, reflect not only 
the current marginal costs and benefits from utilizing those 
factors but also the effects of the current mix upon the 
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flow of returns in subsequent periods. 
The farmer will invest in erosion control capital in any 
period t as to equate the marginal cost of erosion control 
capital to the marginal user cost of the stock. That is, 
a positive net investment will be made in any period l£t£T 
if and only if there is some value of such that 
Pkt = 158) 
Similarly, positive investments in the stock of constit­
uents will be made if and only if in any period l£t_<T 
there is a value of such that 
^Nt ~ Pt+l^^*^) ^ (59) 
That is, the level of investment in the stock of constitu­
ents, if positive in any period, will be that level which 
equates the marginal cost of amendments to the flow of 
discounted marginal benefits from the increment to the 
stock. 
Whether a solution exists to the programming problem de­
pends upon the forms of the production functions, the terminal 
value function, and the constraint functions (Kuhn and Tucker, 
63). The conditions that must be satisfied for a global maxi­
mum shall not be explored here and it will simply be assumed 
that such a solution exists for any set of market prices 
and initial capital stocks. With this asumption it follows 
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that output supply, and factor and investment demand func­
tions may be derived for all periods in the planning horizon. 
The arguments of these functions will be commodity prices, 
factor prices, and the prices of capital goods included 
in the model in all periods in the planning horizon; and 
the rate of discount and the initial resource and capital 
stocks. The form of these functions will reflect the 
underlying technology of production and the physical 
constraint set. Clearly then, the behavior of the instru­
ment variables and thus the stocks and flows depending upon 
the values these instruments take, will depend upon the 
incentives given the economic agent by the market subject 
to restrictions imposed by the technology of production and 
the physical constraint set. 
Comments on time paths 
There are several comments which can be made of a 
general nature regarding the soil management problem with­
out further complicating the analysis. It was shown above 
that the optimal or present value maximizing time path of 
soil depth is that path which, given prices, technology, and 
the physical constraint set, yields an equality of the 
marginal benefits of holding soil to the opportunity cost 
of the capital stock. The path satisfying condition (54) 
is jointly determined with the time paths of all other 
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variables in the model. In general, rising product 
prices, falling factor prices, and technical advances which 
increase the value of holding soil depth in future periods, 
will give incentives to save soil for future periods. 
Also, the lower the rate of discount the greater will be 
the incentive to conserve soil depth relative to economic 
states in which the rate of discount is higher since in the 
latter case, the future returns from holding the stock are 
given less weight than current and near future returns. 
This assumes of course, that the marginal product of soil 
is positive. 
If there is in any period no positive soil depth 
that satisfies (54) or if the depth that does satisfy this 
condition is zero, then the soil depth will be exhausted by 
that period in time. This is true, whether the soil is re­
newable or not. If nonrenewable, the depletion of soil 
depth will require that agricultural production activities 
which require the soil be forever forgone. If renewable, 
and if the natural rate of formation is significant, pro­
duction from the soil may simply be deferred in time until 
sufficient soil is generated to resume production. If the 
natural rate is trivial but if the rate of formation is 
accelerated by crop production activities,then the exhaus­
tion of soil depth will result in soil use being forgone 
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forever since those activities which accellerate the rate of 
formation to nontrivial rates can no longer be pursued. 
The irreversibility of soil exhaustion which is 
suggested to arise above must be qualified by the possi­
bility of specific investments to augment soil depth. If 
such investment activities are technologically feasible 
the soil depth transition equation can be appropriately 
modified and from the analysis of investments to augment 
soil constituents it can be inferred that the optimal invest­
ment in soil depth in any pe±iod, if positive, must be such 
that the cost of the resources used is equal to the marginal 
user cost of soil depth in the peridd the investment, is 
undertaken. If in all periods there is no such level of 
investment then the exhaustion of soil, while techno­
logically reversible, is economically irreversible (Gummings 
and Norton, 29). A situation of some interest would be 
one in which soil depth is naturally nonrenewable and 
exhausted at some point in time but in which the path 
of resource costs and technological advance changes the 
state from one in which it is either technologically or 
economically infeasible to reverse exhaustion to one in 
which it is economic to reverse the state of exhaustion. 
It is not the physical stock of a resource that is of 
importance but instead it is the economic scarcity of the 
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resource. Depleting soil depth, just as the depleting of 
any exhaustible resource, does not imply an increasing 
economic scarcity of the resource. There are numerous 
factors which have been observed to operate to mitigate 
real economic scarcity and it is to be expected that these 
operate in response to soil depth depletion as they do 
in response to the depletion of other resources. These 
mitigating factors include recourse to lower grade re­
sources as higher grades are exhausted, technological ad­
vances which reduce resource requirements, and substitution 
of resources of lesser economic scarcity for resources 
of increasing scarcity (Barnett and Morse, 6; Howe, 53; 
Rosenberg, 81). 
Erosion in the model is in any period determined by 
the capital stocks present in that period, the crop 
production decisions made in that period, and external 
environmental conditions which occur in that period. Soil 
formation is treated in an analogous manner. The time paths 
of erosion and formation in the present value maximizing 
program will be those which yield the optimal soil depth 
path. Again, outcomes are jointly determined for all values 
so that this statement takes as given the time paths of all 
other variables. In general, the greater the marginal 
user cost or economic scarcity of soil depth the greater 
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the incentive will be to choose crop production practices 
which conserve soil and encourage formation. If the scarcity 
value of soil depth is increasing over time, then the 
incentive to conserve soil and encourage formation will 
also be increasing. The scarcity value of soil depth will 
vary as those economic, technological, and physical factors 
influencing it behave over time and so too will vary the 
incentive to save soil or disincentive to erode. 
Erosion control within a period can, in this model, be 
undertaken only by choosing a crop mix to achieve the 
desired level. But with the passage of time stocks in 
the soil resource state vector may be varied to influence 
the erosivity of the soil and investments in erosion control 
capital may be undertaken. The level of investment in any 
period will be undertaken to equate the cost of the re­
sources required to the marginal benefits of increments 
in the capital stock. These marginal benefits will, how­
ever, reflect the optimal time paths of all variables in the 
model and clearly there will be trade-offs between ob­
taining control by adjustments in crop mix, factor input 
mix, augmenting the stock of constituents, and obtaining 
control by investing in control capital. 
The present value maximizing path of soil constituents, 
like the soil depth time path, must equate the marginal 
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benefits of holding the stock to the opportunity cost of 
capital. If there is no stock level that satisfies condi­
tion (55) this stock, despite its renewability, will be 
exhausted. Those factors noted above which influence 
the time path of the stock of soil depth will also affect 
the time path of the stock of constituents as they give 
incentives for more or less conservation of the stock at 
points in time. Beyond introducing this generalized 
stock to further the demonstration of the applicability of 
the theory of extraction to the economics of soil manage­
ment, the stock is included to consider the implications 
of erosion induced losses of soil resources. The stock of 
constituents is assumed in the transition equations to be 
depleted in production in any period with this depletion de­
pending upon among other things the depth of soil. Assuming 
3g3t/9St > 0 then erosion in period t diminishes the stock of 
soil depth available for use in period t+1 and in subse­
quent periods but also results in a depletion of soil constit­
uents as soil is lost. Whether the lost constituents are 
replaced depends upon the time path of the stock. If the 
present value maximizing path is diminishing, erosion serves 
to further the desired results. If the path is increasing 
or constant, then the losses must be replaced. As with 
erosion control, there is a mix of methods by which to 
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augment and investment represents but one raèthod. 
Of importance in dynamic resource allocation models, 
is whether a steady state solution will emerge. If the 
resources in the soil state vector are renewable and if 
prices, technology, and the discount rate are constant, 
there is some basis for considering the possibility that 
a steady state solution exists (Plourde, 79). If, however, 
there are nonrenewable resources in the state vector which 
are depleted by production, then it is impossible to have 
such a steady state since production necessarily depletes 
and thus diminishes those stocks. 
The efficiency of soil exploitation 
It is observed above that the soil exploitation pro­
gram chosen by the price-taking present value-maximizing 
economic agent will depend, given the physical circum­
stances in which production takes place, upon the incentives 
given by the market. The efficiency or optimality of the 
program from a societal standpoint thus depends upon the in­
formation provided the farmer by the market. If there are 
no market failures,it is to be concluded that the program 
yields the optimal state of conservation of the soil resource. 
Any deviation from that state, be it one of underconserving 
or overconserving will result in a real social loss. But, 
if markets do not operate to provide the "correct informa-
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tion," the program chosen by the farmer may result in either 
overconservation or underconservation relative to the 
socially optimal state. Those potential sources of market 
failure which have found prominence in the literature on 
natural resources were noted above. Of these,failure due 
to lack of competition is generally not to be considered 
of importance in soil resources conservation since agri­
culture is regarded as competitive. However, failure to 
obtain the optimal state of conservation as a consequence 
of the absence of perfectly competitive, futures markets, 
perfectly competitive markets for contingent commodities, 
the presence of externalities and common property resources, 
and finally, the pervasive intervention of government in 
agriculture all warrant consideration and investigation. 
The issues involved are complex, particularly those arising 
as a consequence of the absence of complete sets of per­
fectly competitive futures and risk markets. In this 
analysis, considerations will be limited to the implications 
of external water quality damages resulting from erosion in 
a watershed and to measures by which water quality improve­
ments may be obtained. 
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Conjunctive Management of Soils and 
Water Quality 
In this section, the analysis is extended to the simul­
taneous exploitation of several soils and to the conjunctive 
management of soils and water quality. In order to facili­
tate this analysis, a model which is considerably simpler 
than that developed above is utilized. Let the maximum 
profit attainable from the exploitation of the i-th soil 
in period t be given by the function 
^it^^it' ®it^• (GO) 
It is assumed that ^ 0, this representing the 
assumption that more erosive crop practices will be more 
profitable and that restrictions on production to control 
erosion are costly. It might be assumed as well, though, 
that 
WT; > for 0 < E.^ < 
'"it 
31^ = 0 for (61) 
'"it 
< 0 for E.^ > «2 
which would imply that both highly erosive and minimally 
erosive crop practices would be less profitable than 
moderately erosive practices. It is assumed that 
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SiTi^/SSit ^ 0, implying that reductions in soil depth reduce 
profit possibilities. It is again assumed that 
^it+1 ^ ^ it ^sit ~ ®if (62) 
However, to simplify the analysis, it is now assumed that 
is a nonnegative constant. 
Let it be assumed that there are m soils in a water­
shed and that the volume of watershed production does not af­
fect product or factor prices. Let it further be assumed that 
each of the m soils is technologically independent. Consider 
first the problem of maximizing the discounted flow of 
profits from exploitation in the absence of offsite costs. 
So long as the profit functions are based upon market prices 
that reflect the marginal social values of commodities pro­
duced and used in production, this solution will represent 
a social optimum. The problem may be represented formally 
as : 
m n .  
max 2 Z Tr..(E.., S..)(l+r)"(^"^' 
t=l i=l It 
subject to m restrictions in each period t of the form 
®it+l ®it ^sit ~ ®it 
Eit > 0, > 0. (63) 
A solution to this problem, if one exists, is characterized 
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by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. The Lagrangian function is 
L= E Z S.  
t=l i=l 
- ^ it+lfSit+i-Sit-Rgit+Eit)' (64) 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are for soil i in period t: 
sBi; ° - Ait+i 1 0, 
% = + ^it+1 - ^ it 1 
®it 1 «; (67) 
âlj 
31— =-Sit+l + Sit + "sit - = "• («81 
/\ t—1 Defining = X^^^^(l+r) , then it can be ascertained 
from condition (65) that if erosion is positive in period 
t, then it must be true that 
31^ = '''' 
which implies that the level of erosion yielded by the 
crop production activities in period t on soil i must be 
such that the profits gained at the margin from additional 
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erosion, or conversely the profits forgone at the margin 
from reducing erosion, equal the marginal user cost of the 
resource stock. Condition (66) yields the result that if 
a positive soil depth is to be chosen in period t on 
soil i, then it must be true that 
STT . 
^^it (^it+l"^it) ' 
This implies that the marginal opportunity cost of holding 
the stock in period must equal the marginal value of the 
stock in production plus the appreciation of the stock. 
This condition is identical in economic content to those 
derived above. It differs as a consequence of the 
simplification of the model. Again, if the stock condition 
cannot be satisfied by a positive value of soil depth or if 
it is satisfied by a zero stock level, then the resource 
will be exhausted by time t. 
The erosion path and timing of soil exhaustion, if 
it occurs, in the optimal program will depend upon the 
behavior of agricultural commodities prices, factor prices, 
the discount rate and technology over time. In general, 
the more profitable future production can be, the less 
will be current erosion levels. The sequence of develop­
ment of alternative soils will also depend upon the behavior 
of prices, the discount rate, and technology over time. If, 
for example, the change in the profit possibilities over time 
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is generally upward, then one may expect better soils to be 
developed first with poorer soils developed as it becomes 
profitable to do so. 
Now assume that sediments from the m soils flow into a 
river and then into a reservoir where virtually all sediments 
are filtered out. Assume further that sediment is the sole 
water pollutant and that the m soils are the sole source of 
sediments. Let sediment production from soil i at time 
t be given by 
SDit = BiE-t (71) 
Assume that m-n soils deliver sediments to the upper reach 
of the river and let sediment delivery to that reach be 
given by 
sol = V S.E.^ - HyUKit) (72) 
where > 0 and is a sediment delivery control located 
offsite. Let the water quality damage costs be given at 
time t in the upper reach by 
D^(SD^) (73) 
where p^' > 0. Let sediment delivery to the lower reach of 
the river be given by 
T 11 
GiEit - HL'Kzt' 
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where H£ > 0. Finally, assume that sediment delivery to 
the reservoir is given by 
SD^ = fi(SD^ + ySD"). (75) 
Note that is the sediment delivery factor for soil i 
under the assumption that = 0 multiplied by some factor 
which converts inches of soil loss i into a flow of sedi­
ment. The parameter y is the sediment transportation 
factor for upper reach soils to the low reach and it is 
assumed that 0<y^l. The parameter 0 is the sediment trans­
portation factor for the second reach to the reservoir 
and is also assumed to be such that 0<n£l. The damage 
cost function for the reservoir is assumed at time t to be 
D^XSD*, Z^) (76) 
where 
8D^/3SD^ > 0 and 3D^/3Z^> 0, and where 
t-1 R \ SOf (77) 
This specification of the problem is clearly a 
substantial simplification of the process. First of all, 
sediment delivery from any given soil need not be a function 
of current erosion alone, but will depend upon past 
erosion as well. Secondly, while accumulated sediment 
delivery is assumed to cause reservoir damages, the same is 
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not allowed in rivers. Third, there is no reason to assume 
that transportation and delivery ratios are constant over 
time. These will vary with the nature of storms and as 
changes in those features of the land which affect 
delivery change over time. Finally, offsite controls are 
sediment delivery controls. There may be other forms of 
control as well which do not affect sediment delivery but, 
instead, enhance assimilative capacity or otherwise exploit 
the assimilative capacity of the stream and variations in it 
over time. However, the model does capture crucial aspects 
of the problem as it is commonly considered and serves as a 
useful vehicle for discussing water quality policy in the 
next section in that it does reflect most elements of dis­
cussion of the control of water quality found in the recent 
literature on the problem. 
Where agricultural commodities prices and factor prices 
reflect the marginal social values of the goods, and where 
the damage cost function reflects the willingness to pay 
for water quality improvements, the problem for the social 
planner is to maximize the quantity 
subject to the physical constraint set for each soil, the 
- Citait - =2t^2t' (78) 
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transition equations for the sediment delivery control 
stocks, which are assumed to take the form, 
Kit+1 = Kit(l-*i) + lit' (79) 
and to the nonnegativity of erosion, the soil stocks, and 
the capital stocks. Letting the Lagrangian multi­
plier for the stocks of soil depth (i = l,2,...,m) and 8^^^^ 
(i=l,2;) be the Lagrangian multipliers for the erosion control 
capital stocks, the Kuhn-Tucker conditions are; 
3^ 8D? 
3EIT ""IT " 9SD. 
gD? 
- 3Z^ (1+r)-»-^' - Xit+i < 0, 
]=t+l ] 
(%;)^it = ^it = ° (80) 
for all l£i;^m-n and l£t£<»; 
3D5 ,, 
(|^)E.^ = 0, and E.^ = 0 (81) 
for all m-n+l<i<m and l<t<<»; 
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#7- = + Ait+1 - ^ it i 
it it 
®it i » 
for all l<i<m and l<t«»; (82) 
-c.^(i+r)-'^-i' + eit+i < 0, 
<|^)Ilt = 0. and I.^ > 0. (83) 
for i = 1,2 and for all l£t^a>; 
= H^(D^' + YDt' + Y» -\) (l+r)-(t-l) 
9K^t " ^ ^ BSD* 
T 3DJ ,. 
+ ' + Git+l'l-'l'-Glt 1 0' 
]=t+l ] 
= 0, and > 0 
for all l£t<^; (84) 
||— = H£(D^ ' + SI -\) (l+r)-(t-l) 
9K2t L t ggpR 
3D? ,. , s  
+ ' +e2t+l(l-«2l-8ltl°' 
for all l<t<«>; 
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3L 
3X, it+1 
for all l<i<m and l<t<« (86) 
3L 
30 . it+1 "*it+l 
for i = 1,2 and for all l<t<a> (87) 
In condition (83), denotes the per unit cost of incre­
ments to the sediment delivery control stocks. 
The interpretation of these results is analogous to 
those above. The multiplier ^^t+l again the user cost 
of soil depth in soil i and is defined in an identical 
fashion. Condition (80) implies that the optimal rate 
of soil erosion for an upper reach soil is that rate at 
which the marginal profit from erosion, less the marginal 
damage cost occurring in the current period in the upper . 
river reach, the lower river reach, and the reservoir, and, 
finally, less the flow of discounted marginal costs of 
cumulative sedimentation of the reservoir, must equal the 
user cost of the soil. Condition (83) has similar implica­
tions for lower reach soil except that erosion of these soils 
has no effect upon the upper reach of the river, but, on the 
other hand, have a greater effect, per ton of erosion, than 
upper reach soils on sedimentation of the reservoir given Y<1. 
The effect of offsite costs is to diminish the profitability 
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of erosion in any period and, thus, to reduce erosion. 
The introduction of offsite costs will influence the path 
of soil exploitation then for each soil and will also affect 
the sequence of soils development and the timing of exhaus­
tion. Again, the character of the solution will depend 
upon how prices behave and upon the value of the discount 
rate as well as upon the physical constraint set and pro­
ductive technology. But, in addition, the processes of sedi­
ment delivery and transportation, and the behavior of the 
damage costs functions over time must be considered in 
analyzing exploitation paths for given soils and the sequence 
of soils development. 
Sediment control investments will be made, if positive, 
in a manner such that the user cost of the capital stocks 
are equal to the marginal costs of these stocks, as implied 
by condition (84). Iterating (86) and (87) yields 
expressions for the marginal user costs of the control 
stocks under the assumption that these stocks are always 
positive. In the optimal program these are; 
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R 
®lt+l = ^ {HA(D*' + D^' + Y» —:L) (l+r)-!]-!) 
j=t+l ^ ] ] aSDj 
+ E yO (88) 
k=j+l ^ 
,, 30^ ,. , V 
0. , = z HMor + n 
j=t+i ] asDj 
+20 ^^^^l+r)"(k-l)}(i_g )i-t+l^ (89) 
k=j+l ^ 
It is seen that the marginal user costs are discounted 
flows of the reductions in damage costs afforded by the 
capital stocks and that they depend upon the discount rate 
and the behavior of the damage costs functions over time. 
Erosion Control Policy 
It was observed in the preceding chapter that there 
is, at present, a considerable interest in developing 
public erosion control measures. The objective of this 
chapter is to consider some of the proposals which have 
been made and some others as well. Perhaps the appropriate 
point to begin this discussion is with some consideration of 
the motives for public intervention. Accepting Musgrave's 
(73) theory of multiple budget determination, public 
measures to control soil erosion would be indicated if 
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markets fail to provide an efficient or equitable alloca­
tion of soil resource stocks over time or an allocation 
which would be consistent with stabilization objectives. 
The strongest argument for government intervention most 
certainly would be made on the basis that agricultural 
markets fail to yield efficient levels of erosion for one 
or more of the reasons previously outlined, given this norma­
tive viewpoint. While depletion of soils may have some 
implication for sustained economic growth, it is difficult 
to see how adjustments would be called for so long as erosion 
rates are efficient and equitable since any deviation from 
such a path would result in a real welfare loss. Further, 
it is difficult to argue that an inequitable allocation of 
intergenerational welfare would require that adjustments to 
erosion rates be made for the explicit purpose of achieving 
equity given that welfare is far more likely to be a function 
of the distribution of all sources of wealth over time and 
since adjustments to an otherwise efficient alloca­
tion of soils resource stocks over time may cause real 
welfare losses to present and future generations. But it is 
not so difficult to argue that market failures which may 
result in inefficient allocation of soil resource stocks are 
present and, thus, that government intervention on these 
grounds may be warranted. Beyond Musgrave's normative 
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justifications, government intervention may clearly arise as 
a consequence of other motives. However, there is little 
the economist can say about these beyond indicating their 
impacts on efficiency and distribution. In particular, if 
intervention is motivated by considerations other than 
efficiency, equity, or growth, then the action falls outside 
the realm of justifications based upon normative economic 
reasoning in a market economy in which consumer sovereignty 
prevails. It will be assumed for the remainder of this 
analysis that erosion control measures are proposed to secure 
a more efficient allocation of resources. Such measures fall 
into Musgrave's allocative function of government as dis­
tinguished from the distribution and stabilization func­
tions. 
The test for the existence of a market failure is 
whether, given the distribution of welfare, there exists a 
reallocation of erosion levels over time that will result 
in a net increase in social welfare, the reallocation being 
relative to the market solution. However, to find that such 
a reallocation does exist is not sufficient to establish the 
efficiency of government intervention. There may exist a 
variety of alternative measures by which potential Pareto 
improvements may be secured, the appropriateness of which 
will vary with the source of the problem. The test for the 
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desirability of government intervention on efficiency 
grounds is whether there exists a government measure which, 
with its attendant resource costs, results in a net social 
gain. If there are several such measures, then the 
appropriate measure and the appropriate degree to which it 
is pursued, will depend upon the relative net gains of 
the alternatives. 
Consider again the area including the m soils and 
suppose that the only potential source of market failure 
is the degradation of water quality by sedimentation. 
Given that the upper reach, lower reach, and reservoir are 
common property resources, there exists no functioning private 
market mechanism by which to price the use of these resources 
as receptacles for erosion and, thus, farmers will initially 
erode freely into them. Note two problems that arise. 
The failure of the external effects to be priced may result 
in a misallocation of resources in which erosion is excessive 
and in which, as a consequence, water quality is less than 
socially optimal and the stock of soil resources is depleted 
at a rate in excess of that which is socially optimal (Bator, 
7; Buchanan and Stubblebine, 16; Meade, 69). Measures taken 
by the public sector to obtain an improvement in resource 
allocation by reducing soil erosion rates may be considered 
then as environmental improvement policies and as soil 
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conservation policies. 
Students of the problem of externalities are generally 
agreed that if the number of parties affected by the externali­
ty and if the number of parties generating the externality are 
small, then negotiations among these parties will generally 
be expected to result in a socially optimal solution. In 
Buchanan and Stubblebine's (16) terminology, bargaining converts 
a Pareto relevant externality into simply a relevant but 
non-Pareto relevant externality, meaning that initially there 
are gains from trade to be had changing the level of erosion 
and that after negotiations these gains are exhausted, al­
though the externality remains. Such a solution corresponds 
to the Coase Theorem (25), that if property rights are well-
delineated and if there are no transactions costs, then the 
socially optimal level of externality will be obtained by 
negotiations among the parties involved. While qualifications 
to this theorem have been noted by a number of contributors, 
the major problem is that if there are large numbers, then 
transactions costs and free-rider problems can circumvent 
the process. 
The existence of transactions costs do not necessarily 
preclude the achievement of an efficient solution by private 
negotiations. Mishan (72), for example, has considered the 
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implications of lump-sum transactions costs on the existence 
off and bargaining to a solution under alternative distribu­
tions of rights. If, however, government intervention is 
costless, or if the costs of government intervention are 
less than the private transactions costs, and if the benefits 
net of these costs are positive, then government interven­
tion is called for. This point is made by Calabresi (22) 
who goes on to stress that the objective of government inter­
vention should be to choose that measure of set of measures 
that allows the solution which would obtain in the market 
if negotiations were costless to be most closely and cheaply 
approximated, given that the benefits of intervention exceed 
the costs. It is further stressed, however, that the costs 
of a measure or set of measures will make not the costless 
market solution, but some alternative solution the social 
optimum, which is clearly true if costs are not only lump­
sum in nature, as considered by Mishan, but also composed 
of variable costs. This has also been noted by Miranowski 
and Alt (70) who consider the implications of information, 
administration, and enforcement costs on the levels of con­
trol and choice between alternative pollution control 
policies. 
The public policy measures found most frequently in 
the economic literature for obtaining improvements in 
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resource allocation when misallocation is a consequence 
of technological externalities are Pigovian taxes, pollu­
tion abatement subsidies, pollution rights markets, and 
residuals restrictions or regulations (Davis and Kamien, 
33). These and other policies are considered below. 
Pigovian tax or user charge policy 
The taxation of externalities was originally proposed 
by Pigou (78). The approach has received considerable 
support by a number of students of environmental economics, 
most particularly Kneese and Bower (61), as well as others, 
with a notable defense of the approach against the negative 
arguments put forth by Coase and others being offered by 
Baumol (8). Suppose that the tax policy has associated with 
it no information or policy costs of any kind. The objective 
is to tax sediment delivery from each source at a rate 
equivalent to the marginal damage costs at the optimum. 
Thus, the tax placed on sediment delivery to the upper 
reach is equal at time t to D^'(SD^u*) where SD^u* is the 
socially optimal level of sediment delivery. The tax placed 
upon sediment delivery to the lower reach is equal to 
L' L* L* (SD^ ) at time t where SD^ is the optimal amount of 
sediment delivery at time t to this reach. Finally, the tax 
placed upon sediment delivery to the reservoir at time t 
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will be equal to 
BSD* j=t+l 
where SD** and Zt are the socially optimal values of SD* 
and Zj at time t. 
It is to be observed that the three taxes on sediment 
delivery from an upper reach soil can be reduced to a 
single tax of the amount, at time t, 
UCtu = Dt'(SDt*) + YD^'(SDL*) 
+ Yn{^°t(SDt ) + ; !^ii^(i+r)-(i-t)}. 
asDt j=t+i 
(91) 
similarly, the two taxes on sediment delivery from a lower 
reach soil can be reduced to a single tax of the amount, 
at time t, 
^ (92) 
Note that the two taxes differ between reaches as the 
effective marginal damage costs of sediment delivery differ 
and that they will both vary over time. To observe the 
efficiency of the solution requires simply observing that if 
there is subtracted from the maximand for the first problem 
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considered above, the discounted sum of the product of these 
tax rates and sediment delivery over the time horizon, condi­
tions for sediment delivery identical to those obtained in 
the second problem will be yielded. Note, further, that 
where sediment delivery is a function of erosion, the 
Pigovian tax, which is placed on the externality, trans­
lates to a tax on erosion. The tax on erosion of the i-th 
upper reach soil will be 
UC®u = BiUC=„. (93) 
The tax on erosion of a lower reach soil is obtained in a 
similar manner. It is to be observed that, although there 
are only two sediment delivery tax rates at any point in time, 
there could be as many as m soil erosion tax rates. But, 
without knowledge of sediment delivery, there cannot be in­
formation about the optimal sediment or erosion tax rates. 
The problem of monitoring residual flows is one of con­
siderable importance in considering environmental policy 
alternatives and becomes partially complex when dealing 
with nonpoint source pollution. Absence of information and 
other policy cost considerations will, however, be considered 
further below. 
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Sediment abatement subsidies 
An alternative to the taxation of externalities is 
subsidization of the reduction of such. To illustrate, 
consider the following problem. A firm produces a commodity 
q and also in fixed proportions an externality z. Let 
z = 3q. The Pigovian tax strategy would impose a tax 
equal to the marginal damage cost at the optimum. Let 
this tax be denoted t*. The problem of the firm is, then, 
to 
max Pq - C(q) - Zt*. (94) 
q 
The first order condition for an extremum is 
P - C - et* = 0. (95) 
The abatement subsidy policy is as follows: Let A be the 
"base" level of externality and let the firm receive a sub­
sidy of 
S = (A-Z)t*. (96,) 
Note that (A-Z) is the level of abatement of the externality, 
and that the subsidy rate is equal to the Pivogian tax 
which is equal to the marginal damage cost at the optimum. 
The problem of the firm is now to 
max Pq - C(q) + (A-Z)t* (97) 
q 
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and the first order condition for an extremum is 
P - C (q) - 3t* = 0. (99). 
Thus, the firm's output of product and of externality will 
be equivalent under the two control strategies. There are, 
however, certain problems that arise and the apparent 
symmetry of a Pigovian tax policy and abatement subsidy 
policy vanishes. This symmetry is complete if and only if 
the firms producing prior to the imposition of the tax are 
the same as those after imposition. Considering a single 
soil, imposition of a tax may result in a nonpositive present 
value so that the soil will be withdrawn from production. 
This withdrawal, however, may not occur under the abatement 
subsidy program since under this program the firm receives 
subsidy payments rather than tax payments. For the subsidy 
to be neutral with respect to decisions of whether or not 
to produce, it must be true that farmers will receive the 
subsidy if they do withdraw and further that all potential 
entrants are eligible for the subsidy as well so that their 
decisions as to whether or not to enter are unaffected 
by the institution of the program (Baumol and Gates, 10). 
If potential entrants are not eligible then, depending 
upon how the subsidy bases are chosen, the possibility 
emerges that the subsidy will give incentives to bring land 
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which was not previously in use into use so that the 
aggregate level of erosion flows may exceed pre-policy levels 
even though farms previously producing are yielding lesser 
sediment loads. These implications follow under the assump­
tion that.product and factor prices are unaltered by the 
imposition of the policy. If prices do change,the symmetry 
between the policies which appears to obtain by making 
potential entrants eligible is not forthcoming. Indeed, 
it is to be expected that residuals flows will exceed those 
that would have occurred in the absence of the policy 
measure if the industry is competitive (Baumol and Oates, 
10). 
Sedimentation rights market 
Dales (31) originally proposed the auctioning of pollu­
tion rights as a solution to environmental quality problems. 
This policy involves having the public authority auction off 
rights to utilize common property resources, primarily air 
and water, as waste receptacles. As long as the supply of 
rights is equivalent to the optimal level of pollution, the 
result is perfectly symmetric with that of a Pigovian tax. 
In the problem at hand, the authority would sell rights for 
upper reach sedimentation, rights for lower reach sedi­
mentation, and rights for reservoir sedimentation. An 
upper reach farmer would need to acquire all three types 
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while a lower reach farmer would need to acquire only lower 
reach and reservoir sedimentation rights. The rights prices 
established in these markets would equal i.the Pigovian tax 
or abatement subsidy rates. 
Other policies for onsite control of erosion 
The three policies discussed above have all been men­
tioned by various contributors as potential erosion control 
measures. It is not difficult to conceive of a variety of 
others and a number of alternatives can be found in the 
literature. Examples include restrictions on erosion levels 
from farms or from parcels of land, land use restrictions 
such as prohibition of farming on more erosive soils, restric­
tions on crop rotations and cropping practices, and charges 
and/or subsidies to give farmers incentives to install 
erosion control structures and to utilize crops and cropping 
practices which are soil conserving. 
In a world of perfect information in which there are no 
direct resource costs associated with policy measures, 
any policy approach which yields the same allocation of 
resources that is obtained by a Pigovian tax policy is as 
efficient and in such a world there exists no economic basis 
for choosing among those policies which yield the efficient 
solution (Fisher and Peterson, 37). The set of efficient 
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policies will, of course, only be some subset of the set 
of all possible erosion control policies. 
There is virtually no question that many of the poli­
cies emphasized to date would not be included in this 
subset since, as with the thrust of environmental quality 
policy on the whole in the nation, these approaches 
generally stress the use of control technologies with little 
consideration of the costs and benefits incurred (Portney, 
80)  .  
Government provision and offsite controls 
It has been recognized that in some cases, returns to 
scale, property rights problems, and other considerations make 
government production an important aspect of efficient pollu­
tion control. The Environmental Protection Agency has placed 
considerable emphasis upon the utilization of onsite erosion 
controls and little attention has been given to offsite 
controls. Students of environmental economics, most 
notably Kneese, Ayres, and d'Arge (59), stress the concept 
of materials balance in considering the control of pollu­
tion. Among other implications of the concept, as applied 
by economists, are that environmental degradation problems 
can be dealt with by reducing production of goods and 
services, by reducing the flow of residuals from producing a 
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given amount of goods and services, by recovering and re­
cycling residuals, by altering the composition of output, 
by controlling the timing and location of discharges to 
utilize the assimilative capacity of the environment to its 
fullest, and by investing in the assimilative capacity of 
the environment (Freeman et al., 41). All of these have 
some applicability to the sedimentation control problem and 
also have significant implications for government production 
or provision. Greenbelts along rivers and offsite sedimen­
tation impoundments offer measures by which to diminish 
residuals flows for given volumes of production and also 
to control the timing and location of residuals flows. A 
"down-gully" landowner or an owner of riverfront property 
may have no incentives to make such investments which are 
of social value but which may be of little personal value. 
By acquiring property to build impoundments or by acquiring 
riverfront property or offering riverfront property owners 
incentives to develop natural filters, an alternative to 
onsite control is obtained. 
The possibility of government investments in offsite 
controls to reduce sediment delivery motivated the in­
clusion of the two offsite erosion control capital stocks 
in the model developed above. It was observed that in­
vestments in these offsite measures ought to be made to the 
extent that the flow of discounted benefits of these controls. 
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these being the reduction in damage costs allowed, warranted 
the social costs of the measures. It is to be observed, 
then, that an optimal solution to the sedimentation problem 
will have some mix of onsite and offsite control measures 
and that this mix will vary over time and space. It is to 
be further noted that where damage costs are strictly in­
creasing with sedimentation levels, reduction in sediment 
delivery by offsite measures will diminish the Pigovian 
taxes. In addition to offsite sediment delivery measures, 
there may be other offsite public control measures which 
affect damage costs by, for example, enhancing the assimi­
lative capacity of waters. To the extent that such measures 
exist, their inclusion in considerations of efficient 
control is required. 
Further Analysis of Water Quality 
Improvement Policies 
The discussion of policy in the preceding section 
has assumed perfect information and has ignored a number 
of important policy considerations. These will be dis­
cussed in this section. 
Information 
A major problem in the application of theoretically 
derived policy propositions in the real world is the absence 
of information on damage costs. Without this information, it 
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is impossible to identify an optimal Pigovian tax, abate­
ment subsidy rate, regulation levels and so on. Baumol (8) 
has suggested, it lieu of information on damage costs, 
a policy which is variously known as the "Targets with 
Taxes" policy and the "Standards and Charges" policy. This 
policy involves the specification of some environmental 
quality standard which is then achieved at least cost by 
the imposition of residuals charges. For example, suppose 
that on upper reach, lower reach, and reservoir standards 
are imposed and that the standards involve limitations on 
total sediment delivery to each of the bodies of water. 
The solution found by maximizing the present value of the 
flow of profits from soil exploitation subject to these 
restrictions would yield a solution in which a unqiue set 
of charges would be placed upon sediment delivery, or, 
equivalently, an alternative but still unique set of 
charges could be placed upon erosion levels from each of 
the soils. The problems created by absence of information 
go beyond those created by the absence of damage cost in­
formation. If damage cost information were available but 
abatement cost information were not, the problem of identi­
fying the optimum still exists, and, moreover, a least 
cost abatement policy cannot be identified. Perhaps more 
importantly, given fairly good information on agricultural 
production costs, is the previously noted absence of infor­
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mation on sediment delivery. To tax a firm on the residuals 
flow from it requires that this flow can be identified and, 
without this information, taxes, marketable rights, and 
efficient regulation policies cannot proceed to yield the 
social optimum. Considerations of this sort, assuming that 
it is somehow known to be socially desirable; to reduce 
erosion levels, may give some basis for subsidies to utilize 
control practices and construct control structures, to 
impose technical specifications on production, or to pro­
vide programs in which farmers are made to make payments 
to the public authority which are placed in deposit and 
returnable to the operator upon proof of meeting specified 
performance standards (Baumol and Oates, 9) . 
Stochastic considerations 
The quality of water will depend not only upon sediment 
loadings but also upon variations in the volume and rate 
of stream flow as well as upon other factors. Damage costs 
will fluctuate not only with fluctuations in water quality, 
but also with variations in fish populations and other factors 
which attract people to water, and with fluctuations in the 
demand for water. Clearly, then, fairly predictable seasonal 
variations as well as not so predictable random variations 
in water quality damages, may be expected. On the abatement 
cost side, there will also be some predictable seasonal 
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variations and some not so predictable random variations 
due, for instance, to predictable and random variations 
in weather conditions. The Pigovian tax, or any other 
efficient control mechanism, would then have to be ad­
justed as marginal abatement and damage costs fluctuate. 
There are> however, two major problems with frequent rate 
variations. The first is identifying changes in the 
appropriate rates and implementing them, and the second is 
that farms will be unable to respond instantly to such 
changes even if feasible. The latter is of particular 
importance. Suppose that stream flow falls to very low 
levels and that a rainstorm occurs which does not affect 
stream flow above the reach in which sediments are delivered. 
The introduction of runoff waters with high sediment concen­
trations may have critical impacts upon stream quality, yet 
a tax increase of any magnitude would have no effect and nor 
would virtually any other onsite control. Note here, also, 
that even if "quick response" onsite control methods existed, 
sediments accumulated in runoff delivery channels as well 
as erosion from other sites may have a substantial impact, 
both of which were ignored in the model developed above. 
It was noted in the previous chapter that sediments are 
delivered in pulse loadings associated with rainfall events. 
For situations in which there are random variations in 
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residuals flows with critical levels, Baumol and Gates 
(10) have suggested the utilization of taxes to achieve 
desired control levels during normal times. Taxes are a 
measure which cause adjustments which take time to achieve 
the desired effect and with frequent changes, nonoptimal 
responses will occur. The tax rates could alternatively be 
set at levels which diminish the probability of critical 
levels to some acceptable level, but in normal times the 
cost of such a policy may be quite high. Thus, they 
suggest, instead, the use of standby controls for use at 
critical times. The appropriate mix of tax and regulation 
controls would be that mix which minimizes the expected 
cost of residuals control. 
The problem with such a mixed or hybrid strategy in 
the case at hand is the virtual impossibility of quick-response 
control mechanisms as noted above. The farmer's fields are 
tilled and crops planted, slopes, slope length, and soil 
erosivity given at the time of the rainfall event so that the 
onsite determinants of erosion are given. Some might sug­
gest that this would, thus, require stringent measures to 
reduce the probability of critical levels to an acceptable 
level even though the need for controls may be negligible 
during most of the time. I would suggest, however, that it 
most likely implies the need for public investment in im­
poundments or other methods which allow the control of timing 
and magnitude of sediment delivery. 
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Policy cost considerations 
There will be associated with the various potential 
control strategies administration and enforcement costs., and 
these costs will vary among control programs. These costs 
must be incorporated into an analysis of the alternatives 
to no less an extent than any other costs and benefits of 
these alternatives and the inclusion of such costs in the 
analysis may result in a rearrangement of the rankings of 
these relative to the case in which they are not included. 
There has not been, however, any extensive research on these 
costs and to a large extent, it will be the case that these 
costs are dependent upon local conditions. For example, 
if damage costs are composed solely of water treatment 
costs, then abatement benefits may be more readily identi­
fied and estimated than when damages include diminished 
recreation values. As a further example, physical conditions 
in one area may be considerably more conducive to monitoring 
residual flows, as is required for a pure Pigovian tax, an 
abatement subsidy, or any other policy in which the levels 
of residuals flows from particular sources are controlled, 
than in other areas. It is to be noted that, as in most 
cases of nonpoint source pollution, monitoring of residuals 
flows is a complex if not impossible task and may be quite 
costly. This suggests that there may be some considerable 
policy cost advantages to measures which do not require 
the accurate measurement of such flows. 
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Political acceptability and equity 
The history of pollution control in the United States 
and the nature of many of the current proposals reflect 
the greater acceptability of regulation and subsidization 
policies over the charge and marketable rights policies 
to a considerable degree. In an interesting paper, 
Buchanan and Tullock (17) show, for the case of residuals 
regulation, that those affected will have an incentive to 
be regulated rather than charged and that, in general, the 
balance of political interests will result in the greater 
political acceptability of such a control measure. And 
clearly, those to whom policies are directed, would prefer 
subsidization to taxation. An additional consideration, 
which is again related to political acceptability, is the 
real and perceived distribution of burdens and benefits 
of controls. These will vary with the measure. While 
these considerations do not bear upon the analysis of the 
efficiency of alternative measures, they are of considerable 
importance to the real world feasibility of implementing 
control measures. 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has considered soil conservation for indi­
vidual soils and groups of soils and the conjunctive manage­
ment of soils and water quality. It is emphasized that the 
soil management problem is a dynamic problem in the con­
junctive management of the resource stocks that together 
form the composite soil resource, a point which has been 
explicitly recognized in few of the recent analyses of 
erosion control. It is further emphasized that the economic 
theory of natural resource extraction is applicable to the 
problem of erosion, and, in general, to the management of 
soils. This, too, has been recognized by but a few students 
of soil conservation as the developments in this theory which 
have been widely accepted for their usefulness in considering 
problems in minerals extraction, the fishery, forestry, and 
other renewable and nonrenewable resource problems have, as 
yet, not been incorporated to any substantial degree in the 
analysis of agricultural problems. It is noted that there 
may be a variety of sources of failure to achieve the optimum 
state of conservation. To the extent soil conservation is 
not optimal, due to water quality damages, it will be the 
case that those policies which are designed to obtain 
environmental quality improvements efficiently will also 
result in appropriate levels of erosion, given that there 
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are no other sources of failure. There are, however, several 
areas requiring detailed investigation necessary to the 
design and implementation of efficient erosion control 
policies. These include research relating to the generation, 
transportation and damage costs of sediments, the costs of 
offsite control measures and onsite control measures, and 
the information, administration, and enforcement costs of 
alternative policy measures. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE WATERSHED PROGRAMMING MODEL 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the linear programming model of 
crop production developed to investigate economic issues 
in cropland erosion and erosion control in the Four Mile 
Creek watershed. The first section below provides a 
generalized mathematical description of the model and sub­
sequent sections discuss certain features of the model in 
greater detail. Results from the applications of the model 
are presented and discussed in the following chapter. 
Agricultural production is quite complex and in many 
respects too little understood to allow an exact representa­
tion of the physical and economic processes involved 
(Heady, 47). The difficulties in modelling which arise 
as a consequence are further complicated when, as in this 
investigation, the analysis is concerned not just with the 
present state but also with the future. This is due to the 
problems inherent in forecasting future economic and 
technological conditions. Because of these difficulties and 
because of problems which emerge in developing an efficient 
computational technique for generating quantitative results, 
a number of simplifying assumptions and abstractions are 
made to both facilitate and focus the analysis. These 
include the assumptions that product and factor prices. 
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production technology, and environmental conditions are 
invariant over time. It is further assumed that the soil 
resource state vectors for the soils considered, contain 
only two elements; the stock of land and stock of soil depth. 
The former is again assumed constant. These assumptions 
are noted àt this point to facilitate the discussion that 
follows. 
The Structure of the Model 
The objective function 
The objective function of the model is present value of 
the cash flow from production activities for a period of 
fifty years less the present value of penalty function and 
other adjustments. The penalty function is constructed 
to reflect the costs imposed on future years by the soil 
losses resulting from production during the period under 
consideration. This formulation allows an investigation 
of the first fifty years of the crop production plan that 
would be developed by an unspecified private economic 
planner charged with maximizing the net present value of 
production in the entire watershed. 
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The soil management groups 
In order to facilitate the derivation of inferences 
of interest to this research, soils present in the water­
shed are classified by management characteristics, particu­
lar emphasis being given to topsoil and subsoil depths and 
erosivity, of soils, into four relatively homogeneous 
groups. The characteristics of these soil management groups 
relevant to construction of the model are obtained as 
weighted averages of the characteristics of the component 
soils. This treatment of soils is comparable to treatments 
found in a number of watershed studies (Frohberg and Swanson, 
42; Guntermann et al., 45; Narayanan et al., 74; Narayanan 
and Swanson, 75; Seitz et al., 87; Swanson, 99). Table 4.1 
lists the soils in each of the four groups and the total 
acerage of the groups. Table 4.2 presents weighted average 
indicators of the erosivity of the soils in the groups and 
weighted average topsoil depths. The value RKLSl in 
Table 4.2 is the product of the R, K, L, and S factors 
of the Universal Soil Loss Equation for unterraced land. 
The value RKLS2 is that product for terraced land. 
The watershed production model is divided into four 
independent submodels. These submodels are associated with 
the soil management groups and are constructed with allow­
ance for the management characteristics of the component soils. 
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Table 4.1-. Four Mile Creek soil management groups 
Management 
group 
Acreage Soils 
I 2545 118 119 122 
133 430 933 
428B 933B 
II 4385 008B OllB 119B 
120B 162B 377B 
III 4822 120C2 162C2 179C2 
377C2 120D2 162D2 
179D2 377D2 683D2 
763D2 120D3 162D3 
179D3 192D3 377D3 
683D3 763D3 
IV 601 162E2 162E3 
162F3 179E2 
192E3 763E2 
763F3 
162F2 
179E3 
763E3 
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Table 4,2. Group soil depths and erosivity 
Soil 
management 
group 
RKLSl^ 
(tons/acre 
yr. ) 
RKLS2 
(tons/acre 
yr. ) 
Average 
top soil 
depthc 
(inches) 
I 6.46 6.28 more than 20 
II 22.25 19.06 16.39 
III 114.39 70.62 6.34 
IV 357.65 215.97 less than 3 
^RKLSl is the weighted average of the products of the 
R, K, L, and S factors of the USLE of the soils in the group 
for unterraced land. 
^RKLS2 is the weighted average of the products of the 
R, K, L, and S factors of the USLE of the soils in the group 
for terraced land. 
^Soil depths are determined for individual soils by 
assuming that soils in erosion phases zero and one have the 
maximum soil depth indicated in the Four Mile Creek Soil 
Survey (38). Soils in erosion phase two are assumed to 
have seven inches which is the typical maximum for a soil 
to be in erosion phase two. Soils in erosion phase three 
are assumed to have depths of three inches which is the 
typical maximum depth for a soil in phase three. 
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The structure of the watershed model is most easily illus­
trated by considering the submodels separately. 
The Group I Submodel 
The soils in the first management group either have no 
erosion hazard or have negligible erosion hazard and very 
deep topsoils. For this reason, there will be no signifi­
cant depletion of soil depth and no significant stock 
effects and it is therefore expected that these soils have 
zero user costs. With the assumptions outlined above, it 
follows that the same production plan will be chosen in 
every year. 
Let be the acres allocated to the j-th crop 
production activity in any year. The per unit cost of the 
activity is denoted C^j, the output of the r-th crop per unit 
of the activity is denoted and the annual erosion per 
unit of the activity is denoted . Let P^. be the 
price of the r-th crop and L^ be the land area of the 
soil management group. It follows that the cash flow from 
crop production in any year will be given by 
m^ n^ m^ 
^1 " Vljr^lj " ^Ij^lj' 
where m^ denotes the number of permissible activities in 
the group and n^ the number of crops which can be produced. 
Let ggQ denote that factor which gives the present value 
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of one dollar earned annually for fifty years. The present 
value of cash flow from the group will then be "^ h^e 
management plan which maximizes this quantity, will also be 
the management plan which maximizes (1) subject to the 
land resource constraint: 
< Li . (2) 
mi 
] =
The erosion resulting from the plan in each year will be 
"l 
^1 " jfi Plj^li' 
It is.clear that in the absence of any policies con­
straining erosion or the selection of crop production 
activities, the optimal activity will be that activity 
having the greatest annual cash flow.^ 
The Group II Submodel 
The soils in Group II are generally more erosive and 
have shallower topsoils than those in the first group. 
Yet, it is still anticipated that the user cost for these 
soils will be negligible. Based upon USDA (110) estimating 
procedures, a loss of 4.61 inches of topsoil would be re­
quired before any diminution of productive capacity would 
^If there are two or more activities with equal net 
returns and if these net returns are in excess of those from 
the remaining activities, the model will choose some in­
determinate linear combination of the most profitable 
activities. 
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I 
begin to occur. If the fields were left continuously fallow 
and tilled, the RKLSl value given in Table 4.2 implies that 
it would take approximately twenty-nine years to deplete 
these inches given that one-hundred and forty tons 
of soil loss are required to lose one inch. With a 
crop management factor of fifty percent, which is quite high, 
nearly sixty years of highly erosive management would be 
required before losses of productive capacity of any magni­
tude would commence. Further, with such a crop management 
factor, complete depletion of the topsoil, assuming no 
soil formation, would require over two-hundred and fifty 
2 years of highly erosive management. Yet, the subsoils in 
this group are rated as being highly favorable for row crop 
production (Fenton et al., 36). It is expected, then, that 
with a positive discount rate and with the assumptions 
made concerning prices and technology, there is 
little or nothing to be gained by introducing an inter-
The soils in Group II are indicated by Table 4.2 to 
have an average soil depth of 16.39 inches. Based on the 
procedures, mixing of topsoil with subsoil would not be 
expected with deep tillage iuntil the soil depth has been 
diminished to twelve inches. Thus, the estimate of 4.61 
inches given is obtained. 
2 The soil lost to erosion is not entirely topsoil since 
tillage results in mixing of topsoil and subsoil. Conse^ 
quently, the inches of topsoil which must be lost to deplete 
the topsoil is in excess of the initial depth of the topsoil. 
The USDA procedures: indicates that approximately eighteen 
inches of soil loss must occur to achieve a mix of topsoil 
and subsoil which is predominantly composed of subsoil with 
deep tillage and once mixing has begun. 
^. 
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temporal interdependence of production possibilities for 
this management group. 
The submodel for this group is essentially the same 
as that for the first. The only difference between the 
two models is that contour cultivation is considered for 
this group. Erosion from the first group's soils is so 
negligible that there is virtually nothing to be gained 
by contour cultivation or the installation of terraces. The 
slopes of the soils in the second group are sufficient to 
obtain significant reductions in erosion by contouring but 
are not so steep that terracing would be considered. This 
allowance for contouring expands the number of activities 
available in any year. Further modification is required 
for the cost of laying contours. 
To utilize contour cultivation requires that informa­
tion on how to do so be acquired. This information is 
considered here as a capital stock and one of the two 
erosion control stocks included explicitly in the model. 
The information is acquired at some cost but is assumed 
to be applicable into perpetuity. Given the assump­
tions concerning the invariance of prices, technology, 
and environmental conditions, and given the proposition 
that the marginal user cost, .of soil depth is essentially 
zero for soils in Group II, it follows that if contour cultiva-
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tion is utilized it will be utilized in all years in the 
fifty-year period as the same production plan will be chosen 
for those years. The information required must be obtained in 
the first year and is charged against the cash flow in that 
year. 
Let Agj be the acres allocated to the j-th crop pro­
duction activity in any year in the planning horizon, Cg^ be 
the per unit cost of the activity, be the output of the 
z jr 
r-th crop per acre from the activity, and pg^ be the 
annual soil loss per acre of the activity. Let j = 
l,2,...,m2 be the indexes for those crop production activi­
ties not associated with contour cultivation and j = mg+l, 
m2+2,...,m2 be the indexes for those crop production activi­
ties associated with contour cultivation. The cash flow 
in any year exclusive of capital expenditures is 
m^  "2 "^ 2 
^2 = ^.=1 V2jr^2j " 
Where is the cost per acre of laying contours. The total 
contouring expenditures incurred in the first year will be 
given by 
"^ 2 
CC = Z P A„.. (5) 
j=m2+l 3 
Stocks of machinery and equipment, which may include 
implements required for conservation tillage activities, are 
not given explicit treatment in the model. It is essentially 
assumed that the services of these capital stocks can be 
rented in the market. However, the services of terraces and 
contours cannot be had without acquiring the stocks. 
127 
Consequently, the present value of crop production from the 
soils in the group is 82^50*^^2' choice of crop pro­
duction activities is constrained by the land available or 
where is the aggregate acreage of the soils in the 
group. The annual erosion resulting from these soils 
is given by 
As in Group I, the optimal activity is that activity 
which yields the greatest annual cash flow and in the 
absence of any restrictions on land use or erosion, the 
entire average available will be allocated to that 
It is to be noted that maximizing the present value 
defined above will result in a bias against investments 
in contours because the full costs are charged biiit the 
entire flow of benefits from contour cultivation are not 
accounted for. To remove this bias a charge equal to the 
present value of the annualized cost of the investment 
paid for fifty years can be utilized in place of the actual 
^See footnote on p. 123. 
( 6 )  
(7) 
activity 1 
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cost. Thus, at a contouring cost of one dollar per acre 
and a discount rate of ten percent, the per acre charge for 
contouring in the model would be $0,005. The cost of laying 
contours is handled in this manner to eliminate the bias. 
The adjusted net present value function, where is replaced 
by P^, the latter being the adjusted cost, is maximized 
subject to the restriction in Equation (6). To obtain the 
actual cash flow in the first period requires modifying 
the results for actual investment expenditures. 
Comments on the Group I and Group II Submodels 
The use of linear programming models has come to be 
widespread in both the analysis of agricultural production 
decisions and the analysis of environmental quality and 
residuals management as a consequence of the computational 
efficiency with which solutions may be obtained and the 
facility with which such models may be manipulated to obtain 
alternative solutions (Jensen, 55; Kneese and Bower, 60). 
The application of such models to the economic analysis of 
cropland erosion and erosion control has also been wide­
spread and the use of the technique is recommended in an 
EPA (113) publication concerned with analysis methodology 
for cropland erosion control. The Group I and Group II 
models are comparable in their basic structure to many of the 
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previous models developed for investigating the issue. It 
is in the structure of the Group III model that the 
watershed model developed here is innovative. A few 
dynamic models for the investigation of issues related to 
cropland erosion have been developed in the past but not all 
have been true dynamic optimization models (e.g., Narayanan 
et al., 74) and the erosion control policy analyses con­
tained in the remainder have been quite limited (e.g., Burt, 
20; Frohberg and Swanson, 42). 
The Group III Submodel 
Soil scientists classify the severity of erosion on a 
soil by erosion phases. A soil in erosion phase zero is 
uneroded and a soil in erosion phase one is uneroded to 
slightly eroded. In both cases there is no evidence of 
subsoil mixing in the plow layer. Soils in erosion phase 
zero typically have twelve or more inches of top soil while 
soils in erosion phase one have between seven and twelve 
inches of top soil. Erosion phase two classifies a soil as 
moderately eroded with some mixing of topsoil and subsoil 
while soils in erosion phase three are severely eroded with 
the plow layer being largely composed of subsoil. The 
former typically have between three and seven inches of 
top soil while the latter typically have no more than three 
remaining inches of top soil. 
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The soils in the third management group are in erosion 
phases two and three and consequently some diminution 
of productive potential is expedted to have occurred. 
This expectation finds support in a recent soil survey of 
the watershed (Four Mile Creek Soil Survey, 38). Comparison 
of crop yield estimates in the survey for soils which differ 
only in erosion phase show that the higher phase soils have 
consistently lower crop yields. Further, based on the 
data in the soil survey, and the USDA procedures cited above, 
it is estimated that under high management conditions yield 
losses of 0.44 bushels of corn, 0.14 bushels of soybeans, 
0.38 bushels of oats, and 0.02 tons of hay will occur 
with each inch of soil loss.^ These relatively small losses 
7 
The soil survey provides crop yields under high manage­
ment conditions for various soils in the erosion phases that 
occur in the area. The USDA procedures indicate that approxi­
mately six inches of soil loss are required to move from 
erosion phase one to erosion phase two and that approxi­
mately twelve inches of soil loss are required to move from 
erosion phase two to erosion phase three. The soils in 
Group III are moving either from erosion phase two to 
erosion phase three or from erosion phase three to sub­
soil. For each soil in the group the yield loss from soil 
phase two to soil phase three is assumed to be constant per 
inch of soil loss and this loss is assumed to apply as the 
soils move from erosion phase three to subsoil. The Group 
III losses that occur are weighted averages of those 
occurring on the individual soils. This procedure is 
analogous to that utilized by Narayanan et al. (74) and 
a further detailed description may be found there. 
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can be attributed to the relatively high quality of sub­
soils available in the area. 
In addition to decreasing yield potentials, the 
reduction of soil depth increases the erosivity of the soils. 
The gross soil loss estimates utilized in this study are 
obtained by application of the USLE. The factors of the 
soil loss model for the soils in the watershed are reported 
by the USDA (110). Proceeding in a manner analogous to that 
outlined above for yield losses with loss of soil (see 
footnote 1, p. 130), it is determined that each inch of 
soil loss in Group III will bring about an increase in 
the value of RKLSl by 2.99 tons per acre per year and an 
increase in the value of RKLS2 by 1.66 tons per acre per 
year. The initial values of RKLSl and RKLS2 are given 
in Table 4.2. 
While these stock effects are not of substantial 
magnitude, a priori arguments to the effect that current 
decisions will not be significantly influenced by these im­
pacts cannot be made in this case. It is for the reason 
that a multi-period model of crop production is warranted 
for the analysis of this group of soils. The problem which 
arises at this point is the choice of an appropriate pro­
gramming method. To consider this problem an "ideal" model 
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shall first be outlined. 
Let be the acres allocated to the j-th production 
activity in the t-th year. Let be the yield per acre 
of the r-th crop in the t-th year and let be the soil 
loss per acre of the j-th activity in the t-th period. Based 
on data and assumptions noted above, it is not unreasonable 
to postulate that 
t "*3 
*3jrt+l " 3^. P3jt^3jt 
t "*3 
P3jt+1 P3j P3jt^3jt (9) 
Equation (8) states that the per acre yield of the r-th 
crop from the j-th activity in the t-th year is the yield 
for that crop and activity in the first period less some 
quantity depending upon cumulative soil loss prior to the 
t-th year. Equation (9) states that the per acre soil loss 
resulting from the j-th activity in the t-th year is the 
per acre soil loss from that activity in the first year 
plus some quantity depending upon cumulative erosion. 
For the purposes of the issues being considered here, 
the problem of the planner is defined to be: 
00 3^ t-1 "^ 3 
max D Z Z (P $ Z Z p_. .A_. . 
t=l j=l r=l ^ ^ i=l j=l 
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subject in each period l£t£a> to the restrictions that 
""Sit 1 ^3 
t-1 "*3 
P3jt+1 = P3jl " " P3ji^3ji 
and subject to the restriction, assuming no significant soil 
genesis, that 
"*3 
^ 2 ^ S. (10) 
t=l j=l 
In this description of the problem m^ and n^ are, 
respectively, the number of crop production activities 
available and n^ the number of crops available. The cost 
of the j-th activity is denoted C^j and the discount rate 
is denoted as d. The land area available for production 
is L3 and S is the total amount of soil which maybe lost. 
Equations (8) and (9) define recursions and if the 
problem were one of maximizing the cash flow in each period 
t subject to decisions made in previous periods, a recursive 
programming model utilizing linear programming to solve the 
allocation problem in each period could be utilized. How­
ever, the problem is one of maximizing a flow and conse­
quently recursive programming is inappropriate. Linear 
programming cannot be used to solve the problem as it is set 
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forth above because the objective function is nonlinear. 
However, with appropriate constraints and modifications, 
solutions can be obtained by linear programming. The 
advantage of linear programming, as previously noted, is 
the computational efficiency and facility with which 
alternative solutions may be obtained. Nonlinear pro­
gramming algorithms are available and dynamic programming 
models can be solved by specialized computer programs. How­
ever, the cost and complexity of these techniques for models 
of larger size and in which a number of alternative solu­
tions are to be considered are severely limiting (Hadley and 
Kemp, 46; Sposito, .94). Consequently, approximate solutions 
are obtained by developing a linear programming model. 
The fifty year period is divided into ten five-
year production periods for which crop production activities 
are selected. Annual real and monetary flows within each 
period are assumed constant. The initial soil depth is 
divided into two inch zones and the selection of activi­
ties is constrained by the zones in existence in each 
period. The zones are depleted by erosion. For each zone, 
a set of crop production activities exist having those per 
acre yields and soil losses which are estimated to be ob­
tained after cumulative erosion has eliminated the soil 
depth zones nearer the surface. Thus, activities defined 
for the first zone have productivities and per acre soil 
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losses obtained under high management conditions with the 
initial soil depth. After that zone is exhausted by 
erosion,these activities are eliminated from the choice set. 
Activities defined for the second zone have productivities 
and per acre soil loss coefficients estimated to be appli­
cable after the loss of two inches of soil depth. The soil 
depth zones which can be obtained in any period are con­
strained by the maximum cumulative erosion which could have 
occurred by that period. However, in any period the zones 
lying above the deepest zone obtainable by that period must 
be available. 
If an activity is constrained by the existence of a 
soil depth zone, then the use of the activity depletes that 
zone. Activities depleting zones closer to the surface 
have greater yields and lower soil losses per acre than 
activities yielding the same crop mix utilizing the same 
production practicies but which deplete lower zones. Effects 
upon production beyond losses of high management yields and 
increased in soil loss rates resulting from erosion are not 
included in the model. While other effects do occur, they 
are quite difficult to specify and quantify (Beasley, 11; 
Troeh et al., 101; 208 Technical Assessment, 103). 
Let Agj^^ be the acres allocated to the j-th crop pro­
duction 'activity in every year of the t-th production period 
which depletes the k-th soil depth zone. Note that the index 
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t now refers to five year production periods instead of 
years. The annual yield per acre of the r-th crop from 
the j-th activity depleting the k-th soil depth is denoted 
'''Sjrk the annual soil loss per acre of this activity is 
denoted p^j^. It is now assumed that ~ *3irk-l ~ "^r 
and that = Pgjk.i + where 6^ is the loss in high 
management yield of the r-th crop per inch of soil loss 
and where is equal to the increase in the value of 
gross soil loss per acre with an inch of soil loss. If 
i=l the activity is defined for nonterraced land and is 
the increase in RKLSl. If i=2 then the activity is defined 
for terraced land and «g is the increase in RKLS2. 
If l^ j^ m^  let the activities indexed by activities 
not utilizing contour cultivation or terraced acres. As 
in the Group II submodel, contour tillage is an appropriate 
erosion control option. Let the activities utilizing 
this practice be indexed by those values of j such that 
m^^^ ^  i ± In addition, the Group III soils are 
such that terracing represents an appropriate erosion 
control option. The indices for terracing satisfy m^^^ 1. 
i 1 *3' 
Unlike the models developed for Group I and Group II 
the selection of activities in the third soil group need 
not be recurrent in all years. Consequently, transition 
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equations are required for the two erosion control capital 
stocks. Let CA^ denote the stock of acres for which in­
formation on contour cultivation is available at the end of 
period t. Let CI^ be the number of acres for which such 
information is obtained in the first year of the t-th pro­
duction period. Again, assuming that once contours are layed 
they are followed into perpetuity it follows that 
CA^ = CA^_i + CI^ (11) 
Terraces are commonly considered to have a twenty-five year 
life (EPA, 112). However, it is assumed here that once an 
acre has been terraced it is terraced into perpetuity with 
the stocks being replaced every twenty-five years. Thus, 
the transition equation may be written as : 
TA^ = TA^_^ + TI^ (12) 
where TA^_^ is the stock of terraced acres present at the 
end of period t-1 and TI^ is the addition to the stock in 
the first year of the t-th production period. It is assumed 
that an acre which has been placed in contours can be subse­
quently placed in terraces. This does not violate the 
assumption that once contoured an acre is always contoured 
since terrace farming involves by definition contour culti­
vation. To allow for the transfer let 
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CI^ = Cl^t - CTT^ (13) 
where is the quantity of previously uncontoured acres 
added to the stock and CTT^ is the transfer of contoured 
acres into terraces; both in the first year of the t-th 
production period. The increments to the stock of terraces 
in the first year of the t-th period may then be expressed 
as 
TI^ = = CTT^ (14) 
where is the addition of acres which were not previously 
contoured. 
The cash-flow from crop production in any year of the 
t-th production period is given by 
m^ n^ m^ 
®3t = „îiV3rjAjk - <^3j^3jkt 
where Z^ denotes the maximum soil depth zone obtainable 
by period t and C^j is the annual per acre cost of the 
j-th activity for any year and soil depth zone. Let 3^ 
be the present value of one dollar earned annually for 
five years beginning in the first year of the t-th pro­
duction period. It follows that the present value of the 
cash flow from crop production for fifty years is given 
by 
10 
PV, = E (16) 
1 t=l ^ ^ 
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This quantity less the present value of expenditures on 
the erosion control capital stocks, gives the net present 
value of the cash flow obtained during the period. Let 
be the cost per acre of laying contours in the first year 
of the t-th production period and let be the per acre 
cost of installing terraces in that year. Where is that 
factor which discounts one dollar in the first year of the 
t-th production period to the present it follows that the 
net present value of the cash flow obtained during the 
fifty-year period is given by 
PVl - + PTtTIt'Sf- <") 
Maximizing (17) subject to restrictions noted below, 
will not yield the production plan and net present value 
that would obtain during the fifty-year period for two 
reasons. The first is that the full costs of contouring 
and terracing are incurred but the flow of returns from 
contour tillage and from utilizing terraces installed after 
the fifth period are not taken into account. To eliminate the 
bias against terracing the charges for terracing an acre 
after the fifth period are adjusted downward. The adjusted 
costs are obtained as the present value of the flow of 
annualized cost of the investment that would be incurred 
over the years remaining until the fiftieth year. For example. 
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at a ten percent rate of discount the payment of $46.69 
annually for twenty-five years is equivalent to the payment 
of $420.00 in the year the terraces are put in place. If 
the terrace is put in place in the forty-sixth year, the 
charge placed on terracing is the present value in 
that year of $46.69 paid annually for five years. This 
adjustment eliminates the bias noted above but requires, in 
addition, downward adjustment in the cash flow computed in • 
the solution reflecting the actual amount that would have 
been paid in the year the investment was made. The per acre 
terracing cost of $420.00 is obtained from SCS personnel 
familiar with these costs in the watershed.^ Terracing 
costs before the sixth period must also be adjusted to 
incorporate replacement costs incurred before the fiftieth 
year. The bias against contouring is eliminated by adjusting 
the costs in a comparable manner. 
Soil erosion in the first fifty years of the planning 
horizon imposes two types of costs on the remainder of the 
horizon. First, the use of soil depth in the period 
deprives the remaining years of the profits that could be 
obtained from the use of that soil. Secondly, the soil 
available to the remainder of the horizon will be more 
^This estimate was provided by Mr. John T. Nicholson of 
the Tama County Soil Conservation Service Office, Toledo, 
Iowa, in a letter dated August 27, 1980. 
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erosive and less productive. If the entire planning horizon 
were considered here, there would be no reason to look 
explicitly at these costs, since they are determined in 
solving the problem. But, since only the first fifty 
years are investigated, it is required that some 
accounting for these costs be made. 
Recall the model developed in the previous chapter 
in which profits were expressed as a function of erosion 
and the stock of soil depth. The marginal user cost of 
soil depth under the assumption that > 0 for all l£t£<» 
is in period t 
~ 9îr-. n t  
^ 3^(l+r)"^^"-^^ (18) 
j=t+l 
for the i-th soil. Thus, the marginal user cost is 
the flow of profits forgone at the margin into perpetuity 
as a consequence of erosion in period t. The penalty 
function developed here is based upon this result. 
The function applies only to Group III since with 
positive discount rates and common cropping practices this 
is the only group containing soils in which soil loss is 
expected to be of any significant economic concern. The 
activity having the greatest per acre profitability in this 
group is the activity yielding the corn-corn-beans-corn-
beans rotation utilizing a fall moldboard tillage system 
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and straight-row culture. The loss of net returns per 
acre per year to this activity per inch of continuous 
soil loss is $1.23. If this loss were suffered into per­
petuity, the present value of the flow of losses in year 
fifty-one would be $1.23 divided by the discount rate. The 
value of the penalty function is obtained by multiplying this 
quantity by the total soil loss in inches which occurs in 
the first fifty years of the program. 
This does not yield an exact estimate. One reason is 
that the actual cost depends upon thé activities which are 
actually utilized in the years following the fiftieth. Another 
is that the formulation assumes that soil depth will be 
positive in all periods in the planning horizon. The first 
of these deviations implies that the estimate will be an 
overestimate since all alternative activities will be 
less profitable. The second source of deviation also 
implies an overestimate since exhaustion in finite time 
may be the economic optimum. 
The penalty function does not necessarily produce an 
overestimate, however. In addition to diminished pro­
ductivity, the loss of soil also increases the erosivity 
of the activity. Recall now, the first model developed 
in Chapter II. In that model,the marginal user cost of 
soil depth was not simply the sum of the discounted forgone 
net benefits from losing an increment of soil but instead 
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there was an adjustment in the expression for the marginal 
user cost which introduced the effects of soil loss in one 
period on soil loss in all subsequent periods. To allow 
for this effect in the formulation above would, however, 
result in a considerable overestimate of the cost. 
Let be the adjusted cost of laying contours and 
let be the adjusted cost of installing terraces. The 
capital costs considered in the model are then 
10 
PVC = 
Let the penalty function be expressed as 
10 "^3 %t 
P F  =  5-Y •  Z  I  Z P Q I K F A I I K F  ( 2 0 )  
t=l j=l k=l 3]Kt 3]Kt 
where y is the coefficient described above. The quantity 
to be maximized in the model for Group III is then 
PV^ + PVC + PFB^^. (21) 
By subtracting out the present value of the penalty 
function and adjusting for actual expenditures for erosion 
control capital, an estimate of the net present value of 
the cash flow for the fifty-year period is obtained. If 
the capital cost adjustment is made but the penalty 
function is not subtracted out an estimate is provided of 
the real net economic benefits from production during the 
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fifty year period accruing to watershed landowners. 
Land use by crop production activities must be 
constrained in each period to not exceed the available 
stock. In period t the land use constraint is 
Z Z A,., . < L,. (22) 
j=l k=l J 
The use of the stocks of contoured and terraced acres are 
also constrained in each period by the size of the stocks. 
The restrictions in the t-th period are, respectively, 
for contour cultivation and terrace utilization; 
Zt 
E 2 A . < CA (23) 
•"3 
Z 1 A_... < TA. . (24) 
k=l -
Total erosion in each of the soil depth zones must be 
constrained to the total tonnage of soil available in 
two inches of soil depth. For the k-th soil depth.zone the 
constraint is 
10 
where S is obtained as obtained as the product of and 
the total quantity of soil in two acre-inches. The latter 
is estimated to be two hundred and eighty. If the crop 
production activity having the greatest soil loss coefficient 
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in each production period is chosen, and if the entire acreage 
available.for use in each period is allocated to that activity, 
then the total soil loss that could occur by the end of the 
tenth production period is 13.77 inches. Given that each 
soil depth zone contains two inches, seven soil depth zones 
are required and thus seven restrictions on cumulative soil 
loss, one for each zone, are required. These restrictions 
apply to the activities which deplete the zones. 
In summary, the objective function of the Group III model 
is given by (21). The value of this function is maximized by 
choosing values of crop production activities and erosion 
control investments. The choice of values of these instru­
ments is constrained in each period by restrictions of the 
types given in (22), (23), and (24) and by seven restrictions 
of the type given in (25). It is these latter restrictions 
which bring the stock effects into the model. In each period, 
sets of production activities depleting each soil depth zone 
lying above the deepest zone which can be achieved by that 
period are included in the set of all activities available 
for use. The seven restrictions constrain the choice of 
activities depleting each zone to levels such that the total 
loss of soil from the zones are not in excess of the amount of 
soil in two acre-inches. The exhaustion of a zone nearer to 
the surface constrains the choice in periods following that 
period in which the zone is exhausted to activities depleting 
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the remaining zones. With sequential exhaustion of the zones, 
beginning with that having crop yield and soil loss coeffi­
cients applicable to the initial soil depth, the set of activi­
ties available for use is sequentially limited to activities 
having lesser productivities and greater erosivities. 
The linear programming framework does not allow restric­
tions on the sequence in which soil depth zones are utilized 
and an unsatisfactory aspect of this Group III submodel is that 
illogical sequencing of the use of these zones can emerge in 
solutions. The model is in fact, formulated in a manner more 
analogous to the exploitation of multiple grades of a resource 
than to a pure stock effects model (Herfindahl, 50; Herfindahl 
and Kneese, 51; Weinstein and Zeckhauser, 122) . However, with 
restrictions on the behavior of prices and technology, the 
land use constraints and discounting operate to yield logical 
use sequences and thus permit the use of the model to obtain 
approximate solutions. 
The Group IV Submodel 
The soils included in Group IV are steep, shallow, 
highly erosive, and unproductive. At present, acreages in 
the group are mostly used for permanent pasture as they 
are unsuitable for row crop production. In modelling the 
watershed, it is assumed that the entire acreage of the 
group is allocated to pasture. Erosion rates from pastured 
lands even on steep slopes, are so low that no significant 
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additional depletion of these soils depths is forthcoming. 
In contrast to the soils in the first group, these soils are 
considered to have user costs that give very strong incentives 
for use of highly conservative cropping practices. 
The watershed model 
The watershed model is obtained by summing the adjusted 
net present value functions of the submodels. This quantity 
is maximized by choosing crop production plans for each of the 
soil management groups that maximizes the adjusted net present 
values of the groups. The constraints in the watershed model 
are simply the constraints applying to the submodels. 
Crops and Crop Prices 
Five crops of current and potential economic interest 
are included in the model, these being corn, soybeans, oats, 
hay, and pasture. As observed above, it is assumed that 
pasture is always grown in Group IV. Groups I, II, and 
III are allowed three alternative crop mixes or rotations. 
The first, denoted here as C-C-B-C-B, involves allocating 
three-fifths of an acre to corn production and the re­
maining two-fifths to soybean production. The second, 
denoted here as C-C-O-M-M, involves allocating two-fifths 
of an acre to corn production, another two-fifths to hay, 
and the remainder to the production of oats. The final 
rotation, denoted here as P-P, involves allocating one 
hundred percent of an acre to permanent pasture. 
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This selection of crop rotations is considered to allow 
for the generation of solutions in which the crop mix is 
fairly representative of current production while allowing 
flexibility in responses to diminishing productive 
capacity and to erosion control policies. The C-C-B-C-B 
mix is, ceteris-paribus, the most erosive of the possi­
bilities while the P-P option is the least erosive. The 
C-C-B-C-B is also the most profitable and the P-P option 
least profitable given the assumed output prices and esti­
mated activity costs. Output prices are listed in Table 
4.3 and are considered representative of current conditions. 
Table 4.3. Crop price assumptions 
Crop Price 
Corn $3.50 per bushel 
Soybeans $7.50 per bushel 
Oats $37.50 per ton 
Hay $15.00 per ton of forage 
yield 
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Tillage Practices and Costs 
Five alternative tillage systems are allowed in the 
model for the production of the C-C-B-C-B rotation and . 
four such systems are allowed for the production of 
the C-C-O-M-M rotation. In this analysis, the tillage 
systems are differentiated by the primary tillage practice 
applied to first-year corn ground. These practices are 
fall moldboard plow, fall chisel plow, spring chisel plow, 
spring disk, and no-till. The selection of tillage systems 
is based upon current practices in the area with allowances 
made to provide for flexibility of response to policy 
measures and soil loss alternatives discount rates. 
Table 4.4 gives a summary of current tillage practices 
utilized in the area for crop rotations considered in the 
model. Of these, the spring moldboard plow option is not 
used here after determining that this practice is less 
profitable and more erosive than the spring chisel plow 
option and thus it can be eliminated as a viable option in 
the model. The no-till option is not at present being used 
in the area but has been included here to provide for flexi­
bility of response for the C-C-B-C-B rotation. 
The secondary tillage practices associated with each 
of the primary tillages options are also based upon actual 
practices in the area. It is common in economic models 
Table 4.4. Tillage practices in Four Mile Creek (Miranowski et al., 71) 
Number of farmers using practice 
Rotation Moldboard Chisel Disk only 
Fall Spring Fall Spring Fall Spring 
Continuous corn 5 4 11 2 2 4 
Corn after beans 0 0 2 0 6 28 
Beans after corn 3 11 11 2 1 7 
Corn after meadow 4 17 3 0 2 0 
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developed to study the effects of erosion control policy 
measures to assume that secondary tillage activities 
are conducted at a minimum frequency. But in actual 
practice, farmers may respond to a reduction in the 
intensity.of primary tillage by increasing the intensity 
of secondary tillage (Schaller and Amemiya, 85). 
Table 4.5 indicates the secondary tillage practices 
used in the area with each primary tillage practice for each 
crop in the watershed. Fractional values represent average 
values over time. Given environmental conditions, such as 
weather, the farmer may use a secondary tillage practice 
only once during a particular year but twice the next year 
with the same primary tillage practice. Generally, secondary 
tillage operations increase as primary tillage intensity 
decreases. The exception is with fall chisel plowing. 
The secondary tillage operations associated with this 
tillage practice are almost identical to those with fall, 
moldboard plowing. Since the chisel plow requires less time 
and fuel per acre, the cost-savings of fall chisel tillage 
would make it more profitable than fall moldboard tillage 
all other things equal. Fall chisel plowing may result in 
a later planting date than fall moldboard tillage and could 
decrease expected yields. Observation shows that the chisel 
» plow is replacing the moldboard through much of the Corn 
Belt. The cost-savings must be at least equal to if not 
Table 4.5. Frequency of secondary tillage practices in Four Mile Creek (Miranowski et al., 71) 
Crop Primary 
tillage 
Fall 
disk 
Spring 
disk 
Field 
cond. Harrow 
Rotary 
hoe Cultivate 
Planting 
date 
(May 1=120) 
Continuous Fall plow 1 1 1 1 1.66 122 
corn Spring plow 0 2 1 1 1 1.75 125 
Fall chisel .5 1 1 .5 . 1.5 124 
Spring chisel 2 1 1 1.5 126 
Disk only 2 1.5 .5 1.3 129 
Com after Fall chisel 1 1 1 1 128 
beans Spring disk 2 1 1 1.5 124 
Corn after Fall plow 1.5 1 .5 .5 1.5 126 
meadow Spring plow 2 1 .5 .5 1.66 127 
Fall chisel 1.5 .5 0 1.5 122 
Disk only 2 2 0 1 125 
Beans after Fall plow .5 1.5 .5 .5 0 1.5 119 
com Spring plow 2 .75 .5 0 1.5 138 
Fall chisel .5 1.5 1 1 1 130 
Spring disk .5 2 1 .25 0 2 135 
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greater than the yield penalty associated with fall chisel 
tillage. 
The per acre costs of each tillage practice for 
each rotation were obtained by use of the Oklahoma 
State Budget Generator (58) with adjustments made for the 
additional costs of field operations conducted on con­
toured and terraced acres. Representative machinery 
complements for crop production in the area were developed 
from a survey of machinery inventories in the area by 
Miranowski et al. (71). The complements were obtained 
by averaging the size of machinery used in the production 
of the specified crops by the specified techniques. Ferti­
lizer application rates are based upon recommended uses 
for soils in the area developed by Voss (117). Herbicide 
and insecticide application rates are based upon data de­
veloped for Iowa soils by Jennings and Stockdale (56) and 
information contained in a Felco Land 0'Lakes (35) guide­
line. Application methods are based upon actual practices 
as determined by Miranowski et al. (71). 
The cost per acre of tillage systems are inflated 
on contoured and terraced acres. Contouring increases 
field time and fuel usage as a consequence of the modifi­
cations in field operations relative to straight-row culture. 
Based upon data developed by Miranowski et al. and Walker 
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(120), the labor costs obtained from the budget generator 
were inflated by five percent on B slopes, seven percent 
on C slopes, and nine percent on D slopes. Fuel costs 
were similarly inflated for contoured acres on the 
three slopes. These costs were increased by another 
thirty percent on terraced acres. 
Crop Yields 
Basic yield estimates for existing soil depths were 
obtained from data available in the recent survey of 
soils in the study area. Based upon data available in 
Miranowski et al. (71), these estimates were adjusted for 
tillage practices and rotations. Yield penalties of two 
percent, four percent, five percent, and ten percent 
of the yields obtained by fall moldboard primary tillage 
are applied, respectively, to tillage systems utilizing full 
chisel, spring disk, spring chisel, and no-till. The study 
by Miranowski et al. showed that a five percent yield in­
crease is obtained on average for corn following soybeans 
and a ten percent yield increase obtains on the average for 
corn following second-year meadow, the basis for comparison 
being a continuous corn rotation. The study showed that 
no yield losses were associated with a change from straight-
row to contour culture but that a five percent yield loss 
occurred on the average with a change to farming contoured 
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acres. The yields for activities in Group III are adjusted 
for soil loss using the figures for yield losses per inch 
noted above. 
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CHAPTER V. AN ANALYSIS OF CROPLAND EROSION AND EROSION 
CONTROL IN THE FOUR MILE CREEK WATERSHED 
An Overview of the Solutions 
The model is first solved at discount rates of three, 
five, and ten percent without modification for policy alterna­
tives. These baseline solutions allow a consideration of 
the production plan that would be developed by the planner 
in the absence of erosion control policy. A range of 
discount rates is chosen to provide for analysis of the 
impacts of alternative discount rates on the production 
plan. The rates are considered to be real rates and the 
range provided does permit important inferences to be made. 
In the section following, the presentation of the base­
line solutions estimates of the water quality damages 
associated with these solutions are provided. To obtain 
such estimates using technically appropriate economic 
procedures, would be a highly complex and costly endeavor 
(Freeman, 39; Freeman, 40). Such an investigation being 
beyond the scope of this research, the values developed 
here are based upon estimates of sediment damage costs 
found in the applied literature. National estimates 
include those of the American Society of Civil Engineers 
(3, 4) and Stall (95). Studies concerned with damages in 
watersheds include those of Brandt (15), Guntermann et al. 
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(45), Lee (65), Lee et al. (66), and Narayanan et al. (74). 
Based upon data contained in the studies by Brandt (15) and 
Narayanan et al. (74), Boggess et al. (14) derived an esti­
mate of sediment damage costs in the Iowa River above the 
Coralville Reservoir dam of $5.05 per ton. Alt (1) reports 
sediment delivery ratios for watersheds in the area con­
sidered by Boggess et al. to range between 0.04 and 0.22 
and argues that a transportation ratio of one is appropriate. 
Using these three figures would imply damage costs per ton 
of erosion ranging between $0.20 and $1.11. 
In order to consider potential magnitudes for the values 
of water quality damages from erosion in the Four Mile Creek 
watershed, it is assumed that the sediment delivery and 
transportation ratios for all soils in the area are equal 
and that damage costs resulting from sediment discharges 
are invariant with respect to the level of erosion in the 
watershed. Hypothetical damage cost figures of $0.50, 
$1.00, $1.50, $2.00, and $3.00 are utilized. These values, 
based upon data available in the literature, are considered 
to be within a reasonable range. 
The next set of results considered are obtained by 
solving the model at the three discount rates with annual 
erosion taxes of $0.50, $1.00, $1.50, $2.00, $2.50, and $3.'00 
per ton. These solutions can be considered in either of 
two ways. If it is assumed that these are the marginal 
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damage costs in an optimal solution,then the results may 
be interpreted as the optimal solution for the watershed 
if it is further assumed that all other conditions for a 
particular Pareto optimum are otherwise satisfied. In 
such a solution, the taxes may be considered as optimal 
Pigovian taxes. Alternatively, no assumptions concerning 
the information carried by the values may be made and 
the analysis may be viewed simply as an investigation of 
the effects of erosion taxes on the production program.. 
The last set of solutions investigated are obtained 
by solving the model with modifications for alternative 
policy options which are considered as economically viable 
options under present circumstances. Based upon the dis­
cussions in Chapter II and Chapter III,it is clearly the 
case that policy measures requiring the measurement of erosion 
flows cannot be realistically proposed. This eliminates 
the Pigovian tax, marketable rights, and erosion regula­
tions as these require the observation of erosion flows. 
In considering the solutions discussed in the previous 
paragraph, it must be assumed that the USLE accurately 
measures the tax base, which it does not. Ifhere monitoring 
of residual flows is infeasible, realistic policy options 
for environmental quality management generally entail 
either technical specifications or subsidies for the use of 
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control practices. The focus in this analysis is upon the 
first of these two types of approaches. In selecting 
alternative technical specifications for this investiga­
tion emphasis is placed on the efficacy of the control 
practices or structures and upon the facility with which 
compliance may be observed. The policies considered 
are discussed in detail below. 
Presented in Table 5.1 are the present value of 
cash flow from production in the watershed, the present 
value of the penalty, and the present value of cash 
flow less that of the penalty for the baseline solutions. 
Tables 5.2, 5.3, and 5.4 provide data on cropping practices 
in these solutions. The abbreviations M-F and C-F in these 
three tables denotes, respectively, the fall moldboard 
tillage system and the fall chisel tillage system. 
Table 5.1. Baseline present values 
The Baseline Solutions 
Discount rate Cash flow 
10% 
5% 
3% $51,426,431 $292,521 $51,133,910 
$36,683,724 $115,378 $36,568,346 
$19,981,004 $5,531 $19,975,473 
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Table 5.2. Baseline cropping practices; 3% discount rate 
^period) Rotation Tillage Contour Terrace Acres 
I (All) C-C-B-C-B M-P 2545 
II (All) C-C-B-C-B M-F 4385 
III (All C-C-B-C-B C-F X 4482 
Table 5.3. Baseline cropping practices; 5% discount rate 
Group 
(period) Rotation Tillage Contour Terrace Acres 
I (All) C-C—B—C—B M-F 2545 
II (All) C—C—B—C—B M-F 4385 
III (1 to 4) C-C-B-C-B C-F 4482 
III (4 to 9) C-C-B-C-B C-F 3465 
C—C—B—C—B C-F X 837 
III (9 and , 10) C-C-B-C-B M-F 3105 
C—C—B—C—B F-F X 1377 
Table 5.4. Baseline cropping practices; 10% discount rate 
Group 
(period) Rotation Tillage Contour Terrace Acres 
I (All) C—C—B—C""B M-F 2545 
II (All) C—C—B—C—B M-F 4385 
III (All) C-C-B-C-B C-F 4482 
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In Groups I, II, and III, the activity having the greatest 
profitability per acre is the activity yielding the C-C-B-C-B 
rotation utilizing the fall moldboard tillage system and 
straight row cultivation. Because there is no intertemporal 
dependence of production possibilities in Groups I and II 
this activity is chosen for use at all discount rates in 
these two groups. However, this activity is never chosen 
during the period for use on soils in Group III. In addition 
to being the most profitable activity is is also the most 
erosive. The interdependence of production possibilities be­
tween periods, at all discount rates considered, results in 
soil conservation incentives sufficient to lead to the selec­
tion of less erosive practices. These incentives are greatest 
at the three percent discount rate and least at the ten per­
cent rate. The rotations and tillage systems chosen for 
Group III are the same in each period and in each solu­
tion. However, contour cultivation is utilized on the 
entire acreage in the three percent solution, not at all 
in the ten percent solution, and to some extent, in the five 
percent solution. In the five percent solution, contour 
cultivation begins in the thirteenth year with 837 
acres and in forty-fifth year the acreage utilizing contour 
cultivation is expanded to 1,377 acres. 
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The effect of alternative discount rates on the in­
centive to conserve soils is most evident in Table 5.1. 
In the three percent solution,cumulative erosion in 
Group III is 4,378,871 tons and the value of the penalty 
function discounted to the present is $292,521. In the 
ten percent solution, the cumulative erosion by the fiftieth 
year is 8,150.,664 tons but the present value of the 
penalty is only $5,531. In the three percent solution, 
depletion of the fourth soil depth zone begins in the ninth 
period but in the ten percent solution this zone is depleted 
by the fifth period. In the ten and five percent solutions, 
all but the seventh depth zone are exhausted.^ 
The shadow price of a given soil depth zone is the 
amount the private planner would be willing to pay for 
an additional acre depleting that zone during the fifty-
year period. These are not the marginal user costs for the 
zones although they are related. The shadow prices, which 
are discounted to the present, decrease as the associated 
zone is deeper reflecting the poorer quality of the soil 
as soil depth is diminished. The shadow prices of un­
exhausted stocks are zero because these do not constrain 
production. These shadow prices are listed in Table 5.5. 
^Soil depth zones are used sequentially in all solu­
tions . 
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The behavior of erosion in the three groups is given 
in Table 5.6. Because the same activity is selected in all 
periods for Groups I and II, it follows that erosion rates are 
the same in all periods. In all Group III solutions,the 
trend of erosion rates is upward. There are, however, 
substantial differences between the rates in the three 
solutions. Erosion rates in the ten percent solution are 
nearly twice those of the three percent solution in all 
periods. While erosion rates in the five percent solution 
mirror those of the ten percent solution for the first 
three periods, contour cultivation beginning in the fourth 
period and the subsequent expansion of this practice results 
in a moderation of erosion rates in this solution relative 
to the ten percent solution after the third period. 
The land shadow price for a group is the present value 
of the amount the planner would be willing to pay for an addi­
tional acre of the group's land. These shadow prices are listed 
in Table 5.7. The shadow prices are distinguished by period 
for Group III because land is not a homogeneous resource 
in this group as it is in the others under the assumptions 
made here. As soil quality diminishes the present value of 
the amount the planner is willing to pay for land in any 
year is diminished. Table 5.8 lists present values 
analogous to those given in Table 5.1 for each of the groups. 
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Table 5.5. Shadow prices for soil depth zones 
Soil depth Shadow prices 
zone 3% 5% 10% 
1 0.187 0.142 0.065 
2 0.099 0.084 0.028 
3 0.036 0.051 0.014 
4 0.000 0.026 0.005 
5 0.000 0.011 0.002 
6 0.000 0.002 0.001 
7 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Table 5.6. Annual erosion rates in baseline solution 
Group Erosion (tons/acre/year) 
(period) 3% 5% 10% 
I (All) 2.32 2.32 2.32 
II { All) 8.01 8.01 8.01 
III (1) 18.25 32.02 32.02 
III (2) 18.25 32.43 32.43 
III (3) 18.25 33.63 33.63 
III (4) 19.10 32.00 34.64 
III (5) 19.18 32.43 35.36 
III (6) 19.18 33.71 37.05 
III (7) 20.52 34.72 37.87 
III (8) 20.52 35.48 38.79 
III (9) 20.76 34.57 40.41 
III (10) 21.39 34.84 41.51 
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Table 5.7 Shadow prices of land: baseline solutions 
Shadow prices 
3% 5% 10% 
I (1) $5,105.86 3,622.51 1,967.53 
II (1) 4,834.54 3,430.96 1,862.98 
III (1) 668.56 644.50 575.71 
III (2) 573.10 499.44 353.49 
III (3) 490.92 387.74 217.74 
III (4) 421.95 300.23 133.28 
III (5) 362.06 232.71 81.77 
III (6) 310.14 180.72 50.41 
III (7) 263.01 139.93 30.82 
III (8) 227.71 108.51 18.95 
III (9) 194.08 83.99 11.69 
III (10) 166.55 65.04 7.13 
IV (1) 73.33 52.03 28.26 
Table 5.8 Present values by soil management groups : 
baseline solutions 
Group 
(discount 
Cash 
rate) flow Penalty 
Net economic 
benefits 
I (3) $12,994 ,414 - $12,994,414 
II (3) 21,199 ,458 - 21,199,458 
III (3) 17,188 ,488 $292,521 16,89.5,967 
IV (3) 44 ,071 - 44,071 
I (5) 9,219 ,288 - 9,219,288 
II (5) 15,0.44 ,760 - 15,044,760 
III (5) 12,388 ,412 115,378 12,273,034 
IV (5) 31 ,269 - 31,269 
I (10) 5,007 ,364 - 5,007,364 
II (10) 8,169 ,167 - 8,169,167 
III (10) 6,787 ,491 5,531 6,781,960 
IV (10) 16 ,982 - 16,982 
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Comments on the baseline solutions 
The results obtained above are contingent upon thé 
assumptions concerning the economic and technological condi­
tions in the present and in future years, the structure 
of the model, and the data available for development of 
the model. There are, however, several interesting 
implications which may be derived from these results. 
Despite the relatively modest yield losses associated with 
soil loss in the area, it is found even at the ten percent 
discount rate that the incentives to conserve soil are 
strong enough to lead the present value maximizing private 
economic planner to choose crop management practices other 
than those which maximize current returns. Total erosion 
in the model is constrained, but only to the total amount 
of erosion that could occur if the most erosive of crop 
practices is chosen in all periods. However, in none of 
the solutions for Group III is this practice chosen despite 
it's being the most profitable on a per acre basis in any 
year. Consequently, in none of the solutions is the total 
available soil depth exhausted. 
There is considerable flexibility for choosing erosion 
paths less conserving than that chosen for the ten percent 
solution but more conserving than choosing the most erosive 
activity available for use on the entire acreage in all 
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years. It is suggested that for some set of discount rates 
in excess of ten percent, solutions with greater husbanding 
of soil than the least conserving option may result. Simi­
larly, the flexibility remaining for choosing erosion paths 
more conserving than that obtained at the three percent 
solution suggests that lower discount rates may lead to 
solutions in which soil erosion rates are negligible. 
The trend in erosion in all three solutions is upwards 
over time. This movement may be attributed to the effects 
of soil loss on soil erosivity since in no solution is there 
a movement towards more erosive crop management practices 
over time. Indeed, in the one solution in which there are 
changes in crop management practices during the period the 
movement is towards more conserving management practices. 
Such a movement towards practices which are more soil con­
serving are observed to occur in a number of the tax solu­
tions considered below. Given constant product and factor 
prices, and given no technological change, a trend towards 
the greater utilization of conservation practices is to 
be expected; The discounting of returns gives an in­
centive to use more profitable and thus generally more 
erosive practices in earlier periods. Opposing this 
incentive are the incentives to produce profitably for as 
long as possible and to do so with high quality soils. In 
167 
earlier periods, the more distant losses from depleting 
are given less weight. But as the "future" is approached, 
the forgone profits are given greater weight and thus the 
incentive to conserve increases. The incentive to use 
soil conservation practices over time is further 
increased by the imposition of erosion taxes at constant 
rates. 
The choice of practices at points in time and the 
path of erosion depend upon the behavior of prices, tech­
nology, and the dictates of the physical constraint set. 
Increasing product prices relative to factor costs will 
give greater incentives to conserve in the near term in 
comparison to the case in which they are constant. The 
opposite will be true if product prices are decreasing 
relative to factor costs. 
The results have two important implications for the 
empirical analysis of cropland erosion. If the soils in 
Group III were treated equivalently to those in Group I 
and Group II, the practice predicted would be the fall 
moldboard tillage option for the same rotation. The soil 
loss coefficient for this activity is 41.18 tons per acre 
per year. The average annual erosion rates for the three, 
five, and ten percent solutions are, respectively, 19.53, 
33.60, and 36.37 tons per acre for the fifty year period in 
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Group III. Thus, such a treatment would overestimate the 
amount of erosion occurring in each year and the present 
value of production for the fifty year period. Further, 
no indication of the time path of erosion would be 
provided. 
Sediment Damage Costs 
Table 5.9 provides estimates of the present value 
of the offsite water quality damages under the assump­
tions outlined above. Note that while annual erosion 
rates in the ten percent solution are nearly twice those 
of the three percent solution, the discounting of the 
damage costs at the higher rate reduces the present value 
of the economic damages occurring during the period to 
nearly one-hàlf the value of those occurring at the three 
percent rate.^ For the five percent discount rate, however, 
the increase in the erosion rates outweigh the effects of 
increasing the rate of discount so that the estimated 
damage costs increase relative to the three percent 
solution. 
The damage cost figures listed in Table 5.9 are 
subtracted from the net present value figures listed in 
Table 5.1 to obtain those presented in Table 5.10. Assuming 
^As is evident from this statement, it is assumed that 
those damaged discount at the same rate as the private 
watershed planner. 
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Table 5.9. Estimates of the present value of offsite water 
quality damages 
Marginal Present value of damages 
cost 3% 5% 10% 
$0.50 $1,629,868 $1,723,364 $942,988 
$1.00 3,259,736 3,446,728 1,885,976 
$1.50 4,889,604 5,170,092 2,828,964 
$2.00 6,519,472 6,893,456 3,771,952 
$2.50 8,149,340 8,616,820 4,714,940 
$3.00 9,779,208 10,340,184 5,657,928 
Table 5.10. Estimates of 
in Four Mile 
the net benefits 
Creek: baseline 
of production 
solution 
Marginal Net present value of production 
cost 3% 5% 10% 
$0.50 $49,504,042 $34,844,982 $19,032,485 
$1.00 47,874,174 33,121,618 18,089,497 
$1.50 46,244,306 31,398,254 17,146,509 
$2.00 44,614,438 29,674,890 16,203,521 
$2.50 42,984,570 27,951,526 15,260,533 
$3.00 41,354,702 26,228,162 14,317,545 
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that the only potential source of market failure is the 
externality associated with sediment flows into offsite 
water resources, the figures given in Table 5.10 serve as 
estimates of the net benefits from production in the water­
shed during the fifty-year period. 
In considering these damage cost estimates,the 
economic issue which arises is the cost of reducing them. 
It is to this issue that the investigation now turns. 
Throughout the analysis that follows it is assumed that 
policy measures have no impacts upon the prices of 
products or factors of production. 
Tax Solutions 
Tables 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 summarize relevant data 
from the tax solutions. The net present values in these 
tables are the present value of the fifty-year cash flow 
less the present value of the penalty function. The im­
position of the taxes does not affect the returns to Group 
IV soils since erosion on these is trivial. The taxes 
considered are not of sufficient magnitude to lead to 
alterations in the crop management practices utilized on 
soils in Group I and in Group II. The taxes do, however, 
reduce the net present values of these soils. All adjust­
ments to the taxes are found to occur on the soils in 
Table 5.11. Tax solutions: 3% discount rate 
Tax Net present Cumulative Average annual erosion rates (tons/acre) 
rate value ^^tons) Group I Group II Group III TOTAL 
$0.50 $4a,5Q4,042 6,430,283 2.32 8.01 19.53 11.27 
1.00 48,009,313 4,561,333 2.32 8.01 11.20 7.99 
1.50 46,863,402 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
2.00 45,720,412 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
2.50 44,577,422 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
3.00 43,434,432 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
Table 5.12. Tax solutions: 5% discount rate 
Tax 
rate 
Net present 
value 
Cumulative 
erosion 
(tons) 
Average 
Group I 
annual erosion (tons/acre) 
Group II Group III . TOTAL 
$0.50 $35,313,589 6,430.283 2.32 8.01 19.53 11.27 
1.00 34,183,583 5,051,992 2.32 8.01 13.39 8.85 
1.50 33,345,334 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
2.00 32,532,791 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
2.50 31,720,249 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
3.00 30,907,707 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
Table 5.13. Tax solutions: 10% discount rate 
Tax 
rate 
Net present 
value 
Cumulative 
erosion 
(tons) 
Average 
Group I 
annual erosion (tons/acre) 
Group I Group III TOTAL 
$0.50 $19,235,853 6,430,283 2.32 8.01 19.53 11.27 
1.00 18,600,459 5,816,293 2.32 8.01 16.80 10.19 
1.50 18,093,370 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
2.00 17,636,544 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
2.50 17,179,718 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
3.00 16,722,893 4,443,408 2.32 8.01 10.67 7.79 
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Group III, these being the most erosive of the soils in 
the watershed on which row-crops are produced. 
Three percent solutions 
The $0.50 erosion tax has no impact on crop management 
in Group III although it does result in a reduction in 
present value. The net present value for this solution is 
equivalent to the value reported in Table 5.10 for $0.50 
marginal damage. Adjustments do occur, however, as the 
tax is increased to $1.00 and again to $1.50. The increase 
in the rate to $2.00, $2.50, and $3.00 result in no further 
modifications relative to the $1.50 solution. In all solu­
tions the C-C-B-C-B rotation is grown and contour cultivation 
practiced, just as was the case in the baseline solution. 
The increase in the tax from $0.50 to $1.00 leads in 
period one to the allocation of 42.3 percent of the acreage 
to no-till management with fall chisel tillage used on the 
remainder as in the baseline solution. By the sixth period 
however, the entire acreage is no-till-farmed and this 
practice is used in all subsequent periods. While in the 
baseline solution and in the $0.50 tax solution the third 
soil depth zone is exhausted by the tenth period, in the 
$1.00 tax solution the second depth zone is just depleted 
by the tenth period. Increasing the tax to $1.50 leads 
to no-till-farming in all periods and by the tenth period 
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there is soil remaining in the second soil depth zone. No 
further adjustments are forthcoming, though, as the tax 
is increased further to $3.00. 
Five percent solution . 
At the five percent discount rate, changes in the 
production plan for Group III soils relative to the 
baseline solution occur at tax rates of $0.50, $1.00, and 
$1.50. At the tax rate of $0.50, the production plan is 
equivalent to that utilized at the three percent discount 
rate in the baseline and $0.50 tax solutions. Recall that 
in the five percent baseline solution the rotation and 
tillage system were identical to those of the three percent 
baseline but that contour cultivation was utilized initially 
in the fourth period and its use expanded in the ninth. 
The moderation of erosion resulting from expanding to contour 
cultivation is such that the third soil depth zone is de­
pleted and the fourth in use by the end of the fifty year 
period where as in the baseline solution the sixth zone 
is depleted by the last year. The increase in the tax rate 
to $1.00 leads to the use of no-till as it did in the three 
percent solution. The utilization of this practice begins 
in the fourth period and by the sixth period the entire 
acreage is no-till farmed. As in the three percent 
solution, the increase in the tax rate to $1.50 results in 
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the exclusive use of the no-till system. Further rate in­
creases up to $3.00 yield no further adjustments in crop 
management practices. The increase in the rate to $1.00 
results in a moderation of erosion such that the third 
zone is not fully exhausted by the tenth period and the 
increase in the rate to $1.50 results in the availability 
of soil in the second zone for use beyond the fiftieth 
year. 
Ten percent solution 
In the ten percent solution,changes in crop manage­
ment practices also occur at the tax rates of $0.50, $1.00, 
and $1.50 and again increases in the tax by $0.50 incre­
ments to $3.00 result in no further modifications. The 
imposition of the $0.50 tax results in no change in ro­
tation or tillage system relative to the baseline but does 
result in contour cultivation of the entire acreage in each 
period. Thus, this solution is identical to the three 
and five percent solutions at the tax rate of $0.50. The 
solution obtained at a tax rate of $1.50 is also identical 
to those for the three and five percent discount rate cases. 
The $1.00 tax rate solution involves a transition to 
no-till farming beginning in the sixth period and by the 
ninth period no-till is used exclusively. Since the 
solutions at $0.50, $1.50, $2.00, $2.50, and $3.00 are 
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identical to those obtained in the three and five percent 
solutions, the use of the soil depth zones is identical. 
In the $1.00 tax solution, the third soil depth zone is just 
exhausted by the end of the tenth period. In the ten per­
cent baseline solution, the sixth soil depth zone was 
depleted and in the tenth period production was depleting 
the seventh zone. 
Comments on the tax solutions 
The range of tax rates considered above is relatively 
narrow although it is considered reasonable for the purposes 
of this analysis. That there is no response to the increase 
in the tax rate from $0.00 to $0.50 in the three percent 
solution implies that no adjustments to lesser tax rates would 
occur. The strong responses in the five and ten percent 
solutions suggest that tax rates less than $0.50 will 
yield adjustments in cropping practices at these discount 
rates. The magnitude of the response to the imposition of 
$0.50 tax is particularly noteworthy at the ten percent 
rate. 
The existence of conservation measures which will yield 
erosion levels greater than those obtained at the $0.50 tax 
rate and less than those obtained at the $1.00 tax rate 
at all three discount rates implies that rates between these 
values will yield solutions differing from those obtained 
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at the two rates. The same is true for rates between $1.00 
and $1.50. Further, in the three soil management groups 
upon which row-crop production is considered profitable, 
there exists considerable'flexibility for achieving 
levels of erosion control in excess of those obtained at 
rates of $1.50, $2.00, $2.50, and $3.00. Indeed, at the 
limit, erosion in the watershed can be reduced to virtually 
zero by allocating all land to permanent pasture. Thus, it 
is not to be concluded that rates in excess of $1.50 will 
not yield further control. 
The trend in erosion in all three solutions is again 
increasing over time. This can again be attributed to the 
increasing of the erosivity of the soils in Group III with 
soil loss for the trend in use of conservation measures is 
generally upwards over time at the discount and tax rates 
considered. That the incentive to utilize conservation 
practices increases over time was noted above. However, 
in the tax solutions the incentive is further increased 
because the erosivity of the soils is increasing. That 
is, erosion control incentives become greater not just be­
cause the incentive to conserve increases but also because 
the potential tax base of any crop production activity 
is increasing. 
Comparing the net present value of production figures 
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in Table 5.10 to those in Tables 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 it is 
to be observed that all discounted marginal damage 
costs in Tables 5.11, 5.12, and 5.13 exceed the cor­
responding values in Table 5.10 except at the three per­
cent discount rate with a $0.50 tax rate. If these 
damage costs can be interpreted as those which obtain in the 
optimal solution, the results imply in all cases but the one 
noted that the reallocation of resources brought about by 
the costless imposition of a Pigouvian tax will represent 
a potential Pareto improvement. 
Technical Restrictions for Erosion 
Control 
Aggregate erosion levels in a watershed may be reduced 
from a technical standpoint by reducing the number of acres 
in row-crops and by reducing erosion rates on acres in 
row-crops. From the standpoint of public policy, reduc­
tions in aggregate erosion levels can be obtained by 
introducing economic incentives for erosion control 
measures or by imposing restrictions on land use. En­
vironmental quality policy in the United States has largely 
involved the imposition of technical restrictions to obtain 
reductions in residuals flows. If this approach is carried 
over into the control of nonpoint source water pollution from 
agricultural activities, then the approach would be one in 
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which farmers are directed to utilize "best management 
practices" in row-crop production. In this section, the 
impacts of such directives are considered. The practices 
included are chosen, as noted previously, for the facility 
with which compliance may be observed and for their efficacy 
in controlling erosion. 
Three basic potential components of erosion control 
packages are evaluated. These are bans on fall tillage in 
row crop production, a requirement that contour cultivation 
be utilized in row-crop production, and a requirement that 
row-crop production be done on terraced land. The fall 
tillage ban can be applicable to any of the three manage­
ment groups individually or to combinations of the groups. 
Contour cultivation, however, has little impact upon 
erosion on the soils in Group I and thus the requirement 
would be realistically imposed upon production on soils in 
Group II, Group III, or both. The requirement that terraced 
land be used in row-crop production would sensibly be 
imposed only on the use of soils in Group III. 
The three components can be combined in a variety of 
ways to obtain various degrees of erosion control. Fall 
tillage could be prohibited across the board or on particular 
soils. Contouring could be required on Group I and Group II 
or on one or the other. Further, the fall tillage restriction 
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can be combined with contour restrictions. Clearly there 
are a number of possible combinations. Some of these will 
be dominated by others as will be demonstrated below. 
Fall tillage bans 
For soils in all three management groups for which 
row-crop production activities are defined, the activity 
yielding the greatest annual profits per acre is that 
activity yielding the C-C-B-C-B rotation utilizing the 
spring-disk tillage system and straight-row cultivation. 
Under the assumptions made here concerning the constancy 
of product and factor prices, the absence of technological 
change, and the absence of a significant intertemporal 
interdependence of production possibilities in soils in 
Group I and Group II, it follows that imposition of a ban 
on the use of fall tillage in row-crop production on soils 
in these groups will result in the choice of this activity. 
There is no need, then, to solve the submodels for these 
two groups to ascertain the impacts of bans on fall tillage. 
The same is not true of soils in Group III. Solutions of 
the submodel for soils in Group III indicate the use of the 
spring-disk tillage system to produce the C-C-B-C-B rotation 
at the three discount rates of three, five, and ten per­
cent. However, straight-row cultivation is found to be 
exclusively used only in the ten percent solution. In the 
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three percent solution, contour cultivation is used exclusively 
in all years in the fifty year period. In the five percent 
solution, straight-row cultivation is used in the first ten 
years but beginning in the eleventh year and continuing 
until the fiftieth, 948 acres are managed with contour 
cultivation with the remainder managed with straight-row 
cultivation. These results indicate that despite the 
greater degree of conservation of soil depth imposed by 
the imposition of the ban, at discount rates of three and 
five percent, there remains sufficient incentive to save 
soil for use in future years to lead to the choice of less 
profitable but more conserving crop production activities. 
At the ten percent discount rate, however, the incentive 
to conserve is not sufficient to lead to conservation beyond 
that imposed by the ban. The restriction results in approxi­
mately one-half inch of soil saved at the three percent dis­
count rate and approximately two inches of soil saved at the 
five and ten percent discount rate. 
Contour cultivation restrictions 
The imposition of a restriction that crop production 
utilize contour cultivation on Group III soils will have no 
impact on the production plan at the three percent discount 
rate since this method is voluntarily utilized as indicated 
in the baseline solution. At the five and ten percent 
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discount rates, a policy requiring contour cultivation on 
Group III soils will yield the same results with respect 
to rotation and tillage system as that obtained in the 
three percent baseline solution. Consequently, there will 
be a significant increase in the conservation of soil depth 
relative to the five and ten percent baseline solutions. 
That moldboard tillage is not chosen in the five percent 
solution, and particularly in the ten percent solution is 
of interest. It has been previously noted, that this activity 
is more profitable on a per acre basis and it is clear that 
the contour restriction results in greater conservation at 
the five and ten percent discount rates than would be chosen 
by private planner in the unrestricted case. That it is 
not chosen indicates that the incentive to conserve for 
production in future periods still outweighs the gains from 
maximizing current profits despite the imposition of greater 
soil conservation by the policy. The moldboard tillage 
system option will be chosen for use in producing the 
C-C-B-C-B rotation on Group II soils when the contour culti­
vation restriction is imposed since this is the most 
profitable crop production activity available. 
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Fall tillage bans and contour cultivation restrictions 
A policy which simultaneously bans the use of fall 
tillage and requires the use of contour cultivation will 
at any of the three discount rates result in the selection 
of a spring-disk tillage system to produce a C-C-B-C-B 
rotation regardless of whether it is applicable to Group 
II or Group III. The degree of soil depth conservation 
resulting from the imposition of this policy measure is 
considerable, particularly in comparison to the five and 
ten percent baseline solutions, as the loss of soil depth 
resulting over the fifty year period is just slightly more 
than four inches in Group III. 
Fall tillage bans and terrace restrictions 
If row-crop production is restricted to terraced land 
on Group III soils the model indicates the selection of a 
fall moldboard tillage system for use in all periods at 
all three discount rates in the production of C-C-B-C-B 
rotation. The degree of soil conservation imposed is 
again, then, such that the activity which maximizes annual 
profits is chosen for use. Slightly more than four inches 
of soil loss occur by the fiftieth year. With the further 
requirement of spring tillage the spring-disk tillage system 
is chosen and as a consequence, little more than two inches 
of soil loss occurs by the end of the tenth period. 
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Evaluation of the technical restrictions 
Ideally the various restrictions and possible combina­
tions of them would be economically evaluated on the basis 
of the net present value of the resulting abatement benefits. 
There is, however, insufficient information to permit such 
an evaluation and consequently an alternaive method for 
comparison is required. In Tables 5.14, 5.16, 5.17, and 
5.18 the cumulative reduction in erosion during the fifty 
year period, the reduction in the net present value of 
the fifty year cash flow less the present value of the change 
in the penalty function, and the cost per ton of the reduc­
tion in cumulative erosion are listed for the alternative 
restrictions and soil management groups. The first of 
these permits consideration of the effectiveness of the 
restriction in controlling erosion and the second permits 
consideration of the costs in terms of the forgone present 
value of watershed production. The cost per ton figure 
permits a comparison of the total costs of the restrictions 
relative to the cumulative control resulting. 
Table 5.14 presents the results for bans on fall 
tillage. At all three discount rates the greatest abate­
ment is obtained by imposing the ban on soils in Group 
III and the least is obtained by imposing the constraint 
on use of soils in Group I. .These results arise because 
the soils in Group II are more erosive than those of Group 
Table 5.14. Fall tillage restrictions 
Group Reduction Reduction in Average Cost 
(discount in net cumulative annual per 
rate) present value erosion (tons) erosion (tons/acre) ton 
I (3%) $448,913 97,982 1.55 $4.58 
II (3%) 723,220 585,398 5.34 1.24 
III (3%) 438,867 679,023 16.50 0.64 
I (5%) 318,583 97,982 1.55 3.25 
II (5%) 513,221 585,398 5.34 0.88 
III (5%) 430,390 1,254,960 28.00 0.34 
I (10%) 172,984 97,982 1.55 1.76 
II (10%) 278,666 585,998 5.34 0.47 
III (10%) 226,882 1,316,382 30.50 0.17 
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I and those in Group III are more erosive than those in Group 
II and because the acreage in Group III exceeds that of 
Group II which exceeds that of Group I. The total cost of 
a ban on fall tillage is greatest for Group II at all dis­
count rates but at the rates of five and ten percent the 
costs of the control for Group III soils exceed those of 
Group I, The cost per ton of abatement are least at all 
three discount rates for soils in Group III and greatest 
for soils in Group I. 
Table 5.15 presents the results for the bans on 
straight-row cultivation. This ban will have no effect 
upon the use of soils in Group III at the three percent 
discount rate since this practice is chosen voluntarily by 
the unrestricted planner in the baseline.solution. At the 
five and ten percent discount rates the ban will yield greater 
cumulative control with lower total costs and lower costs 
per ton when placed on the more erosive soils in Group 
III than when imposed upon the soils in Group II. Table 
5.16 presents the results for simultaneously imposing a ban 
on straight-row cultivation and a ban on fall tillage. 
The remarks concerning the ban on straight-row cultivation 
alone apply here except that at the three percent discount 
rate the measure will lead to a reduction in cumulative 
erosion relative to the baseline solution. However, the level 
Table 5.15. Contour cultivation restrictions 
Group 
(discount 
rate) 
Reduction 
in net 
present value 
Reduction in Average Cost 
cumulative annual per 
erosion (tons) erosion (tons/acre) ton 
II (3%) 
III (3%) 
$398,328 
0 
826,573 
0 
4.24 
19.53 
$0.48 
II (5%) 
III (5%) 
285,209 
44,762 
826,573 
3,146,689 
4.24 
19.53 
0.35 
0.01 
II (10%) 
III (10%) 
157,803 
142,130 
826,573 
3,146,689 
4.24 
19.53 
0.19 
0.05 
Table 5.16. Contour cultivation and fall tillage restrictions 
Group 
(discount 
rate) 
Reduction 
in net 
present value 
Reduction in 
cumulative 
erosion (tons) 
Average 
annual 
erosion (tons/acre) 
Cost 
per 
ton 
I (3%) $1,084,047 1,135,715 2.83 $0.95 
II (3%) 443,138 681,916 16.50 0.65 
I (5%) 770,576 1,135,715 2.83 0.68 
II (5%) 434,336 3,832,805 16.50 0.11 
I (10%) 420,434 1,135,715 2.83 0.37 
II (10%) 310,520 4,453,709 16.50 0.07 
190 
of control is less than that obtained on soils in Group II 
by imposition of the same restrictions although it does 
come at a lower total cost and a lower cost per ton. 
Comparing the data given in Tables 5.14 and 5.15, it is 
clear that a ban on straight-row cultivation generally 
dominates a ban on fall tillage for Group II and Group III 
since in all but the three percent case for the third group, 
the degree of control achieved by the former exceeds that 
of the latter while the costs of the former are less than 
those of the latter. Comparing the results given in Tables 
5.14, 5.15, and 5.16 it is observed that the simultaneous 
bans on fall tillage and straight row cultivation will yield 
a greater level of control at a higher cost than the 
individual restrictions yield for Groups II and III. How­
ever, the costs per ton are less than those of the restric­
tions on fall tillage but greater than those for the 
restrictions on straight-row cultivation. 
Table 5.17 presents the results for the requirement 
that row-crop production on soils in Group III be done on 
terraced acres. Table 5.18 presents the results when there is 
added to this restriction, an additional restriction that 
spring-tillage be used. The level of control afforded by 
these two measures exceed those considered above as do the 
total costs for Groups II and III. The costs per ton are also 
Table 5.17. Terrace restriction 
Discount 
rate 
Reduction 
in net 
present value 
Reduction in 
cumulative 
erosion (tons) 
Average 
annual 
erosion (tons/acre) 
Cost 
per 
ton 
3% 
5% 
10% 
$10,029,629 
7,488,496 
4,930,516 
072,673 
4,123,562 
4,744,462 
15.20 $10.31 
15.20 1.31 
15.20 1.04 
Table 5.18. Fall tillage and terrace restrictions 
^ Reduction Reduction in Average Cost 
Discount . ^ ^,in net cumulative annual per 
present value erosion (tons) erosion (tons/acre). ton 
3% $10,388,448 2,168,478 9.86 $4.79 
5% 7,716,652 5,319,367 9.86 1.45 
10% 5,124,062 5,940,267 9.86 0.80 
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in excess of those measures considered above except the 
ban on fall tillage on soils in Group I at the discount 
rates of five and ten percent. 
Based on the results presented above, some guidance 
to the efficient design of erosion control policy using 
technical restrictions is obtained. Consider the results 
for the three percent discount rate. The measure which 
yields the greatest degree of control at the lowest total 
cost and the lowest cost per ton is a ban on straight-
row cultivation on soils in Group II. Starting with this 
measure the public authority could achieve a cumulative 
control of 826,573 tons at a cost of $0.48 per ton. The 
measure which yields the next greatest level of cumulative 
control with the next lowest cost per ton is a ban on 
fall tillage on soils in Group III. A package of the two 
measure would yield a cumulative control of 1,505,569 tons at 
an average cost per ton of approximately $0.55 per ton. 
It is to be observed, then, that the public authority can 
obtain increasing levels of control by expanding the package 
of control measures. The cost of the package and the degree 
of control obtained will depend upon how it is composed. 
There will be, however, packages which dominate others be­
cause they yield greater levels of control at a flower; cost 
per ton and perhaps even at a lower total cost. 
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Comments on technical restrictions 
Only a limited number of possible technical restric­
tions have been considered here under a limiting set of 
assumptions and discount rates. The results demonstrate 
that increasing levels of erosion control can be obtained 
by imposing increasingly stringent restrictions on pro­
duction and that increased control levels will come at 
higher costs. It is also demonstrated that some packages 
of restrictions will dominate others. The results suggest 
that the effectiveness of restrictions will be greater on 
more erosive soils and that the costs per ton of abate­
ment will, be lower for these soils than for less erosive 
soils. Finally, it is suggested that across the board 
restrictions will generally be less efficient than control 
strategies in which restrictions are tailored for soils of 
specified types. 
The major alternatives to a control program in which 
"Best Management Practices" are imposed by directive is a 
program in which subsidies are given for utilization of 
control practices. There is a wide range of alternative 
subsidy programs for erosion control which can be envisioned 
and under present circumstances it is difficult to forsee 
the probable structure of such programs. This makes it 
difficult to analyze alternative programs since it is not 
clear what is to be subsidized and what the subsidy rates will 
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be. It can be said that any subsidy program which yields 
the same outcome as a program of technical restrictions 
will be no more efficient, however, and if the object of 
a subsidy program is to obtain the same results but in a 
more politically acceptable manner then there is no economic 
basis for choosing between the two approaches. 
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CHAPTER VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Introduction 
The purpose of this endeavor has been to contribute to 
the conceptual and applied economic analysis of issues in 
cropland erosion and erosion control for water quality im­
provement. The salience of these issues is established in 
Chapter II and it is observed in that chapter that these 
issues are particularly relevant in the Corn Belt states. 
The purpose of this brief chapter is to reiterate some of 
the more important points which have been developed in this 
investigation. 
Soil Management and Soil Erosion 
Chapter III considers soil conservation issues for 
individual soils and for groups of soils, and the conjunc­
tive management of soils and water quality. It is empha­
sized that the soil management problem is a dynamic problem 
in the conjunctive management of resource stocks, a 
point which has been explicitly recognized in few of the 
recent analyses of erosion control. It is further emphasized 
that the economic theory of natural resource extraction is 
applicable to the problem of erosion, and, in general, 
to the management of soils. Recent developments in 
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this theory which have been widely accepted for the analysis 
of problems in minerals extraction, fisheries, forestry, and 
other renewable and nonrenewable resources have, as yet, not 
been widely incorporated in the analysis of soil erosion 
problems. 
It is observed that the soil exploitation program 
chosen by the price-taking present value-maximizing 
economic agent will depend, given the physical circum­
stances in which production takes place, upon the incentives 
given by the market. The efficiency or optimality of the 
program from a societal standpoint thus depends upon the in­
formation provided the farmer by the market. If there are 
no market failures, it is to be concluded that the program 
yields the optimal state of conservation of the soil re­
source. Any deviation from that state, be it one of under-
conserving or overconserving will result in a real social 
loss. But, if markets do not operate to provide the "correct 
information," the program chosen by the farmer may result 
in either overconservation or underconservation relative to 
the socially optimal state. Market failure, due to lack of 
competition, is generally not to be considered of importance 
in soil resources conservation since agriculture is regarded 
as competitive. However, failure to obtain the optimal state 
of conservation as a consequence of the absence of futures 
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markets, risk markets, the presence of externalities and 
common property resources, and finally, the pervasive 
intervention of government in agriculture all warrant 
consideration and investigation. The issues involved are 
complex, particularly those arising as a consequence of 
the absence of futures and risk markets. In this analysis, 
consideration is limited to the implications of external 
water quality damages resulting from erosion in a water­
shed and to measures by which water quality improvements may 
be obtained. To the extent soil conservation is not opti­
mal, due to water quality damages, it will be the case 
that those policies which are designed to efficiently 
obtain environmental quality improvements will also 
result in appropriate levels of erosion, given that 
there are no other sources of failure. 
Comments on Cropland Erosion Control 
Policy 
The test for the existence of a market failure is 
whether, given the distribution of welfare, there exists a 
reallocation of erosion levels over time that will result 
in a net increase in social welfare. However, to find that 
such a reallocation does exist is not sufficient to establish 
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the efficiency of government intervention. There may exist 
a variety of alternative measures ex ante by which potential 
Pareto improvements may be secured. The test for the 
desirability of government intervention on efficiency 
grounds is whether there exists a measure which, with 
its attendant resource costs, results in a net social gain. 
If there are several such measures, then the appropriate 
measure and the appropriate degree to which it is pursued, 
will depend upon the relative net gains of the alterna­
tives. 
The public policy measures found most frequently in 
the economic literature for obtaining improvements in 
resource allocation when misallocation is a consequence 
of technological externalities are Pigovian taxes, pollu­
tion abatement subsidies, pollution rights markets, and 
residuals restrictions or regulations. In a world of 
perfect information in which there are no direct resource 
costs associated with policy measures, any policy approach 
which yields the same allocation of resources that is 
obtained by a Pigovian tax policy is as efficient. In 
such a world there exists no economic basis for choosing 
among those policies which yield the efficient solution. 
The set of efficient policies will, of course, only be 
some subset of the set of all possible erosion control 
policies. 
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There is virtually no question that many of the poli­
cies emphasized to date would not be included in this 
subset since, as with the thrust of environmental quality 
policy on the whole in the nation, these approaches 
generally stress the use of control technologies with little 
consideration of the costs and benefits incurred. Further, 
the discussion of erosion control policy in Chapter III 
stresses that the efficient achievement of water quality 
improvements by reducing sediment flows will entail some 
mix of onsite erosion control measures, offsite sediment 
delivery control measures, and perhaps further offsite 
measures directed towards enhancing the assimilative 
capacity of surface water resources. Yet current delibera­
tions focus almost exclusively on obtaining water quality 
improvements by onsite erosion control measures. 
It is also observed in Chapter III that there are 
several areas requiring detailed investigation necessary to 
the design and implementation of efficient erosion control 
policies. These include research relating to the generation, 
transportation and damage costs of sediments, the costs of 
offsite control measures and onsite control measures, and 
the information, administration, and enforcement costs of 
alternative policy measures. One issue of particular 
concern is the inability to accurately monitor erosion 
flows and sediment contributions from particular economic 
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entities. Those policies which are generally most 
favored on efficiency grounds by economists in­
volve the measurement of residuals flows. Such policy 
measures include Pigovian taxes and pollution rights 
markets. This problem, assuming that it is somehow known 
to be socially desirable to reduce erosion levels, gives 
some basis for considering subsidies to utilize control 
practices and construct control structures, to impose 
technical specifications on production, or to provide 
programs in which farmers are made to make payments to the 
public authority which are placed in deposit and returnable 
to the operator upon proof of meeting specified performance 
standards. 
The Empirical Analysis 
There has been considerable support of applied research 
in the area of soil erosion control. There are several com­
mon traits in such studies. One is that these studies 
largely focus on the impacts of alternative public policies 
for controlling soil erosion, on the predicted level of 
erosion, on crop and livestock production, and on farm prices 
and/or income. A second common trait of such studies is that 
they are performed within the framework of static linear pro­
gramming models which have evolved to have relatively 
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standardized structures in terms of the types of activi­
ties and constraints included. A problem with static 
models is, however, that the failure to incorporate 
the effect of erosion on future soil productivity can result 
in misleading results concerning the effects of policy meas­
ures. The contribution which this research endeavors to 
provide centers to a large extent on the treatment of the 
soil management problem in a dynamic setting. There have 
been a few previous studies involving dynamic analysis of 
soil management but these have been quite limited in their 
consideration of the impacts of erosion control policy 
measures. 
Chapter IV presents the multi-period linear programming 
model of crop production developed to investigate economic 
issues in cropland erosion and erosion control in the Four 
Mile Creek watershed. In order to facilitate the derivation 
of inferences of interest to this research, soils in the 
watershed are classified by management characteristics into 
four relatively homogeneous groups. Submodels are developed 
for each group and combined to obtain the watershed model. 
The soils in two of these (Group I and Group II) manage­
ment groups either have no erosion hazard or have negligible 
erosion hazards and relatively deep topsoils. It is argued 
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that these soils have very small user costs. The submodels 
developed for these two groups are comparable in structure 
to many of the previous models developed. The soils in a 
third management group (Group III) are relatively shallow 
and have relatively high erosion hazards. It is expected 
that the quality of these soils has been effected by 
erosion. It is also expected that further yield losses 
and increases in the erosivity of these soils will occur 
with soil loss. A multiperiod model of crop production is 
required for the analysis of this group of soils. The Group 
III submodel is constructed in a manner which incorporates 
the effects of soil loss on future productive capacity 
and erosivity of the soils in the group. The model is 
formulated in a manner more analogous to the exploitation 
of multiple grades of a resource than to a pure stock 
effects model. The soils included in the final group 
(Group IV) are steep, shallow, highly erosive, and unpro­
ductive. At present, agreages in the group are mostly 
used for permanent pasture because they are unsuitable for 
row crop production. In modelling the watershed, it is 
assumed that the entire acreage of the group is allocated 
to pasture. 
The criterion function of the model is the present 
value of the cash flow from production activities for a 
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period of fifty years less the present value of a penalty 
function and other adjustments. The formulation allows an 
investigation of the first fifty years of the crop produc­
tion plan that would be developed by an unspecified 
private economic planner charged with maximizing the net 
present value of production in the entire watershed. In 
developing the model prices and technology are assumed 
invariant. 
The model is first solved at discount rates of three, 
five, and ten percent without modification for policy 
alternatives. These baseline solutions allow a considera­
tion of the production plan that would be developed by 
the planner. A range of discount rates is chosen to 
provide for analysis of the impacts of alternative dis­
count rates on the production plan. The rates are con­
sidered to be real rates and the range provided does permit 
important inferences to be made. Despite the relatively 
modest yield losses associated with soil loss in the 
area, it is found that even at the ten percent discount 
rate the incentives to conserve soil are strong enough to 
lead the present value maximizing private economic planner 
to choose crop management practices other than those which 
maximize current returns. Total erosion in the model is 
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constrained, but only to the total amount of erosion that 
could occur if the most erosive of crop practices is chosen 
in all periods. However, in none of the solutions for 
Group III is this practice chosen despite it's being the 
most profitable on a per acre basis in any year. Conse­
quently, in none of the solutions is the total available 
soil depth exhausted. 
The trend in erosion in all three solutions is upwards 
over time. This movement may be attributed to the effects 
on soil loss on soil erosivity since in no solution is there 
a movement towards more erosive crop management practices 
over time. Indeed, in the one solution in which there are 
changes in crop management practices during the period the 
movement is towards more conserving management practices. 
Given constant product and factor prices, and given no 
technological change, a trend towards the greater utilization 
of conservation practices is consistent with the propositions 
of the theory of exhaustible resource management. 
The results have two important implications for the 
empirical analysis of cropland erosion. It is demonstrated 
that if the soils in Group III were treated equivalently to 
those in Group I and Group II, the model would overestimate 
the amount of erosion occurring in each year and the present 
value of production for the fifty year period. Further, no 
indication of the time path of erosion would be provided. 
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The next set of results considered are obtained by 
solving the model at the three discount rates with annual 
erosion taxes of $0.50, $1.00, $1.50, $2.00, $2.50, and $3.00 
per ton. These solutions can be considered in either of 
two ways. If it is assumed that these are the marginal 
damage costs in an optimal solution, then the results may 
be interpreted as the optimal solution for the watershed 
if it is further assumed that all other conditions for a 
particular Pareto optimum are otherwise satisfied. In such 
a solution, the taxes may be considered as optimal Pigovian 
taxes. Alternatively, no assumptions concerning the infor­
mation carried by the values may be made and the analysis 
viewed simply as an investigation of the effects of erosion 
taxes on the production program. The trend in erosion 
in all three solutions is again increasing over time. 
This can again be attributed to the increasing of the erosi-
vity of the soils in Group III with soil loss for the trend 
in use of conservation measures is generally upwards over 
time at the discount rate and tax rates considered. That the 
incentive to utilize conservation practices increases over 
time was noted above. However, in the tax solutions the 
incentive is further increased because the erosivity of the 
soils is increasing and thus because the potential tax 
base is increasing. 
207-208 
The last set of solutions investigated are obtained 
by solving the model with modifications for alternative 
policy options, which are considered as viable options 
under present circumstances. Where monitoring of residual 
flows is infeasible, realistic policy options for 
environmental quality management generally entail either 
technical specifications or subsidies for the use of 
control practices. This investigation considers some 
potential technical restrictions. The results demonstrate 
that increasing levels of erosion control can be obtained 
by imposing increasingly stringent restrictions on production 
and that increased control levels will come at higher 
costs. It is also demonstrated that some packages of 
restrictions will dominate others. The results suggest 
that the effectiveness of restrictions will generally be 
greater on more erosive soils and that the costs per ton 
of abatement will be lower for these soils than for less 
erosive soils. Finally, it is suggested that across-the-
board restriction will generally be less efficient than 
control strategies in which restrictions are tailored 
for soils of specified types. 
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